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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The long association of the people of the United States with
the people of Puerto Rico began almost as an afterthought.

Spain al-

ready had made peace overtures in Washington before Major General Nelson A. Miles landed American troops on Puerto Rico's south coast on
July 25, 1898.

There was little fighting, and the Puerto Ricans gen-

erally extended a friendly welcome to the invaders.

Eugenio Marla de

Host6s y Bonilla, the island's foremost intellectual, commented that
his land had not been conquered.

It had merrily saluted its 1 ibera-

tors because the conquerors were believed to be liberators. 1
General Miles encouraged this interpretation of the landing.
His proclamation to the islanders, issued from Ponce on July 28, 1898,
included the statement:
We have not come to make war upon the people of a country that
for centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to
bring you protection not only to yourselves but to your property, to promote your prosperity and to bestow upon you the
immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our
Government.2
·
lEugenio M. de Hostos y Bonilla, Obras completas, vol. 4: Cartas, 20 vols. (Habana: Cultural S. A., 1939), p. 212.
2L. Munoz Rivera, C. Coll Cuch!, and E. Benitez Castano, 11 To
the Congress of the United States," in William A. Jones Papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va., Box 89, p. 5 (hereafter cited as Jones Papers).

2

The well-intentioned proclamation of General Miles would echo back
somewhat bitterly to the Puerto Ricans in later years.

An even

greater cause of bitterness would be the divergence between the
amount of local autonomy exercised by the islanders at the time of
the North American landing and that allowed them by the new administration.
Puerto Rico, like Cuba, had suffered the fluctuations in colonial pol icy emanating from Madrid during the nineteenth century as
the political pendulum there swung back and forth between 1 iberal and
conservative governments.

Apart from the short-1 ived Grito de Lares

in 1868, Puerto Rico had not been given to rebel] ion against Spain.
Not even the repression and tortures inf I icted by Governor-General
Romualdo Palacios in 1887 caused revolt.

There are many explanations

for Puerto Rico's role as the "Ever Faithful Isle."

Among the most

frequently expressed are the pacific temperament of the Puerto Rican
and the relative Jack of previous bitter experiences that left Cuba
a fertile ground for rebel I ion.

The Puerto Rican press and political

leadership greeted the outbreak of war with a surge of loyalty to
Spain and the Latin race.3

It appears, however, that the Puerto

Rican separatists aiming for the complete independence of the island
from Spain were comparatively few in number,4 and their active
3Lidio Cruz Monclova, Luis Munoz Rivera; Los primeros 10 afios
de su vida politica (San Juan; Institute Cultura Puertorriquefia, 1959),
pp. 661-672.
4Edward J. Berbusse, S.J., The United States and Puerto Rico,
1898-1900 (Chapel Hill; The University of North Carolina Press, 1966),
p. 45.

3
role in the Cuban struggle may have siphoned off the potential leaders
of armed revolt in Puerto Rico.
The conservative political element in Puerto Rico was composed
of many Spaniards, while the majority opinion among the Puerto Ricans
seems to have been I iberal and reformist, but loyal to Spain.5

The

dual aims of this majority were greater participation and self-government for Puerto Rico within the Spanish political system and a reduction in limitations on trade, especially with the United States.

Des-

pite bitter factional disagreements within the ranks of the Puerto
Rican 1 iberals, which resulted in dizzying realignments of party names
and affiliations, the basic tenet that Puerto Rico could attain its
desired reforms from the Spanish national political parties was unshaken.6
In 1897, the Puerto Rican Autonomist party concluded an agreement with Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, the leader of the Liberal Monarchical party in Spain.

This agreement, largely engineered by Luis Munoz

Rivera, committed Sagasta to a reform program for Puerto Rico should
he and his party come to power in Spain.

The assasination of Conserva-

tive leader Antonio Canovas de! Castillo on August 8, 1897,

op~ned

the door to Sagasta, who returned to the Spanish ministry on October 4.
He was not slow to keep his promise to Puerto Rico.

An autonomous

6Gordon K. Lewis, Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribean (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963), p. 63.

4

charter, with his sanction, was secured by November 25, 1897.7
Puerto Ricans greeted the Autonomous Charter of 1897 with great
enthusiasm.

It provided a Governor-General appointed by the Queen, a

six-member cabinet, and a bicameral legislature.

The upper house of

the legislature was to consist of seven appointed by the governor and
eight elected members.

The lower house was elected.

given to all males over twenty-five years of age.

Suffrage was

The legislature was

restricted to local matters, but these included the budget, revenue,
tariffs, and the right to negotiate commercial treaties.
granted to the town councils.

Autonomy was

Governor-General Manuel Macias Casado

proclaimed the new form of government on February 9, 1898, and the
cabinet members took off ice on February 12,

The initial cabinet con-

sisted of members of both branches of the Puerto Rican Autonomist
party, which had split over the terms of the Sagasta agreement.

Brief-

ly they tried to work together to start out the new system with maximum success.8

Although the composition of the cabinet was to vary,

it was led for the entire period of the Charter's operation by Munoz.
The Insular Assembly was elected on March 27, 1898, with Munoz'
followers gaining twenty-six of the t hirty-two seats.
1

Because of the

war, however, the Assembly did not hold its first session until July
17.

In April, the Governor-General suspended some of the guarantees

of the Charter.9

It can be said that the Charter hardly functioned at

7Berbusse, p. 56.
81bid .• pp. 56-57.
91 bid' p. 58.
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all before General Miles' landing.

The major achievement that Munoz

could claim in these months was the reorganization of the taxation
system, primarily by eliminating taxes on fish, stamps, and licences,
which totaled about a million and a half dollars. 10

During the war

Puerto Rico faced a serious hunger problem; the government tried to
alleviate this situation, 11 but its continuance and its severity may
have contributed to the joy with which the poorer islanders greeted
General Miles.
Despite the lack of opportunity for the Autonomous Charter of
1897 to function, it was to represent a rallying point for Puerto Rican resentment of the American administration of their island.

It is

also true, as two widely different commentators note,12 that the Charter was granted by Spain under the pressure of revolt in Cuba and that
perhaps it would have been revoked as previous reforms had been.

In

the summer of 1898, however, the Puerto Ricans had no reason to suspect that their long sought autonomy under the new Charter offered
other than optimism for the future.

Despite the friendliness of their

welcome to the Americans, as Edward J. Berbusse 1 s excellent study
points out, the Puerto Ricans were torn between loyalty to Spain and
its traditions and the hope that an even better future might be theirs
with the political traditions and 'material advancement of the United
lOThomas Aitken, Jr., Poet in the Fortress: The Story of Luis
Munoz Marin (New York: New American Library, 1964), p. 32.
llserbusse, p. 64.
12Lewis, p. 65; Stephen Bonsal~ The American Mediterran~an (New
York: Moffat, Yard, & Co., 1912), p. 294.

6
States.

"The last shock came when Puerto Ricans realized that they

were to share in neither the privileges of the American Constitution
of 1789 nor in the Spanish Autonomous Charter of 1897. 11 13

That shock

came gradually over the next few years.
Military Government
Just as the invasion of Puerto Rico appeared to have been an
ill-planned last-minute venture, adequate instructions regarding the
goals of their administrations in the island were not given to General
Miles or his successors.

General Orders, No. 101, of 1898 was the

basis of the authority of the military government,
power to change existing laws.

It granted the

This power was used by the military

governors to change more than just the laws clearly conflicting with
the United States Constitution because they assumed that it was their
job to prepare Puerto Rico for territorial status.

The protocol

signed prepatory to the armistice did not provide further guidelines
for the military.

President William McKinley wanted to avoid any

restrictions on the freedom of action of the United States.

The proto-

col simply called for the immediate evacuation of Spanish troops.14
General Miles, who commanded the American forces in Puerto Rico
only from the landing on July 25 until August 14, 1898, allowed the
Puerto Rican courts and town councils

~o

function.

He insisted upon

13serbusse, pp. 65-66.
14wilfrid Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean Pol icy of the United
States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), pp.
102-103.
.
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submission to the military, especially because of the problem of banditry during his tenure.15

Miles and his successor, Major General

John R. Brooke, made important decisions in Puerto Rico in their efforts to deal with the immediate problems of American occupation.
Little resentment, however, was engendered during Miles' command or
the first part of Brooke's.

This was at least partly due to the fact

that North American silence, and perhaps uncertainty, about the future
of Puerto Rico led the islanders to expect the best.

One of the few

Puerto Ricans who immediately equated Miles' landing with annexation
was Eugenio Maria de Hostos y Bonilla.
On July 27, 1898, Hostos was writing that the Cubans would not
include Puerto Rico in their negotiations because they were convinced
that the United' States would annex the island.

As he was in Washington

at the time, Hostos tried to get a commitment from the United States,
but all he could get was a statement that the American government would
take the will of the islanders into account.

Hostos hoped that the

United States would not annex Puerto Rico without a plebiscite. 16

Long

a separatist, Hostos wanted an independent Puerto Rico and a federation
of the Spanish Antilles.

He organized a League of Puerto Rican Patri-

ots to secure the island's right to the self-determination of its destiny.

Most Puerto Ricans, however, reacted indifferently to Hostos'
15Berbusse, pp. 79-80.
l6Hostos, 4:197-198.
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urging that they must immediately scream very loudly for their rights
or they would not get justice. 17
Governor Macias Casado made the official announcement of the
cession of Puerto Rico to the United States on September 29, 1898. 18
Major General Brooke then took over the official governorship of the
island with the withdrawal of the last Spanish forces on October 18,
1898.

It was during his tenure as governor, which ended on December 9,

1898, that several controversial measures were taken.

On the credit

side of the ledger, General Brooke thought it important to keep the
Spanish legal system in order to prevent the chaos that would come with
too rapid change, and, generally, he respected the Puerto Rican cabinet
headed by Munoz Rivera.

However, Brooke abolished the legislature,

which had been established under the Autonomous Charter, on November
29, 1898, because he thought it unnecessary.

It was during his gover-

norship that the name of Puerto Rico was arbitrarily Anglicized as Porto Rico.

When the schools reopened in November, English was an impor-

tant part of the curriculum.

Because he believed that accused persons

were intimidating the courts so that few convictions were made, Brooke
on December 8 set up a special military court, which Berbusse compares
with the efficient Tudor Star Chamber. 19
Meanwhile, the terms of the Treaty of Paris were being worked
out.

The Spanish Commissioners had written an article that would have

17vicente Geigel Polanco, El despertar de un pueblo (San Juan:
Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriquenos, 1942), pp. 67, 69.
18Berbusse, p. 65.
191 bid. , pp. 81 -84.
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given all inhabitants of ceded territory American citizenship with the
option of retaining Spanish citizenship.

The American Commissioners

had been advised on November 20 that President McKinley was concerned
that citizenship not be extended to native uncivilized tribes in the
Philippines.

Apparently, Puerto Rico was included by the Commissioners

in the same category. 20

The provision of the Treaty of Paris relative

to citizenship allowed the option to retain Spanish allegiance, but
the citizenship of the "native inhabitants" of ceded territory was to
be determined by the United States Congress.

Freedom of religion was

the only guarantee written into the Treaty of Paris.

Congress would

decide the political status and civil rights of the Puerto Ricans.

No

promise was given for citizenship or statehood although such commitments had been made by the United States for newly acquired lands in
the past.21

In their memorandum of December 9, 1898, justifying these

provisions, the Commissioners said that Congress "surely could be
trusted not to depart from its well-established practice in dealing
with the inhabitants of these islands, 11 since Congress had never passed
an oppressive or detrimental law.22

During the Senate debates on the

on the Treaty, some Senators spoke for the independence of the islands
20Delores Muniz, "Puerto Rico Under the Administration of Governor Yager, 1913-1921 11 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan,
1945), pp. 222-224.
2 \yman Jay Gould, "The Foraker Act: The Roots of American Colonial Pol icy 11 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958), pp.
3-4.
22 Quoted in Bolivar Pagan, Puerto Rico: The Next State (Washington, D. C., n. p., 1942), pp. 10-20.
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and against colonial ism, but apparently the majority agreed with Senator Orville Platt that the islanders had whatever rights the Congress
might choose to give them,23
With the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in April 1899, it
was clear that the United States Congress would decide the future of
Puerto Rico,
year.

bu~

no legislation regarding the island was passed that

The last two military governors operated without knowing what

the disposition of the Congress was to be.

Their lack of instructions

can be partly explained by the almost total lack of information about
Puerto Rico in the United States.

Even the War and Navy Departments,

well informed on Cuba, had only obsolete maps and harbor charts; 2 4
Henry K. Carroll, chosen for the task by McKinley in December, conducted the first serious survey of conditions in the island, but this
was not published until late in 1899,25

These problems were compli-

cated by the fact that, after the Treaty had been ratified, the military governors operated on tenuous legal grounds, especially when legislating by decree.26
Replacing General Brooke in December was Major General Guy V.
Henry, who was the military governor only until May 9, 1899, when he
was recalled at his own request.

His six months in office saw a sharp

23u. S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record 32:287-297, 502.
24Trumball White, Puerto Rico and Its People (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1938), p. 23.
25Henry K. Carroll, Report on the Island of Porto Rico (Washington, D. C.: Superintendent of Documents, 1899).
26 Gauld, p. 58 .
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increase in friction between the military administration and the Puerto Ricans.

One of Henry's first acts was his .refusal to accept the

resignations of the members of the Insular Cabinet.

The good impres-

sion created by this gesture was negated by Henry's tactlessness.27
During his first month in office, Henry was involved in a full-scale
battle with the island press, which had antagonized him by criticizing
continued military rule.28

La Democracia, Munoz Rivera's paper, was

brought before a civil court, but other papers were fined or suppressed by military order.29

The suppression of a paper in Ponce

prompted Hostos and Rosendo Matienzo Cintron to write to Henry reminding him that freedom of the press was a sacred principle of the
United States Constitution,30

Henry had to deal with rumors in March

1899 that there was to be an insurrection led by Munoz Rivera with the
aid of Cuban troops.31

In April, Henry ordered direct military con-

trol of Puerto Rican periodicals, but he eased this control before
his departure from the island,32
Although Henry would not allow American lawyers to practice
27Berbusse, pp. 88-89.
28 1bid., pp. 89-90.
291bid., p. 94.
30Hostos, 4:204.
31cables between Henry and Adjutant General, March 1899, War
Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350, National Archives, Washington, D. C., File 1338 (hereafter cited as BIA).
32Berbusse, pp. 95-96.
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in Puerto Rico because they had no knowledge of Spanish law, he abolished laws he did not 1 ike with the same lack of knowledge,33

Henry

also abolished the Insular Cabinet which he viewed as opposed to progress and American principles.

The secretaries, including Munoz Rive-

ra, resigned and asked for a legislature representative of the Puerto
Rican people.

Henry denied this request as premature.34

Hostos at-

tributed the growing criticism and discontent in the Spring of 1899
to the islanders' disappointment at not having received the expected
civil government.35

This grievance was aggravated by a continuing

crescendo of antagonism between Henry, Munoz Rivera and his followers,
and the political opposition

11

'
Puros," who would
soon organize the

Republican party and whose members filled the dependent secretariat
created by Henry in February 1899.36
The Puerto Rican Republican party was organized in April 1899
with Gabriel Ferrer Hernandez as its president.
real leader was Jose Celso Barbosa.

Soon to emerge as its

Other leading members included

Federico Degetau y Gonzalez, Cayetano Coll y Toste, and Rosendo Matienzo Cintron.

With ultimate statehood for Puerto Rico as their goal,

the Republicans favored cooperation with the military government and
Americanization, including the teaching of English in the island's
331bid., p. 120.
341bid., pp. 91-92.
35Hostos, 4:214.
36serbusse, pp. 92 and 95.
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schools.37

When Munoz Rivera reorganized the Autonomists as the Fe-

deral party in October 1899, its program also included eventual statehood.38

Munoz would be criticized later for the "opportunistic" es-

pousal of statehood in 1899,

As one defender states, this was probaI

bly done to aid in bargaining with the North Americans for more autonomy.39

Luis Munoz Marin argued that his father never wanted statehood,

but that in 1899 the Puerto Ricans generally assumed that the American
Congress would make the island a territory and, eventually, a state,40
The last military governor of Puerto Rico was Brigadier General
George W. Davis, who served for almost a year.
island's government.

Davis reorganized the

He created the office of Civil Secretary to head

the government in May 1899 and gave this job to Cayetano Coll y Toste.41

General Davis tried to give both parties representation in the

three bureaus under Coll.

He wanted to choose for merit, not party,

but he was criticized both because there were more Republicans than
Autonomists chosen and because heterogeneous councils had failed to
work under both Macias and Henry. 42

Davis also tried to put local

37Angel Manuel Mergal Llera, Federico Dezetau: un orientador
de su pueblo (New York: Hispanic Institute, 194 ), p. 166,
38Lewi s, p. 106.
39Aitken, p. 38.
40Luis Munoz Marin, Del tiempo de Munoz Rivera a nuestro tiempo:
lo gue ha mejorado; lo gue no ha mejorado (Puerto Rico: Editorial del
Departamento de lnstruccion Publ ica, 1956), p. 17.
41Juan Angel Silen, We, the Puerto Rican Peo le: A Stor of
Oppression and Resistance, trans. Cedric Belfrage New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1971), pp. 55-56.
42serbusse, pp. 106 and 247.
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government on an election basis.

Municipal elections were held in

1899 and 1900, but Davis felt that the alcaldes were domineering and
that only the presence of troops had prevented bloodshed during the
elections.43
General Davis thought that the Puerto Rican courts were corrupt
and inefficient.

He set up provisional courts of three justices to

handle cases that would go before the Circuit Courts in the United
States.

In July 1899, he gave military commanders the authority to

act as court commissioners for these provisional courts.

The mili-

tary were to enforce laws against conspiracy and filibustering.

Davis

restated the principle that the press was punishable for bringing the
government into the disaffection of the people.44

During his admin-

istration there was one brief incident that got out of control.

Davis

complained to Elihu Root on April 5, 1900, that restless groups backed
by Spanish sympathizers were making it difficult to maintain order.45
The next day he cabled the War Department saying that his troops had
been brought into the city to reinforce the San Juan pol ice because
of Puerto Rican attacks on resident blacks from the English Caribbean.
Two people were killed in this disturbance.46
Although Davis believed that the Puerto Ricans were not ready
43william F. Willoughby, 11 Municipal Government in Porto Rico, 11
Political Science Quarterly 24 (September 1909) :417.
44Berbusse, pp. 98-100.
45callcott, p. 168.
46Davis to Bureau of Insular Affairs, 6 April 1900, BIA 1599.
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for self-government, primarily because of the illiteracy of the majority and a heritage of bossism, he felt that it was his duty to implement changes that would hasten readiness for local autonomy.47

Davis

adhered to the principle that law should be made and enforced by the
people themselves.

He expected that the island would soon become a

territory in accordance with previous practice when the United States
acquired new territory. 48

Perhaps as much as any governor, military

or civilian, appointed from the North American mainland for Puerto
Rico, Brigidier General Davis had both sympathy and insight in his
dealings with the Puerto Ricans.
In one area in particular, General Davis' sympathy served the
island well.

That area was economic.

Davis attested to the poverty

of the people both before and after the hurricane, San Ciriaco, of
August 1899.

The hurricane killed nearly three-thousand persons; it

destroyed the food supply and eighty per cent of the coffee crop which
would have been worth $7,000,000.49

Davis organized the relief of

the island and pleaded, successfully, with the War Department for
immediate supplies and money.50

Even before San Ciriaco, Puerto Rico's

economy was seriously hurt by the change of sovereignty.

The island

47aerbusse, pp. 101, 105-106.
48Arturo Morales Carrion, "The Historical Roots and Political
Significance of Puerto Rico," in The Caribbean: British, Dutch, French
and United States, ed. A. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 1958), p. 142.
49Berbusse, pp. 103-104.
501bid., pp. 104-105.
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lost markets and gained 1 ittle, since American tartffs applied.

Al-

ready in 1898 Puerto Rico relied on imported food, and now imported
goods were more expensive.51

Davis would testify before the United

States Congress that Puerto Rico was not politically mature, but he
would back up the islanders pleas for special consideration under
the tariff and financial administration that Congress would impose.
In evaluating the military government of Puerto Rico, it can
be seen that it tried, wisely, to operate within the general outlines
of the political and legal system left by Spain.

The military gover-

nors, especially Davis, tried to receive both advice and cooperation
from the islanders.

Without instructions from Congress, the military

adopted the modus operandi assumption that they were to prepare Puerto
Rico for territorial status and remove aspects of the Spanish system
that were in conflict with the Constitution.52

The period of military

government served as a transitional time during which Puerto Ricans
and Americans were introduced to each other and exchanged information
about each other.53

In the areas of education, pub I ic health and sani-

tation the military worked diligently to improve conditions in Puerto
Rico.

Their only great fault was the occasional lack of tact and the

sometimes unquestioning belief that all things American were superior
to all things Puerto Rican.54
511bid., pp. 131-132.
52Gould, pp. 58-59.
531bid.' pp. 63-64.
54Berbusse, pp. 109-110.

~··
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The Foraker Act
While on the island the Americans and Puerto Ricans were getting to know one another, the fate of Puerto Rico was being decided
in Washington.

On the executive side of the American government, the

man in charge of that fate was Elihu Root.

He had been persuaded to

accept the post of Secretary of War when he was told that the job included the task of setting up governments for the new territories acquired in the Spanish-Cuban-American War.55

Although he never favored

either citizenship or statehood for Puerto Rico, Root was concerned
that the United States fulfill a moral obligation to treat its dependencies in accordance with principles of justice, freedom, and opportunity.56

Despite this belief, Munoz Rivera's request for an elected

Puerto Rican council to cooperate with the military government and
handle non-military affairs was not acted upon.57

The outlines of the

features of government that would become embodied in the Foraker Act
were suggested by Elihu Root.58
Puerto Rican leaders, of course, attempted to influence their
destiny through lobbying in Washington.

The tactic suggested by Hos-

tos to his fellow separatists, Manuel Zeno Gandia and J. Julio Henna,
was to take their case to the American people and Congress, not President McKinley 1 and to work for a trfumph of antf-.expansionist public
55callcott, pp. 211-212,
56Gould, pp. 72-73.
57Munoz to Root, 14 August 1899, BIA 168/19.
58Gould, pp. 73-74.
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opinion.59

Munoz Rivera, and the sometimes-editor of his newspaper,

Mariano Abril, also tried to reach the American people through the
press and tried to talk to every Congressman and administration off icial who would hear them.

Abril concluded, however, that the only

news the North American papers usually printed about Puerto Rico dealt
with the factious political fights among the islanders and that American politicians were ignorant of and indifferent to Puerto Rico.60
The Puerto Ricans expressed varying points of view in regard to the
political future of their island, but American citizenship was usually
requested.

Everyone agreed that the island's sugar, coffee, and to-

bacco needed protection within the American tariff system.

They

stressed the wish for free trade between Puerto Rico and the United
States.

The islanders who would testify before Congressional hearings

in 1900 would pay more attention to economic than to political desires.
This was perhaps due, as Lyman Jay Gould suggests, to their confidence
that the Congress would be liberal in establishing Puerto Rico's pol it. l system. 61
1ca
President McKinley's message to the Congress on December 5,
1899, urged passage of legislation for Puerto Rico.

McKinley recom-

mended Root's idea of a mixed insular government of appointees, but
self-government on the municipal level.
59Hostos, 4:216, 243, 244.
60serbusse, p. 117.
61Gould, pp. 69-70.

He also urged free trade
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between the states and the island, which Root favored.62

On January

9, 1900, Joseph Benson Foraker, of Ohio, introduced his civil government bill in the Senate.

Ten days later, Sereno Payne introduced a

free trade bill into the House.

On February 8, the House Ways and

Means Committee returned a substitute bill levying 25 percent of the
Dingley tariff rates on trade between Puerto Rico and the mainland.
This bill passed the House on February 28 with a reduced rate of 15
percent.

When it reached the Senate, all but the enacting clause

was stricken from the House bill and Foraker's civil government bill
was attached with a 15 percent tariff .63

Four important provisions

of Foraker 1 s original bill were deleted: American citizenship for the
islanders, extension of the Constitution to Puerto Rico, one Puerto
Rican delegate in the Congress, and free trade.64
The Constitution and American citizenship were denied to Puerto
Rico because of the tariff. 65

At a rate of 15 percent of the Dingley

rates, the tariff was really too low to produce sufficient revenue
for the island's government.

In addition, the tariff was to cease

as soon as the Puerto Rican legislature enacted a local taxation
system, but at any rate it was to be in effect no longer than two
years, 66

Only two Senators opposed a grant of citizenship to the

62{bid,, pp, 74-75,

107~108.

63rbid,, pp. 39-40.
641bid., pp. 75-76.
65Morales Carrion, p. 143, and Calicott, pp. 166-167.
66Gould, pp. 44-45.
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Puerto Ricans on pol icy grounds.67

Debate in the Senate centered not

on the provisions of the governmental system to be established in the
island, but on constitutionality and the tariff.
Democrats, Populists, and a few Republicans attacked the Foraker bill as imperialistic, protection oriented, and trust backed.
They considered it a breach of good faith with Puerto Rico, especially
in view of General Miles' July 1898 Proclamation.68

They saw the Fora-

ker bill as a violation of American tradition and constitutional principles.

The Republican party, however, was the party of protection

and, more recently, the party of imperial ism.

The Republican leader-

ship was acutely aware of the Puerto Rican civil government bilt as a
precedent.69
As Gould convincingly argues, the precedent had to be estab1 ished not because protection against the products of Puerto Rico was
so necessary, nor because granting citizenship and the Constitution
to the Puerto Ricans was repugnant, but because of the Phil ippines.70
Senator Foraker wrote that the crops of Puerto Rico were not large
enough to hurt mainland producers, but those of the Philippines were.
The testing of Congressional ability to erect a tariff wall between
the mainland and the new islands was essential before the bill for the
67The two Senators opposed were Teller of Colorado and Spooner
of Wisconsin. Ibid., p. 78.
681 bid. , pp. 157-160.
691 bid. ' p. 119.
701bid., pp. 95-96.
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Philippines was drafted.

An "open door" in the Philippines could des-

troy the American tariff system.71

McKinley and Root had not seen the

Puerto Rican bill as a precedent for colonialism when they supported
free trade.

Ardent protectionists induced McKinley to change his mind

on the tariff, primarily because he saw party unity as crucial with
the Philippine question unsettled and an election coming up.

Several

dissident Republicans swung into 1 ine when McKinley changed his mind,
and this was important for the passage of the bi 11 in the Senate. 72
The Puerto Rican tariff was highly unpopular with the press and the
pub I ic, but the Republicans got it through because of the power structure of the Senate and because the bill was made a party measure~73
The roll cal 1 in the Senate showed forty votes for the Foraker bill,
thirty-one against, and sixteen not voting.74
The Foraker bi 11 returned to the House on Apr i I 4, 1900.

It

went to the Ways and Means Committee where Joseph G. Cannon pushed
its acceptance without alteration.
accept the bill as a party measure.

A Republican caucus decided to
The bill returned to the House

on April 10, and on April 11 a special rule to I imit debate to that
afternoon and to stop amendment or recommitment was introduced and
passed by a vote of 158 to 142.75

The roll call in the House showed

71J. B. Foraker, "The United States and Puerto Rico, 11 The North
American Review 170 (April 1900) :470-471.
72Gould, pp. 100, 109-lll.
73The power structure refers to the Aldrich, Allison, Platt,
Spooner alliance. Ibid., pp. 167-173.
7 4 1bid., p. 175.
751bid., pp. 81-83.
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161 voting for the Foraker bill, 153 against, five present, and twentysix not voting.76

President McKinley signed the Foraker Act the next

day, April 12, 1900.
Many members of the House of Representatives were bitter and
angry, both because they objected to the Foraker Act and because they
felt that their prerogatives had been violated.

One of the bitterest

critics was Representative William A. Jones, of Virginia.
only one to object to changing Puerto to Porto Rico.

He was the

He strongly

opposed the Executive Council as an oligarchy and thought it inconsistent to refuse to extend the Constitution to Puerto Rico and still insist that all officials there take an oath to support it.

As Jones

also pointed out, most Representatives were entirely ignorant of the
provisions of the bill because none of its government features had
been either read or debated before passage.77

This was true enough,

as evidenced by a letter from one Representative to Elihu Root almost
a month after the House passed the Foraker Act.

Noting that the is-

landers had been enfranchised according to laws and military orders
in effect in March 1900, the Representative, John H. Small, asked if
Root would send him a copy of the military orders.7 8
The civil government created for Puerto Rico by the Foraker
Act was headed by a governor appointed by the President, who also
76 Ibid. , p. l 78.
771bid., pp. 83-85.
78small to Root, 8 May 1900, BIA 1028/9.
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appointed the eleven members of the Executive Council.
of these were to be natives of the island.

At least five

Six members of the Execu-

tive Council were also heads of the executive departments of the government.
cans.

In practice, these six were almost invariably North Ameri-

The Legislative Assembly was elected by universal manhood suf-

frage, but the fact that the Executive Council formed the upper house
of the legislature and that it was dominated by Americans often frustrated the will of the elected representatives of the Puerto Rican
people.

The veto of the governor could be over-ridden by the legisla-

ture, but in most cases bills were vetoed by simply disappearing forever in the Executive Council.

In any case, the United States Congress

retained the right to annul any legislation of the Puerto Rican legislature, although it never did so.

The islanders could elect a Resident

Commissioner to represent their interests in Washington, but he had
neither voice nor vote in Congress.

The Judicial Branch of the gov-

ernment consisted of an insular Supreme Court appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
William F. Willoughby, who served in the Puerto Rican government for years, be! ieved the Foraker Act organized an island system
with almost complete autonomy and independence of the Washington government. 79

This is true enough.

The island's government was, however,

under the control of mainlanders appointed by the President.

On the

insular government level, Puerto Ricans had 1 ittle control, but they
79Willoughby, p. 410.
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had the opportunity to express their wishes through the thirty-five
delegates in the Legislative Assembly.BO

Willoughby believed that

the governmental system of the Foraker Act had been drafted with the
dual aims of efficfency and the largest possible self-government.
The islanders were granted relatively I ittle self-government in order
to avoid

11

all of the dangers of misrule and inefficiency that the ex-

perience of other Latin-American countries had demonstrated to be
present. 1181
The islanders had expected at least as much from the American
Congress as they had received in the Spanish Autonomous Charter.

They

disliked the Foraker Act and wanted reforms right from the time of its
passage.82

The Puerto Ricans saw the Foraker Act as unconstitutional

and as a violation of a trust. 83

Trumbull White was quite correct

that the Executive Council was the most hated feature of the Foraker
Act.

He was less than astute with his bland statement that only a

discontented element was critical of the Act, while generally

11

it was

an era of good feeling engendered by the manifest liberality of the
American scheme of government. 11 8 4
80Victor S. Clark, et al., Puerto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D. C.; Brookings 1.nstitution, 19302, p. 94.
8Jwillia.m F .. Willoughby, llThe Executive Council of Porto Rico, 11
American Political Science Review_ 1 (August 1907) ;561.
82Muniz, p. 142,
83Berbusse, p. 168.
84white, pp. 50 and 62.
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Puerto Ricans felt, I ike their leader of the post World War I I
era, that politically the Foraker Act did not correspond with the
ideal of government by the consent of the governed.
ever, it was beneficial to the island.85

Fiscally, how-

The tariff would end as

soon as Puerto Rico's budgetary needs were met by local legislation.
All revenues collected in the island were reserved for its own treasury.

Taxes on Puerto Rican goods collected in the states were re-

turned.

Economically, the Foraker Act was realistic and considerate

of the island's needs.86
The Foraker Act was to go into effect on May 1, 1900, but it
had been signed only on April 12.

There was not sufficient time for

President McKinley to fill all of the offices called for in the Act.
Senator Foraker sponsored a Congressional Joint Resolution to cover
the time gap necessary.

The House of Representatives took advantage

of this opportunity to amend the Act through the Joint Resolution
adopted May I, 1900.

The first of the two important amendments stipu-

lated that all railroad, street railway, telephone and telegraph franchises had to be approved by the President.87
Law was inserted.

Secondly, the 500 Acre

Section 3 of the Resolution provided that no corpo-

ration could engage in buying or selling real estate.

A corporation

85Luis Munoz Marin, Puerto Rico and United States Citizenship
(San Juan: Editorial de! Departamento de lnstrucci6n Pub! ica, 1957),
p. I I.

86Morales Carri5n, p. 144.
87Gould, pp. 85-86.
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could hold only as much land as was needed for the aim of its organization.

No corporation for agricultural purposes could own or manage

lands in excess of 500 acres.88

Motivating these amendments was the

desire to prevent the promoters and large numbers of American investors from exploiting the resources of the island.89
The Gould thesis says that the United States commited itself
to colonial ism with the passage of the Foraker Act and that Puerto
Rico became the laboratory for colonial ism because it was a precedent for the Philippines.

Another holds that the Foraker Act repre-

sented a compromise between the wish to end military rule and the
fact that there was no real pol icy as to the future status of Puerto
Rico.90

Puerto Rican government suffered for the confused policy of

the United States, which was in the hypocritical position of having
colonies but no colonial pol icy.91

One islander asserts that the wel-

come of the Puerto Ricans vanished into dreams of separation for many
years because of the governmental system established by the Foraker
Act and the manner in which it was administered.9 2

Truly the Foraker

Act did not provide the most auspicious political ambient for the
88Puerto Rico {Gobierno de), Departamento de! Trabajo, Legislac1on Social de Puerto Rico, comp. Vicente Geigel Polanco (San Juan:
Negociado de Pub! icaciones y Educaci6n Obrera, 1944), pp. 578-589.
89wiJloughby, "Executive Council," pp. 575-576.
90Morales Carrion, p. 144.
91Rexford Guy Tugwell, The Stricken Land (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1947), p. 70.
92Antonio Fern6s-lsern, "From Colony to Commonwealth," The
Annals 285 (January 1953) :19.
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confrontation of two proud cultures.

CHAPTER I I
CONFLICTS OF AMERICANIZATION
With the Treaty of Paris, the United States annexed a densely
populated island whose cultural and political traditions were homogeneous, but in sharp contrast to those of the North American.

Assimila-

tion or absorption could not be achieved as easily as they had been
with New Mexico, Texas or California.

This fact made American leaders

indecisive about the future of Puerto Rico.

Their lack of any clear-

cut pol icy made the problem of Americanization more complex.

It made

Americans hesitant and Puerto Ricans both more resistant and more
divided in their response to their new situation.
easily accomplished.

Conquest had been

It would be a more vexatious problem trying to

convert the Spanish guardian of the Caribbean into an American one.
The Foraker Act was a bitter disappointment to the aspirations
of most politically conscious Puerto Ricans, despite their desire for
the end of military government.

Congressional failure to grant Ameri-

can citizenship, the Constitution or broad local self-government was
taken to mean that Puerto Rico was not regarded as worthy of them, at
least for as long as the Puerto Ricans remained unchanged and proud
of their language, culture, and traditions.

The wounded pride of the

islanders was reflected in their defense of their Hispanic tradition

28
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against the tide of Americanization.

~~. ~

lengua

and~~

became focal points of friction between the islanders and their new
metropolis.

The three were emotion-packed symbols of Puerto Rican

identity.
Race, Language and Religion
Racism was an irritant to a double degree.

The Anglo-Saxon

American frequently had I ittle regard for the Latin-American or for
the black.

Many Puerto Ricans were both.

The census of November

1899 reported that 38.2 per cent of the island's 953,243 people were
11

Colored 11 meaning either mulatto or black. 1 Although island society

was sharply stratified on class lines, there was no color-line or
racial hatred.

As Jose Celso Barbosa, himself a black, pointed out,

in Puerto Rico

there was no color bar in public or political I ife.

He acknowledged that social discrimination did exist. 2
were aware of this.

Americans

For example, in 1909 the Acting Governor of Puer-

to Rico felt that he had to change the list of those invited to the
inauguration of the new governor because it had been prepared from
the politically-motivated suggestions of the alcaldes.

"To have

followed the list meant the introduction of considerable 'color• into
lLt, Col. J. P. Sanger, Inspector-General, director, Report on
the Census of Porto Rico, 1899 (Washington: Government Printing Office,

1900)' p. 56.
2Jose Celso Barbosa, La Obra de Jose Celso Barbosa, ed. Pilar
Barbosa de Rosario, vol. 3: Problema de razas, 6 vols. (San Juan:
lmprenta Venezuela, 1937), p. 31.

)
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the Inaugural Ball, which would have caused all the best families to
get up and leave, 11 3

Barbosa•s contention, however, that Puerto Rican

opinion had always opposed any legal discrimination or harassment
seems correct.
American concepts of race were applied to dealings with Puerto
Rico.

In advocating home rule for Puerto Rico, the island's first

North American Bishop, James H. Blenk, was careful to state that the
Puerto Ricans were Caucasian and not
Phil ippines.4

11

hybrid varieties" as in the

Bishop Blenk, who was born in Germany, served as Bishop

of Puerto Rico from 1899 to 1906.
however, saw in the islanders

11

The Attorney General of Puerto Rico,

The same want of individual initiative,

the same shiftlessness and lack of thrift, that are noticeable among
the negro population of our own South. 11

He added that discontent in

the island was due to the amount of Negro blood there because he felt
the Puerto Ricans had more independence and political power than even
hoped for from Spain.

Negroes, he thought, caused discontent because

of their attempts to seem as good as whites.5

Newly appointed to the

Federal Court of Puerto Rico by his friend, Woodrow Wilson, Judge Peter
J. Hamilton, a native of Alabama, advised that

11

The mixture of black

and white in Porto Rico threatens to create a race of mongrels of no
3G. Cabot Ward to Gen. Clarence R. Edwards, 3 November
BIA 295/55.

1909,

4The Daily Picayune, New Orleans, l April 1913, BIA 26429/8.
5wolcott H. Pitkin, Jr., to Felix Frankfurter, 21 January 1913,
BIA 26429/11.
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use to anyone, a race of Spanish-American talkers.

A governor from

the South, or with knowledge of Southern remedies for that trouble,
could, if a wise man, do much. 11 6
Southern remedies were known in the island.

An article en-

titled "How the race question is resolved in the country of liberty,"
reported the proud claim of Southern Pines, North Carolina, that there
was no race problem there; this was so because blacks were not allowed
to vote, do business or live in the town.7

Lynchings in the United

States were reported in the Puerto Rican press, which also noted the
first conviction in United States' history of a man on trial for having lynched a black.8

Stating that one-hundred and seven blacks and

eight whites had been lynched during the previous year,

~

Correspon-

dencia commented that despite this the Yankees continued calling themselves a civilized nation.9
In 1909, the Governor and Attorney General of Puerto Rico
wanted an executive ruling on citizenship.

They dreaded the upset

caused in the island by Congressional discussion.

In Congress,

Southerners were 1 ikely to become "inflammatory" about race when dis.
puerto R.1co. 10
cussing

One Puerto Rican flatly told William Jennings

6Hamilton to Wilson, 21 July 1913, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Wilson Papers).
7La Correspondencia, San Juan, 9 April 1900.
8 tbid., 8 April 1900, 9 August 1901, and 16 October 1901.
9tbid., 10 April 1901.
10Henry M. Hoyt 2d to Harry M. Hoyt, 22 December 1909, BIA 1286/

15.
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Bryan that American administrators of his island had been motivated
by race prejudice.11

Unflattering comparisons of North American

racial problems and attitudes with those of Puerto Rico have continuously served the arsenal of Puerto Rican nationalist polemics. l2
For example, one separatist claims that Puerto Rican blacks followed
Barbosa's Republican party because they were unaware of American
racism, but well acquainted with island conditions. 13

This claim

seems unwarranted because the island press did keep the Puerto Ricans
informed about racial strife on the mainland.
Barbosa was well aware of American racism but remained the
''Rock of Americanization. 11 14

Born into a humble family, he succeeded

in getting a medical degree from the University of Michigan.

He was

a member of the Executive Council from 1900 to 1917 and the undisputed leader of the Puerto Rican Republican party until his death in
1921.

Dr. Barbosa unswervingly advocated American citizenship, state-

hood, Americanization, and bilingualism.

As his biographer notes,

his stand on Americanization frequently resulted in his being considered a traitor both to his fellow Puerto Ricans and blacks.15

He

llG. O'Neill to Bryan, 10 April 1913, BIA 26429/with 7.
12 Jose Coll y Cuchi, El nacionalismo en Puerto Rico (San Juan:
Gil de Lamadrid Hermanos, 1923), p. 92; Jose Enamorado Cuesto, El imerial ismo an ui
la revolucion en el Caribe (San Juan: Editorial
Campos, 1936 , pp. 19 and 25.
13s i Jen, p. 53.
14 Barbosa, 2, Post Umbra, p. 229.
15Antonio S. Pedreira, Un hombre del pueblo: Jose Celso Barbosa
(San Juan: lmprenta Venezuela, 1937), p. 142.
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believed that Puerto Rico was tied to the United States by geography,
commerce, and history.

He saw Americanization as signifying democracy

and 1 iberty because Puerto Rico would receive these with statehood.
Americanization was necessary before statehood would be granted.16
Barbosa argued that Puerto Rico could retain all that was good in her
Spanish heritage while accepting what was good from the United States.
Care should be taken, of course, that the American racial problem not
be imported into the island.

Barbosa regarded the racism of the Ameri-

can South as the use of specific laws to destroy the spirit of the
Constitution.

He felt that most Americans supported the spirit of

democracy in the Constitution.
Rico.17

That was what he wanted for Puerto

Despite his contention that his political creed was founded

on reason while that of his adversaries was based on sentiment, some
of his writings suggest that his unshakable devotion to the brand of
American democracy he witnessed in Ann Arbor, Michigan, might be tied
to his dislike of Puerto Rico's "best famil ies, 11 whose sons he freely
called imbeciles.
The son of one such family was Barbosa 1 s opposite.

Vicente Bal-

bas Capo was to hispanidad what Dr. Barbosa was to Americanization.
Balbas edited the virulently anti-American Heraldo Espanol .18

He was

the first to renounce officially, and loudly, American citizenship
16sarbosa, 4, Orientando al pueblo, pp. 49, 54.
17tbid.' 3:35-36, 41.
18vicente Balbas Capo, Puerto Rico a los diez anos de americanizaci6n (San Juan: Tip. Heraldo Espanol, 1910).
Editorials from 1907.
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when it was granted in 1917.

Although he had been born in Puerto Rico,

Balbas was generally considered a Spaniard.
role in local politics.

He never assumed a leading

Therefore, the most rabid defender of Puerto

Rico's traditions was not the most influential.
Jose de Diego, poet, orator, and politician.

That role fell to

De Diego became the

leading spokesman for the Latin personality of the island.
American reaction to that Latin personality is stated openly
in the letters of Judge Hamilton to President Wilson.

Hamilton said

that the Puerto Ricans, like other Latin Americans, were "tenacious
of local customs, even when they are clearly inferior to the American.1119

He thought an American wardship over Haiti and Santo Domingo

like that over the Indian .tribes would be necessary because the Latin
respected power not law like the Anglo-Saxon.20

Puerto Rico would

be difficult to Americanize because the people held "entirely un-American11 Latin ideals. 21

When dancing at a ball stopped until the gover-

nor agreed to commute a murderer's sentence, Hamilton saw the incident as an example of Latin excitability, typically swayed by sentiment or force.22
savages.

Islanders felt the Americans regarded them as

Munoz Rivera said that 11 Entre las injurias que sufrimos,

ninguna mayor que la injuria de considerarnos inferiores y de actuar
l9Hamilton to Wilson, 25 November 1914, Wilson Papers.
20Hamilton to Wilson, 10 August 1915, Wilson Papers.
21 Hamil ton to Wilson, 19 February 1917, Wilson Papers.
22Hami 1ton to Wilson, 18 February 1915' Wilson Papers.
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como si fuesemos salvajes. 112 3 As Hamilton's comments show, the Puerto
Ricans who, like de Diego and Munoz Rivera, valued their Latin heritage were held to be un-American and enemies by many Americans.

The

fact that these enemies were the most important political leaders in
the island did not smooth the path of Americanization.
Rejecting permanent association of Puerto Rico with the United
States, de Diego, like Hostos before him and the founder of the National ist party, Jose Colly Cuchl, after him, sought the brotherhood
of the Latin American Republics and advocated a confederation of Puerto
Rico with Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

The separatist wing of

Munoz Rivera's party was ascendent under de Diego 1 s leadership between
1910 and 1915.

Campaigning in 1913, de Diego identified a vote for

the Union party with a vote for the preservation of the
tradiciones, costumbres, leyes, y fe. 11 24

11

raza, lengua,

Dr. Barbosa attributed the

success of the Union party in every election after 1904 to the force
of this appea1.25

To Balbas and de Diego the most heated issue in

the defense of hispanidad was

~

lengua.

The teaching of English in Puerto Rican schools, begun under
the administration of General Brooke, was seen by Americans and Puerto
Ricans, who agreed with Barbosa, as the essential touch-stone of Americanization.

English and Spanish were to be the official languages of

23Luis Munoz Marin, ed., Obras completas de Luis Munoz Rivera,
vol. 2: Campanas pollticas, 3 vols. (Madrid: Editorial Puerto Rico,
1925)' p. 26.
24Jose de Diego, Nuevas campanas (Barcelona: Sociedad General
de Publicaciones, 1916), p. 62.
25Barbosa, 4:56.
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of the island.

Bilingual ism was the official policy of the adminis-

tration of the island.

Enforcement of bi! ingualism, while most Puerto

Ricans spoke only Spanish, could cause embarrassing incidents.

For

example, in 1901, Andres Crosas voted against the passage of a municipal bond bill because it had been passed in the House of Delegates in
English, without translation.
had understood the bill.26

Crosas knew that meant few delegates

Puerto Ricans were required to use English

before some of the courts in the island, and Jose Enamorado Cuesta,
polemicist for the Nationalist leader of the 1930 1s, Pedro Albizu Campos, claimed that he had once been jailed for refusal to do so.27
Puerto Rican leaders agreed with Americans that the island's
educational facilities must be improved.

The Legislature enacted

numerous bills creating night schools, industrial schools, scholarships, and normal schools from 1901 on.28

Co-operation between the

islanders and mainlanders contributed to progress in reducing the
illiteracy rate in Puerto Rico from 77 percent in 1899 to 55 percent
in 1920.29

Everyone stressed the importance of education.

The ques-

tions occasioning bitter conflict were: what kind of education and
who would control it.
The Massachusetts educational system and American teachers
were imported into the island.

Neither underwent appreciable change

26 san Juan News, 2 February 1901.
27Enamorado, p. 168.
28de Diego, pp. 169ff,
29Berbusse, p. 141.
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or adaptation to island conditions.

In 1900, a Puerto Rican teacher

complained about the Commissioner of Education's recommendation that
teaching vacancies be filled by Americans.30

American teachers were

not only given preference, they were considered superior to Puerto
Rican teachers even when they were not as well prepared to be educators and did not understand the language or sentiments of the children they were to teach.3 1

One American school administrator was

stunned by the difference in the attitude of school children when
singing

11

The Star Spangled Banner" as compared to

11

La Borinquen. 11 32

As Governor Arthur Yager testified in 1916, when the American school
system in Puerto Rico began, most of the teachers were Americans, but
the number of schools was small.
in the island.

American teachers did not stay long

The number of schools grew.

replaced American teachers.

Gradually Puerto Ricans

Yager estimated that in 1916 there were

about two-hundred American teachers in the island out of a total of
eleven or twelve-hundred.33

Puerto Ricans were the majority among

teachers, but the more important administrative posts in the educational system went to North Americans.
Yager stated that the higher positions in the Department of
Education, including the director and his assistant, were held by
30la Correspondencia, 5 December 1900.
31La Democracia, San Juan, 26 January 1914.
32 tbid.
33u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Hearings,
on H.R. 8501, A Civil Government for Porto Rico. 64th Cong., 1st
sess., 1916, pp. 38-39.
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Americans.34

Hostos spent the last few years of his 1 ife organizing

a new educational system, including normal schools, in the Dominican
Republ ic.35

There was some bitter comment on the fact that Hostos

could not get even an inspector of education job in his native island .36

Secretary of War Lindley Garrison encouraged giving an in-

creased number of top administrative posts in the island government
to Puerto Ricans but felt that the Commissioner of Education must be
an American.37

Governor Yager was quick to head off Munoz Rivera's

attempt to get some of the schools put under the control of the Commissioner of Health, who would be a Puerto Rican, instead of the
Commissioner of Education, always an American.38

Puerto Ricans re-

sented the number of important posts in their island filled by Americans, who appeared to have no particular superiority in qual ifications over Puerto Rican applicants.
acute in regard to the schools.

This resentment was especially

Both islanders and Americans fully

appreciated the importance of public education in Americanizing or
Hispanicizing the younger generation.
Education and language in the schools have not, since 1898,
been purely pedagogical issues.

They are political issues.

They

have been, and will be, political issues as long as the status of
341bid.
35Hostos, 4:248.
36Gelgel, p. 70.
37Garrison to Wilson, 3 May 1915, Wilson Papers.
38vager to Mcintyre, 7 February 1916, BIA 3377/246.
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the island and its future terms of association with the United States
are undecided.39

Some American politicians have always insisted that

Puerto Rico must be English-speaking before becoming a state.40

Puer-

to Ricans have not argued that English should not be taught in the
schools.

They have insisted that English must not be taught to the

detriment of Spanish or the education of their children.
The goal of bilingual ism was stated by Commissioner of Education Paul Miller in 1915.
lingual.

"The schools of Porto Rico must be bi-

The American flag is here to stay.

And I want pure Span-

ish taught in the public schools and pure English. 11 41

Miller re-

placed a Commissioner of Education, Edward H. Bainter, who supported
the use of English in the schools at all levels as the language of
instruction.

Bainter's policy had been followed by all but one Ameri-

can appointed Commissioner since 1898.42

Miller's change of attitude

was important because of the power of the Commissioner in setting
school policy on language.

The Auditor of Puerto Rico in 1914 had

urged that the powers of the Commissioner be even broader because
each session of the Puerto Rican legislature saw debate over this
issue.

The Auditor felt that teaching English in the schools would

39Erwin H. Epstein, ed., Politics and Education in Puerto Rico:
A Documentar Surve of the Lan ua e Issue (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1970, pp. 5 -60.
40This is true up to the present; see Ibid., p. 45.
41Puerto Rican Comercial, San Juan, 15 September 1915, BIA 1043/
11.

42 Kal Wagenheim, Puerto Rico: A Profile (New York: Praeger Pub1 ishers, Inc., 1970), p. 167.
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not make anyone give up Spanish, but English was necessary if Puerto
Ricans were to be Americans. 43

Dr. Barbosa argued that failure to

teach English in the schools deprived poor Puerto Ricans of an opportunity to improve their lives by emigrating to the mainland and
entering its labor market.44
Jose de Diego led the Puerto Rican House of Delegates in its
discussions of language in the schools.

In 1913, de Diego secured

the approval of the Union party for his advocacy of the use of only
Spanish as the language of instruction in all grades, with English
offered as a preferred course from the fifth grade on.45

La Democra-

cia echoed his view that education had not progressed as much as had
been expected with the effort and vast sums of money poured into it
because the use of English, which the Puerto Rican child did not know,
greatly impeded his progress in schoo1.46

Munoz Rivera included every

imported teacher instructing classes in English as among his enemies.47
In arguing that Puerto Rico could support itself as an independent
republic, de Diego pointed out the money that could be saved if it
were not necessary to buy English books, pay English teachers, and
cover the expenses of bilingual ism.48

De Diego viewed the Spanish

43J. W. Bonner to Major Irvin L. Hunt, 12 August 1914, BIA 3377/
215.
44 Barbosa, 4:257.
45de Diego, pp. 135-136.
46La Democracia, 3 November 1913.
47Munoz to de Diego, 23 January 1914, BIA 6429/A/4.
48 de Diego, p. 99.
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language as

11

una de las causas mas hondas de nuestra personal idad

~tnica y polTtica. 114 9 He established his own school and an Antillean
Academy of the Language to preserve Castillian, while precipitating
a major upset to the tranquility of the island in 1915.
In January, de Diego introduced into the House of Delegates a
bill making Spanish Puerto Rico's official language, with English
official only in relations between the island and the United States.
Spanish was to be required of all employees of the administration
and the courts in the island.

Public instruction was to be in Span-

ish, and Spanish grammar was to be taught in a minimum of five grades.
English was an optional course.SO

Juan B. Huyke won notoriety in

opposing de Diego in the House debate on this bill .5 1
not passed by the Executive Council.

The bill was

De Diego's language program

would not be adopted in Puerto Rico for many years.

The bill, how-

ever, did initiate a strike in San Juan's schools.
The strike began when one boy tried to solicit signatures requesting the Puerto Rican legislature to end instruction in English
in the public schools.52

Judge Hamilton, advising the Bureau of In-

sular Affairs of the success of the strike, thought this symptomatic
of the attitude of the islanders.

Hamilton added that Americanization

491bid., p. 226.
SOLa Correspondencia, 12 January 1915.
51Pedreira, p. 148.
52El Tiempo, San Juan, 4 March 1915, BIA 1043/lOA.
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depended upon English.53

The New York Tribune devoted a half-page

spread to a sympathetic article covering the
Language in Porto Rico.''

11

Fight to Save Spanish

This article noted the tie between the

language issue and the status issue in Puerto Rico.54

Hamilton told

Wilson that the kind of agitation typified by the strike would end
once the passage of a new organic act was secured for Puerto Ricans,
11

rather a child race, easily led by appeals to sentiment. 11 55

Juan strike ended after three months.

The San

It was followed by a six-weeks

strike by Arecibo 1 s high school students in 1916.

Commissioner Miller

issued a regulation which stipulated automatic expulsion for strikers
following the Arecibo strike.56
Balbas' paper praised de Diego's House bill and applauded the
vote of solidarity on this issue passed by the Senate of the Dominican
Republic.57

De Diego responded by introducing a resolution of thanks

to the Dominican Republic into the Puerto Rican House of Delegates.5 8
A Spanish language newspaper also noted the language fight in Puerto
Rico and stated that

11

Sancho 11 wanted to kill

Spanish in Puerto Rico.59

11

Quijote 11 by killing

Latin fears that it was a struggle to the

death for Spanish had been reinforced by statements such as that of
53Hamilton to Mcintyre, 2 March 1915, BIA 1043/10.
54New York Tribune, 18 April 1915, BIA 1043/lOB.
55Hamilton to Wilson, 2 June 1915, Wilson Papers.
56Muniz, p. 76.
57Heraldo Espanol, San Juan, l June 1915, Wilson Papers.
58Bulletin Mercantil, San Juan, 15 March 1916, BIA 1043/13.
59El Dia, Ponce, 17 June 1916, BIA 26429-A/12.

43
Governor William H. Hunt, who wrote:
In order to make the laws and language of the mainland and
the island uniform, ..• , every effort must be made not only
to teach new doctrines and ideas, but at the same time to
destroy the prejudices, ignorance, and false teachings of
the past.60
Jose de Diego did not believe that English could replace Spanish
as the native tongue of the Puerto Ricans.

He fought not to defend

Spanish from death but from corruption by English.

A later analysis

concludes that he did not succeed, but Spanish in Puerto Rico has been
altered in the same way, if to a larger degree, as in other parts of
Latin America. 61
The same might be said

regarding~

fe.

Americanization of

Puerto Rico's language and of its religion has been only partly suecessful.

In 1898, it might have been predicted that Protestantism

would fare better.

The change in sovereignty had adversely effected

the Catholic Church in Puerto Rico.

Her income from the Spanish

government was gone, and most islanders were unable to contribute
to the Church.

Numerous Spanish clerics returned to the Peninsula,

further reducing a staff already inadequate to serve the island.
Only gradually did American clergymen come to Puerto Rico.
The property of the Church had been vested in the Spanish
Crown.

It went to the United States government with the Treaty of

60william H. Hunt, Report of the Governor of Porto Rico (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 13.
61Francisco Ayala, "The Transformation of the Spanish Heritage," The Annals 285 (January 1953):104.
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Paris and to the people of Puerto Rico with the Foraker Act.

Root

requested an inventory of the property claimed by the Church in
1899.62

No action was taken until 1903 when Senator Foraker intro-

duced a bill to return the claimed property to the Church.

Despite

the support of President Theodore Roosevelt, Foraker could not get
his bil 1 through Congress.63

In 1906, the Supreme Court of Puerto

Rico, in a decision handed down by Jose Severo Quinones, returned
the property.
Court in 1909.

This decision was upheld by the United States Supreme
During these years when the Catholic Church in Puerto

Rico was in such an uncertain condition, American Protestantism began
its campaign to convert the island.
A Baptist and a Lutheran missionary arrived in Puerto Rico in
October 1898.

The historian of the conversion campaign reports that

the Catholic hierarchy opposed their preaching, but the islanders
crowded to hear them. 6 5

In the next year, the mission boards of the

Presbyterian, Baptist, Congregational, and Methodist Episcopal Churches agreed to avoid duplication of effort by dividing the island
into exclusive spheres of operation.
. .
.
66
be open m1ss1on territory.

Only San Juan and Ponce would

The missionaries developed techniques

62Edward J. Berbusse, S.J., "Aspects in Church-State Relations
in Puerto Rico, 11 The Americas 19 (January 1963):298-299.
63tbid., p. 299.
64rbid., p. 302.
65Donald T. Moore, Puerto Rico para Cristo (Cuernavaca, Mexico:
Cidoc Sondeos, 1969), pp. 2/17-2/23 (sic).
66rbid., PP· 211, 212.
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such as itinerate preachers on horseback, lay pastors, and encouragement of the use of native converts as pastors.67

By 1916, twelve

Protestant sects claimed 13,391 Church members, 20,410 Sunday School
members, and 215 organized churches.68

If accurate, these figures

indicate that almost three percent of the population of Puerto Rico
were Protestant Church members.

It is probably, however, that resi-

dent mainlanders are included in the figures.

The addition of their

numbers would over dramatize the success of the conversion campaign.
Freedom of religion had been promised in the Treaty of Paris.
American officials dealing with Puerto Rico are noticeably silent on
this issue of evangelization.

They do not stress the need for Prot-

estantism as a part of Americanization in the way that they stress
English.

Catholicism, however, was not supported.

In 1913, the Cath-

olic Bishop of Puerto Rico, William A. Jones, reported rumors that
the Presbyterian leader in the island was leading a movement to prevent the appointment of a Catholic governor.69

The report of Bishop

Jones, who had previously played an important role in establishing
American Catholicism in Cuba, is given credence by the fact that the
Presbyterian leader, Edwin A. Ode! 1, had just requested an interview
with President Wilson.

Odell told Wilson that he wished to discuss

Puerto Rico and bolstered his request for an interview by noting that
671bid., p. 2/21, 2/24 and 2/38.
681bid., p. 2/80.
69Bishop W. A. Jones to Fredrick R. Coudert, 28 May 1913, Wilson
Papers.
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he was a graduate of Princeton.70

Judge Hamilton advised against a

Catholic governor because such an appointment would, in his view,
be seen in Puerto Rico as a reestablishment of a state church and
would adversely effect the advances made by Protestantism in the
island.71

Included among Representative William A. Jones' papers

relative to Puerto Rico is a January 1913 issue of an Aurora, Missouri, paper carrying in its masthead the statement that "If the
Liberties of the American People Are Ever Destroyed, It Will Be By
the Hands of the Roman Catholics."

The lead article in this issue

decried the selection with American advice of Archbishop Adolfo Nouel
as compromise president of the Dominican Republic.72

It is not clear

how much consideration Wilson may have given to the appointment of
a Catholic governor, but he did not choose one.
On the island, the Protestant crusade caused some friction.
In 1903, a pol iceman in Manati brought charges against one member
of a Protestant congregation for disorderly conduct.

The charges

were dropped because all of the witnesses, who were fellow members
of the accused's congregation, stated that he had only been preaching.73
The Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Puerto Rico, James H. Van Buren,
had expressed the opinion that the appointment of a Puerto Rican as
70Edwin A. Odell to Wilson, 26 April 1913, Wilson Papers.
71Hamilton to Wilson, 21 July 1913, Wilson Papers.
89.

72The Menace, Aurora, Mo., 21 January 1913, Jones Papers, Box
Archbishop Nouel was president for sixteen months.
73San Juan News, 11 January 1903.
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the treasurer of the island would result in government support of Catholic education.

He added that the performance of the alcaldes did not

inspire confidence in the appointment of Puerto Ricans to important
posts.

In its criticism of Van Buren for these remarks, La Democracia

replied that corrupt alcaldes were not unknown in the United States.74
Two Baptists were taken before a judge by a local priest for preaching
in the town plaza, but the fine levied by the judge was reversed by a
higher court.75

In Barranquitas, a Baptist preacher was stoned for

refusing to remove his hat during a Catholic religious procession.
Stones were also the only response for two years to a Puerto Rican
Protestant preacher's unattended services in Trujillo Alto.76
Jose de Diego objected to the missionaries in Puerto Rico on
the grounds that they divided the people's solidarity.

The mission-

aries told them that they were incapable of governing themselves,
and, in de Diego's eyes, exemplified the type of prejudice that would
prevent the election of a Catholic as President of the United States.77
Bishop Van Buren was accused of being a carpetbagger who was in Puerto
Rico only to enjoy the income of his benefice.78
74La Democracia, 17 August 1905.
75Moore, p. 2/29.
761bid.' p. 2/30.
77de Diego, pp. 79-80.
78La Democracia, 17 August 1905.
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Rosendo Matienzo Cintron, the missionaries in general were religious
carpetbaggers sent by pseudo-religious commercial-political societies. 79

Considerably less comment was made by North American or Puerto

Rican political leaders on religion than on language, but these two
aspects of their tradition may have been equally important to many
islanders.

Later Puerto Rican nationalists are as bitter in their

denunciations of religious Americanization as of the Anglicization
of their language.

The missionary, like the teacher, was considered

an agent of North American colonialism.80
Press and Politics
Race, religion, and language were the most emotional areas of
conflict between Puerto Rico and the United States.
less popular appeal but considerable importance.

Other areas had

Friction often devel-

oped when some Puerto Rican institutions were Americanized and also
when others were not.

This seeming contradiction is due, of course,

to the fact that the will of the islanders was not consulted before
changes were or were not made.
Americanization of the tax system caused the major political
storm of 1901.

Spanish taxes still in effect at the time of the Ameri-

can landing had been suppressed.
military government.

A direct land tax was imposed by the

This tax was frequently assailed because the

79Luis M. Diaz Soler, ed., Rosendo Matienzo Cintron, vol. 2:
Recopilacion de su obra escrita, 2 vols. (Mexico: Ediciones de! Institute de Literatura Puertorriquena, 1960), p. 83.
80Enamorado, pp. 20, 208; Silen, pp. 102-103; Lewis, p. 4.
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rich paid little and the poor much,81

Thfs inequity was of concern

in the drafting of the re~enue bill,82 which became known by the name
of the Treasurer of Puerto Rico, Jacob H. Hollander.

The Hollander

bill set up a new revenue system for Puerto Rico, but its aim of shifting the tax burden from the poor led to mass protest meetings of
planters and merchants.83

Leading figures among those attending the

protest meetings were Balbas and Munoz Rivera.

The tax was held to

be unjust and obviously drawn without reference to conditions in the
island.84

Because the Executive Council felt it necessary to pass a

tax bill before the close of the legislative session, there was rush
and maneuvering.

The Hollander Act was castigated as a taxation sys-

tem imposed on the island by the Americans with the cooperation of a
subservient Republican House of Delegates.BS
Desired reforms were sometimes withheld, but good will was generated in 1902 when the House of Representatives granted the floor and
a voice in debates concerning Puerto Rico to the Resident Commissioner,
Federico Degetau y Gonzalez.86

The United States Supreme Court ruled

in the Insular Cases that the Constitution did not apply to Puerto
Rico.

Noting the lack of a bill of rights in the Foraker Act, a bill
81La Correspondenci~, 28 July 1900.
82Barbosa, 4:43.
83san Juan News, 25 January 1901, 6 February 1901.
84tbid., 30 January 1901.
85tbid., 29 January 1901.
861bid., 1 July 1902.
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embodying the personal guarantees of the Constitution was introduced
into Congress.Bl

The bill did not pass, and the island's legislature,

led by Jose Celso Barbosa, enacted its own guarantees.
the law was of special importance.

Section 3 of

It guaranteed the freedom to speak,

write or publish whatever one pleased, subject to responsibility for
abuse of this right.88

Americans frequently felt that the Puerto Rican

press did abuse it.
The military governors had serious conflicts with the Puerto
Rican press.

Repression by Generals Henry and Davis caused caustic

comment by Hostos.89

Even the "Good Neighbor" Governor would complain

years later of the vicious attacks by the island's press.90

One Puerto

Rican judge ordered the arrest of an editor who had attacked him, but
the American Attorney General asked for the removal of the judge for
his violation of the privilege of the press.91

Regis Post, when Secre-

tary of Puerto Rico, found it necessary to defend himself against the
attack of La Democracia for what he had considered a simple administrative decision.92

The Bureau of Insular Affairs kept a file of newspaper

87u.s., Congress, House, A Bill to amend an Act entitled 'An Act
temporarily to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico,
and for other purposes,' approved April twelfth, Nineteen Hundred, and
to establish personal rights for the people of Porto Rico, H.R. 13525,
57th Cong., 1st sess., 1902.
88Puerto Rico, Legislaci6n Social, p. 34.
89Hostos, 4:241, 244-245.
90Tugwell, p. 238.
91san Juan News,

July 1902.

92La Democracia, 15 September 1905.
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<=1rticles considered inflarnmatory.

Their filer

however~

did not con-

tain anything particularly unusual in the context of the press of
the period.

Governor William H. Hunt liked to point out the role

of Spaniards in Puerto Rico as editors of critical newspapers.93
Balbas would be an example of such an editor.

Governor George B.

Colton referred to one paper, which was owned by a Puerto Rican whom
the present writer views as a moderate, as "the mouthpiece of the
disgruntled harpers. 11 94

Hunt and Colton missed the point, as did

most Americans except Governor Charles H. Allen,95 that the Puerto
Rican press was a faithful reflection of the political atmosphere
of the island.
Representative Albert Douglas commented that there was not
one newspaper in the island that considered any issue without a pol itical basis for their conclusion.

Douglas thought the island's press

included many politically rabid papers, like La Democracia.96

Despite

the denials of the Puerto Ricans present when Douglas made his statement, he was correct in viewing the press as very political and vitriol ic compared with usual American standards.

After 1902, American

administrators respected the freedom of the press in Puerto Rico but
93Hunt, p. 11.
94colton to Edwards, 20 September 1911, BIA 750/7.
95charles H. Allen, Report of the Governor of Porto Rico (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 45.
96u.s,, Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Hearing
upon the bill providing Civil Government for Porto Rico. 61st Cong.,
2d sess., 1910, p. 144.
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they never stopped complaining about it.

The problems Americans en-

countered with the press were really extensions of the problems they
had with the political parties.

Puerto Rican parties and press had

been bitterly factional long before 1898.

They would continue to be

so long after.
Political passions in Puerto Rico ran very high among both
politicians and public.

During the first election under the Foraker

Act, there were several incidents.

In the town of Yauco, reports

were received that the Republican election judges were wounded in a
hostile reception by the Federals.
of Federals were to be attacked.

The rumor spread that the homes
Yauco settled down only when the

judges advised that the reports of their wounds were false.97

The

Mayor of Guayama admitted armed Federals into the town which resulted
in a fight with sixteen wounded.98

San Juan saw the biggest squabble,

since its Republican Mayor, Manuel Egozcue, was a bitter enemy of
Luis Munoz Rivera.

Munoz published an angry criticism of Egozcue

and his treatment of some Federal party members.

His paper was raided

on September 14, but on the 18th the offices and shops were destroyed.
The mob then went to Munoz' home.

Shots were fired there,99 and

though no one was hurt, Munoz was brought to trial in December.

He

was acquitted, but the trial stirred additional political anger among
97 La Correspondencia, 8 November 1900.
98rbid., 8 October 1900.
99Aitken, pp. 43-44.
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his followers. lOO
This uproar during the campaign of 1900 began with the first
meetings of the Executive Council installed under the Foraker Act.
President McKinley appointed two Republicans, two Federals, and one
independent, Andres Crosas, to the five Puerto Rican seats on the
Council.
the fal I.

One of their first jobs was to prepare for the election in
In dividing the island into electoral districts three plans

were prepared.

One plan was proposed by the Republicans, one by the

Federals, and one by Crosas.

When the plan of the independent was

accepted by a vote of nine to two, the Federals, de Diego and Manuel
Camunas, resigned. 101

Crosas claimed that his plan had been suggested

by an American, who perhaps did not realize that different areas of
the island were the territory of one party or the other.

Following

Spanish procedure, the outvoted ITTinority resigned because Munoz Rivera
told them to do so. 10 2

This whole procedure was viewed as perverse

and undemocratic by Americans I ike Governor Allen.

Shortly before

November 6, the Federals decided to boycott the election.

That meant

that all of the Republican candidates were elected and both houses of
the legislature were entirely Republican.
In 1902, the supposed leader of the Republican mob in San Juan
was jailed for attacking someone who disagreed with his political
JOOBerbusse, United States in Puerto Rico, p. 179.
lOlAJ len, pp. 18-19.
102serbusse, United States in Puerto Rico, p. 175; White, p. 59.
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views.103

That same year an election riot in Humacao resulted in a

death sentence for murder.

The Puerto Rican Supreme Court upheld the

conviction, but the legislature petitioned the governor for commutation. 104

In Manati several incidents of physical attack by Republicans

on political opponents were reported. 105

By 1903 the San Juan News

switched its allegiance from the Republican to the Federal party.
Its editor never tired of denouncing the Republican "turbas" but did
not say anything about their Federal party equivalent.

Mayor Egozcue

was arrested for destroying receipts from the water department, and
it is not surprising that the campaign disclosing the scandal and
fighting every attempt on the part of the Mayor to shift the blame
was led by the News. 106
Governor Charles Allen and, even more so, his successor, Hunt,
were considered partial to the Republicans. 107
enough.

The charge seems true

A new governor in 1904 said he would not tolerate the elec-

tion abuses of the past.

The effect of this change of governor upon

the re-emergence of Munoz Rivera's followers to political victory was
over-emphasized by one Munoz admirer.108

With the increasing domina-

tion of Puerto Rican politics by the Union party after 1904, grass
103san Juan News, 3 August 1902.
1041bid., 28 February 1904.
1051bid., 21 January 1903.
1061bid., 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 14 January 1903, 21 and 25 February, 1903.
1071bid., 17 January 1903.
108Aitken, p. 48.
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roots pol iticaJ fighting seems to have diminished.

Even in 1910, how-

ever, the Union party president, Carlos M. Soler, pleaded with party
alcaldes to protect the meetings of opposition parties.

Soler argued

that every incident only gave the Americans one more excuse to say
that the Puerto Ricans were unfit to govern themselves.109
Governor Hunt complained that every bill in the legislature
was a party measure, with party control exerted over voting even on
bills that had no possible partisan impact. 110

A lesser American

appointee noted that the delegates thought it necessary to vote for
every measure introduced by a member of their party.

This is how he

explained the fact that the Executive Council had to bury or amend
so much legislation sent up from the House of Delegates.Ill

De Diego

and Herminio Diaz tried to enforce a technical rule to disqualify five
Republican delegates, but they were outvoted, and the island's Supreme
Court declined to interfere in the affairs of the legislature. 112
Federico Degetau was very early disgusted with the
sult" between the island's parties.113

11

pol itics of in-

There were several occasions

when the leading politicans tried to bury party differences in order
to work for common goals, notably a new organic act, despite political
109circular, Soler to Union AlcaJdes, 8 October 1910, BIA 719/11.
1 l Owh i te, p. 66.

111Roland B. Falkner, "Citizenship for the Porto Ricans, 11 American Political Science Review 4 (May 1910):186.
112san Juan News, 21 January 1904.
113La Correspondencia, l November 1900.
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rancor.

These attempts at cooperation were short-1 ived.
Only one attempt to consolidate Puerto Rican leadership was

very successful.

In January 1904, Santiago Palmer, president of the

Federal party, wrote to Manuel F. Rossy, president of the Republicans,
suggesting that both parties dissolve and unite into one new party to
defend Puerto Rico's interests.114

Barbosa rejected the proposal.

The only Republican leader to defend it was Rosendo Matienzo Cintron.115
The Federal party later did dissolve.

When its members reconvened to

form a new party, they were joined by Matienzo and his followers from
the Republican ranks.

Thus the Union party began.

Ideological differ-

ences between the two major parties had been slight in 1899, but they
increased as years went on.

Even in the early years, real cooperation

was impossible because of inheritances of rivalry from the past.
people followed the ideals of the parties but little.
cistas or barbocistas.

The

They were muno-

The parties were built on the personal ismo of

their respective leaders. l16
As the Puerto Rican political scene has already been described
with the characteristics of personal ism, domination of geographical
areas, and strict party loyalty and discipline, its next characteristic,
especially criticized by Americans, is almost predictable: bossism.
The Federal party had been the allegiance of planters and merchants.117
114san Juan News, 24 January 1904.
1151bid., 26 January 1904.
116Pedreira, pp. 139-140.
ll?san Juan News, 26 January 1904.
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With the defection of Matienzo and the retirement of Degetau, the Union
party even more strongly could be described as the party of the socially and economically dominant classes in Puerto Rico.118

It appears

that this might be significant in explaining the electoral victories
of the Union party as much as its hispanic appeal to the voters, given
bossism and personal ism.

Hispanidad and disillusionment with the Amer-

icans drew the Puerto Rican upper classes firmly to the Union party.
These people then delivered the votes of the illiterate majority of
the voters.
In 1910, a former Commissioner of Education stated that leaders
in Puerto Rico were few and bossism characterized public life. 119

Gov-

ernor Colton thought opposition from the Puerto Rican House of Delegates to the Olmsted bi! I was based on its "reduction of influence of
political bosses called leaders who now handle the ignorant class like
sheep. 11 120

Attorney General Foster V. Brown thought Munoz Rivera was

the one person who told the islanders what to say and think.

Brown

added that Munoz was hostile to President William H. Taft and was very
anti-American.121

Judge Hamilton equated Puerto Rico's problems with

those of Mexico: land and caciques.

Hamilton noted that "the present

118Leland H. Jenks, "American Rule in Puerto Rico", in The
Caribbean Area, ed. A. Curtis Wilgus (Washington: The George Washington University Press, 1934}, p. 153.
119Falkner, p. 189.
120colton to Edwards, 23 February 1910, BIA 3377/40.
sted bill was a new organic act proposal.
121Brown to Edwards, 4 December 1911, BIA 127/10.

The Olm-
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political leaders are followed with a personal devotion (1 ike that to
the old caciques) which has no relation to the policies they stand for,
if there are any. 11 122

Attorney General Pitkin also saw bl ind devotion

to political leaders and personal ism.
of political issues or institutions.

The people, he felt, knew little
He wrote that: "Often on election

day bands of them are seen guided, or rather driven like sheep, to the
polls by a man on horseback. 11 123
Puerto Rican Republicans denounced Munoz Rivera's contention
that it would be hard to find capable representatives for each district
if delegates must reside in the district.

The Republicans said it

might be hard to find a boss resident in each district, but not a representative. 124

Dr. Barbosa's El Tiempo became very critical of the

Union party-dominated legislature and Governor Colton for failing to
reform registration and voting to stop vote-buying and other election
abuses.125

The leader of the younger Americanized Unionists wrote

that he had tried to fight the bosses, who operated on Spanish political principles.126

He had done so, and Munoz Rivera attacked him for

not voting with the party on the Executive Council but as he chose.127
122Hamilton to Wilson, 30 May 1914, Wilson Papers.
123Pitkin to Frankfurter, 21 January 1913, BIA 26429/11.
124 Guzman Benitez to Jacob Dickinson, 30 April 1910, BIA 127/3.
125El Tiempo, 8 February 1912, BIA 1028/18.
126Martin Travieso, Jr., to Mcintyre, 17
719/46.
127La Democracia, 16 December 1915.

tfovember 1915, BIA
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Puerto Rican leaders, like Munoz, did not see party control as bossism.
It was seen as union in the defense of Puerto Rico against its new
overlord.

Munoz had a great deal of trouble in maintaining party

unity, because, unlike Barbosa 1 s party, it was the "Union" in which
different ideals were held and several factions existed.
The best analyst of the problems that existed between Americans
and Puerto Rican politics notes that many American administrators ignored the fact that the local political leaders were the only avenue
available for working with public opinion in the island.128

Willough-

by thought that the delicate machinery of the divided political system
created by the Foraker Act was excellent because it gave both Puerto
Ricans and Americans a veto power. 129

In fact, the system was vulner-

able because it had to get a balance between two independently variable political forces.

As Leland Jenks stated:

"Hence the party

leadership in Porto Rico has always been able to avoid responsibility
to its electorate, and many an American Governor has excused his
failure by dwel I ing on the shortcomings of insular pol iticians. 11130
The tragedy of a political tradition in Puerto Rico that included a vituperative press, bitter party fights and bossism was, however,
that it did convince many Americans that the islanders were not capable
of self-government.

This truth was aptly stated by Mrs. Theodore Stoy,

an American woman resident in Manati

~

She was outraged that Governor

128 Jenks, p. 156.
129Willoughby, "Executive Council," pp. 568-569.
130Jenks, pp. 152-153.
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Arthur Yager had said Puerto Rico was prepared for self-government.
In a letter to Secretary of War Lindley H. Garrison, she wrote:
To anyone who really understands these people and their
hatred of Americans, and the way in which they let politics
completely dominate their judgment, this is appalling.
Only a negligible part of the people know how to read or
write; so there is no public opinion as we understand the
word. Native control would be to throw the government
into the hands of three or four men, and these the most
blatant and irresponsible ....
This country is not like Cuba or the Philippines where it
was understood that our control would be only temporary.
Here we have invested our money with the understanding
that we were on American territory and under our own flag.131
"Native control" was precisely the goal Puerto Ricans most cherished.

The highly cultivated and

themselves a small minority.
Ricans were ill iterate.
qualified to run their

sophisti~ated

islanders acknowledged

They knew that the majority of Puerto

They believed, however, that they were better
11

territory 11 than Americans who knew nothing

about the island.
Many administrators dealing with Puerto Rico were, at least initially, almost completely ignorant about the island.

One ironic ex-

ample is the Bureau of Insular Affairs employee who reviewed an article
by Balbas.

He said the author, Balbas, was ingenious, versatile, and

amusing, but that his facts were all questionable. 13 2

The facts ques-

tioned by the reviewer dealt with simple points in the history of Puerto Rico and its relationship with the United States, and Balbas' facts
131Mrs. Theodore Stoy to Garrison, 6 January 1914, BIA 26429/38.
132Beckwith note to Heraldo Espanol, 16 September 1913, BIA
26429/27.
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were accurate.

General Davis had pointed out to Root the advantage

of Executive Council apointees having a knowledge of Spanish, Latin
Jaw and Latin people. 133
fications.

Few appointees to any office had these quali-

The United States did not have a core of trained colonial

administrators from which such people could be drawn.134

Most Ameri-

can appointees were well qualified to administer the types of jobs
they were given in the island, especially in more technical jobs.135
There were, however, numerous political appointments.

The outstanding

examples of both the worst and the best people appointed to administer
the island came after 1917.
Puerto Ricans were displeased with the appointments made by the
United States because too many good jobs went to Americans who were
not particularly knowledgable about Puerto Rico.

Islanders typically

considered American appointees as off ice seekers just as the Americans
routinely accused Puerto Rican politicians of squabbling only for positions.

There is evidence to indicate that both grciups did concern

themselves with getting the most lucrative and prestigious posts.136
The islanders particularly resented American control of the municipal
and legal institutions of the island on the grounds of tradition,
power, and patronage.
133oavis to Root, 20 April 1900, BIA 168/29.
134callcott, p. 169.
135Jenks, p. 151; Clark, p. 94.
136see San Juan News, 26 March 1904; Geigel, P· 37: Munoz Marin,
Del Tiempo, p. 20.
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Judge Hamilton, who was himself a rather controversial appointee, advised President Wilson to maintain the system of American government, schools and courts in Puerto Rico because he saw the island
as a part of his nation's policy in the West lndies.137

Hamilton

commented that :he thought most Puerto Ricans preferred to be left
alone but that Americans would have to legislate the real interests
of the islanders and then force them to obey the law.138

The Judge's

opinion that Americanization was to the best interest of the island
was shared by many Americans.

One observer said that the lack of

political training in Puerto Rico under Spain made impossible the
amount of self-government usually considered part of the American
system.

This same lack, however, would make the introduction of Ameri-

can institutions easier. 139

As early as 1909, a Puerto Rican wrote

that the smiling welcome in 1898 changed into a crescendo of disenchantment, as the conquerors failed to respect Puerto Rican institutions and rights.

He felt that the Americans forgot their own history

and traditions when dealing with the new colony.140

By 1914 General

Mcintyre could refer to the latent anti-American feeling always present in Puerto Rico.141
137Hamilton to Wilson, 4 February 1914, Wilson Papers.
138Hamilton to Wilson, l May 1916, Wilson Papers.
l39L. S. Rowe, 11 The Significance of the Porto Rican Problem, 11
North American Review 173 (July 1901):36-37.
140co 11 y Cuch i, p. I I .
141Mclntyre to Yager, 2 June 1914, BIA 3377/207.
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The real question in the relationship between the mainland and
the island was whether mutual respect, friendship, and solidarity could
be built between the two despite their differences in culture, race,
and traditions.142

Puerto Rican leaders urged the people both to Amer-

icanize and to preserve their traditions, contributing to a disorientation built upon uncertainty.143

Most Americans, like Mrs. Stoy or

Judge Hamilton, saw the Puerto Ricans as permanently tied to the United
States.

They did not fully appreciate the fact that it was the Ameri-

cans who saw such permanent union as in their best interests or that
Puerto Ricans did not all agree that the relationship was in their best
interests.

The conflicts of Americanization progressively convinced

more islanders that it was not.

These unavoidable conflicts between

two cultures were worsened because they took place in an ambient of
colonial ism rather than equality.

The colonial power was hesitant to

give the islanders any assurance that cooperation with it and its goals
of Americanization would result in a future relationship between equals.
Puerto Ricans were asked to speak English and to adopt American attitudes and institutions while being denied American citizenship.

They

were asked to accept American administration and Americanization of
their island although their political status was unsettled and increasing numbers of them came to prefer the option of independence to that
of statehood.
142Munoz Marin, Puerto Rico, pp. 9-10.
l43Geigel, p. 45.

CHAPTER 111
THE CITIZENSHIP AND STATUS QUESTIONS
The conflicts of Americanization caused Puerto Ricans to cling
to their own cultural identity when confronted by an alien culture.
Despite their pride in their Latin heritage, many of them wished to become American citizens.

There has been continual controversy over the

political status of the island.

Everyone opposed perpetual colonial ism,

but opinions varied as to whether independence, statehood or autonomy
should be the goal of the islanders.

Citizenship and cultural person-

ality were parts of the status question.
Puerto Rico since 1898.

This dilemma has plagued

Its solution has been postponed with compro-

mises between ideals and realities.
Background
When, in the Fall of 1898, it became known that the United
States would annex Puerto Rico, the islanders assumed that their citizenship and status would follow the usual mainland pattern of expansion,

Under that pattern, they would become American citizens with

territorial status leading to eventual statehood.
governors operated on this assumption.

The four· military

In the Treaty of Paris, deter-

mination of the citizenship and status of the islanders was left to
64
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the United States Congress.

During the time in which Congress failed

to enact legislation for Puerto Rico, the expectation that the United
States would follow its historical precedent in dealing with its new
acquisitions continued.
Senator Foraker noted that in all cases, except that of Alaska,
the treaties under which the United States acquired new lands stipulated that the territories would be incorporated into the nation and
that their inhabitants were to enjoy American citizenship and the
Constitution. 1 Alaska, acquired in 1867, became a territory in 1912.
Hawaii, acquired in 1898, became a territory in 1900.

These non-con-

tiguous acquisitions followed the traditional pattern of expansion.
President McKinley, although he may have thought the pattern would be
applied to Puerto Rico,2 wanted no commitment written into the Treaty
of Paris.

As Rupert Emerson wrote, the islands annexed in the Treaty

were not fitted into the American sense of the "constitutional fitness
of things" or the territory-state pattern.

A new pattern had to be

devised for the American Empire.3
With the annexation of Puerto Rico, eventual statehood seemed
to represent the destined solution of giving the island the self-governing status it had sought from Spain.4

In 1899, both the Republican

!Foraker, p. 468.
2Berbusse, The United States, p. 222.
3Rupert Emerson, "Puerto Rico and American Pol icy Toward Dependent Areas," The Annals 285 (January 1953):10.
4Morales Carrion, p. 156.
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and the Federal parties in Puerto Rico favored statehood.5
Ricans waited for Congress to legislate for them.

The Puerto

They expected to

receive citizenship, the Constitution, and a respectable amount of
self-government.

Willoughby, a bulwark of the American administration

in the island, agreed that the cultivated, friendly Puerto Ricans had
grounds to expect them.6
Senator Foraker's original draft of the bill for Puerto Rico,
which was known as the Foraker Act after passage, included United
States citizenship and the Constitution.

Puerto Rico lost them on

the floor of the Congress when it was decided that the bill must act
as a precedent for the Philippines.

The Foraker Act made the is-

landers citizens of Puerto Rico unless they chose to retain their
previous citizenship.

Primarily intended to set up a civil government,

the Foraker Act contained no promise as to the future of the island.
It was to be a temporary measure, and the precise status of the island
in its relationship with the United States was not defined.
porary Foraker Act was in force for seventeen years.

The tem-

Its vagueness

on important points left ample room for argument and interpretation.
The newly created citizens of Puerto Rico quickly noted that
they were citizens of a political entity that did not enjoy sovereignty and was nowhere recognized.

Degetau, the first Resident Com-

missioner, always maintained that the terms of the Foraker Act had
5Merga 1 , p. 166.
6wil loughby, "Executive Council , 11 p. 562.
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made the Puerto Ricans citizens of the United States.7

A laborer

named Jorge Cruz was brought to New York in 1900 under contract to
the New York Herald in order to bring a legal suit as to whether the
islanders were American citizens.a

In 1901, La Correspondencia ar-

gued that when Degetau was allowed to speak before the United States
Supreme Court, it implied his recognition as a citizen.9

In 1902,

the United States Commissioner of Immigration ruled that the immigration laws applied to Puerto Ricans, apparently intending that the immigration of Puerto Ricans be governed in the same manner as immigration
from the Philippines.lo
Puerto Ricans were entitled to the services of the American
consuls when in foreign countries.

Their anomalous citizenship, how-

ever, created numerous problems concerning passports, immigration, and
naturalization.

These problems were dealt with in a series of Supreme

Court cases known collectively as the Insular Cases.

In these cases,

the decisions ruled that Puerto Ricans were not citizens of the United
States but were not aliens either. 11 The bill of rights was found to be
applicable to Puerto Ricans in some instances but not in others.12
Initially, Puerto Ricans resident in the United States were naturalized
7The Times, Washington, D.C., 10 July 1901, BIA 16a/40.
ala Correspondencia, 14 April 1900.
91bid., 2 July 1901.
lOsan Juan News, 3 August 1902.
11 Gould , p . 221 .
12ca11cott, pp. 167-16a.
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as American citizens.

Then after the Insular Cases, naturalization

was denied on the grounds that the islanders were not foreigners.13
The naturalization law of June 1906 was held to mean that Puerto Ricans
resident in a state or an organized territory, which Puerto Rico was
not, might apply for citizenship.14

Judge Hamilton complained of his

distaste at having to deny naturalization to a Puerto Rican who was
serving in the United States army. 15
The Supreme Court decisions concerning the definition of the
status of Puerto Rico in matters other than citizenship were equally
confusing.

Rulings handed down in the Insular Cases were closely

fought and dissenting opinions were usual.

This was due to the fact

that the Court was composed of five Justices with imperialist leanings
and four Justices who were anti-imperial ists. 16

The problem confron-

ting the Court in the Insular Cases was to establish a legal background for breaking with Constitutional tradition and compromising
democracy with empire.17
Downes v. Bidwell was the most important of the Insular Cases.
This case tested the constitutionality of erecting a tariff between
the United States and Puerto Rico.18

Puerto Rico was held to be both

13Muniz, p. 127.
14Mclntyre to Jones, 6 May 1916, BIA 1286/after 133.
15Hamilton to Wilson, 25 November 1914, Wilson Papers.
16Gould, p. 203.
1hew is , p. 109.
18oownes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
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foreign and domestic at the same time. 19

The island was not foreign

in the international sense, but it was foreign in the domestic sense. 20
This latter interpretation was necessary because otherwise the tariff
imposed by the Foraker Act would have been unconstitutional.

As Sena-

tor Foraker put it, "Porto Rico belongs to the United States, but it
is not the United States, nor a part of the United States. 11 21
Rico was defined as an unincorporated territory.

Puerto

The doctrine of in-

corporation was equated with the French colonial idea of assimilation.
Incorporation occurred when new lands were admitted on a basis of
equality with the areas already constituting the state.22

After the

passage of the Jones Act, the Supreme Court again held that Puerto
Rico was unincorporated territory despite the fact that its inhabitants
were United States citizens.23

In essence, the Supreme Court decisions

in the Insular Cases upheld the power of the Congress to legislate for
possessions as it saw fit.

The Constitution followed the flag only

with the express wish of Congress.

Thus, the vagueness of the Foraker

Act was resolved in the Insular Cases with the curious doctrine that
Puerto Ricans were neither citizens nor aliens, and their island was
unincorporated territory.

Perhaps the only thing that was becoming

19Pagan, pp. 26-27.
20Morales Carrion, p. 145.
21Joseph Benson Foraker, Notes on a Busy Life, 2 vols. (Cincinatti, Ohio, n.p., 1916), 2:75.
22Alpheus H. Snow, The Administration of De endencies (New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons - The Knickerbocker Press, 1902 , p. 563.
23c1ark, p. 95.
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clear was that the traditional territory-state pattern of United States
expansion would not be applied to Puerto Rico.
Varying Puerto Rican Opinion
Initially, the islanders accepted the idea of statehood.

Once

the Puerto Ricans realized that the island might not eventually become
a state, their unanimity of opinion disappeared.

Under Spanish saver-

eignty, Puerto Ricans favored either assimilation, independence or autonomy.

The same factions reappeared in 1900 favoring statehood, inde-

pendence or autonomy.

As a dependency of the United States, however,

the issue of which political status was most desirable has been compl icated by a conflict between the problems of economic survival and
.
24
cu It ura l 1.d entity.
Advocates of eventual statehood for Puerto Rico were generally
admirers of the United States.

They accepted the geographical tie of

the island to the mainland and hoped that the wealth of the colossus
would afford the opportunity to eliminate poverty among the Puerto
Ricans.

The democratic principles of the American Constitution were

desired as a means of transforming island society.

Proponents of

statehood since 1900 have been a sizeable minority in Puerto Rico.
The leading statesman upholding statehood for Puerto Rico in
the early years were Jose Celso Barbosa and Federico Degetau y Gonzalez.

Dr. Barbosa wanted American citizenship for the islanders, since
24wagenheim, p. 10.
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he believed that self-government would follow with it.25

Expansion

of the hegemony of the people of the United States seemed inevitable,
and Barbosa visualized American citizenship becoming what Roman citizenship had been.26

Despite his Republican party's defeats and the

inaction of the Congress, he continually assured the Puerto Ricans
that their government would be 1 iberal ized, that they would be given
American citizenship, and that the Constitution would be extended to
the island as a step toward statehood.27

Barbosa argued that Puerto

Rican patriotism was not incompatible with statehood because he saw
in the federal system a guarantee of the preservation of local pride,
interest, and personality.28
As Resident Commissioner, Degetau worked continually to obtain
citizenship and statehood for Puerto Rico.

Like Barbosa, he never

lost the conviction that they could be gained.

In 1901, he pointed

out that the Republicans wanted territorial status as a step toward
statehood, while the Federals wanted territorial status with the
rights of a state, except representation in Congress.
not conceive of the validity of the Federal position.29

Degetau could
What the Fed-

erals wanted was full self-government to the degree that a state had
it.

In 1910, five years after his retirement from politics, Degetau
25Barbosa, 4:45.
26 rbid.
27rbid., 4:11.
28 1bid.' 4: 3 5.
29La Correspondencia, 16 February, 1901.
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spoke at a dinner honoring William Jennings Bryan.

His speech reiter-

ated his belief that immediate statehood, for which Puerto Ricans were
prepared, served the best political and economic interest of the island.30

Degetau's widow wrote to Representative William A. Jones that

her husband's last words had been a request to continue his work for
citizenship and statehood.

She reminded Jones of Degetau 1 s confidence

in him as a partner in that work.31
Barbosa and Degetau could side-step the cultural identity issue
because of their belief that Puerto Ricans could preserve their local
heritage under the federal system.

It might be noted that both of

them had 1 ived for years in the United States.
survival of local custom and heritage there.

They had witnessed the
The other major Puerto

Rican objection to statehood as a solution to the status question was
more difficult to avoid.

Puerto Rico could not afford the financial

responsibilities of statehood.
Under the Foraker Act, Puerto Rico kept all revenues collected
in the island for the support of its government and public works.
contributions to the United States government were expected.

No

In addi-

tion, Puerto Rico did not have to support a defense establishment and
received emergency help and a share in federal programs from the
United States,

Jose de Diego, who believed only statehood or inde-

pendence were ideologically defensible positions, noted that statehood
30"Remarks Made by Hon. Federico Degetau on 'Statehood' at that
banquet offered to Mr. Bryan, April 9, 1910," Jones Papers, Box 89.
31Ana N. Degetau to Jones, 3 February 1914, Jones Papers, Box
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would be impossible because of the constitutional clause requiring
equality among the states in contributions to the federal government.3 2
Even under the favorable economic arrangements of the Foraker Act, the
Puerto Rican government did not have sufficient funds to carry out
desired programs in education, sanitation, and road or harbor improvements.
A somewhat typical example of the arguments of an American who
opposed statehood for Puerto Rico are those of Roland P. Falkner.

He

had been Commissioner of Education for the island from 1904 to 1907.
Falkner said that either territorial status or statehood would be a
disaster because Puerto Rico would lose customs revenue and be required
to contribute to the federal government.

Puerto Ricans who wanted

statehood, according to Falkner, "share the coJTJllon traits of Latin
races of being more solicitous of the forms of liberty than of its
substance. 11 33

Not surprisingly, Falkner added that statehood should

not be granted because Puerto Rico's racial and language heritage
made it impossible to assimilate the island into the United States.
Since the islanders were mostly ill iterate and all without experience
in democracy, Falkner concluded that, despite their intelligence, the
Puerto Ricans would not be ready for citizenship or self-government
soon.34

Many Puerto Ricans agreed with the substance of Falkner's
32de Diego, p. 52.
33Falkner, pp. 182-183.
341bid., pp. 184-185.
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argument, except in regard to their being unfit for self-government.
Frank Martinez, one of the younger generation of Union party
leaders, agreed.

He opposed statehood because the island could not

support the obi igations that went with it.

In addition, the dense

island population could not be culturally assimilated.

Because of

the difference in climate and products between Puerto Rico and the
United States, Martinez added that the economic interests of the two
were incompatible.35

Those who wanted statehood could point out that

the United States was not culturally or ethnically uniform.

Many

nations, notably Switzerland, existed and prospered with more than
one official language.

The level of civilization on the island was

not below that of the United States, although North Americans might
not see this point.

As Puerto Rico succeeded rapidly in reducing

its illiteracy rate, pro-statehood islanders could also compare their
island favorably with parts of the mainland in this regard.

These

answers to those opposed to statehood have never, however, been convincing enough to change the mind of anyone concerned with the assimilation problem.
Some of the basic arguments against statehood formed the nucleus
of the arguments for independence.
portance here.

Cultural identity was of great im-

Not only was it impossible for the island to be assimi-

lated into the United States, it was undesirable.

Advocates of inde-

pendence had been a minority while Puerto Rico belonged to Spain.
35Muniz, pp. 100-102.
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sentiment for independence would gain increasing popularity under the
American regime.

Jose de Diego became the outspoken champion of the

cause of Puerto Rican independence.
In 1913, de Diego argued that, since the Foraker Act created
Puerto Rican citizenship and, since sovereignty emanates from citizenship, the island was sovereign, and its status as an American colony
an usurpation.36

He added that continuation of the colonial situation

was contrary to both American traditions and Puerto Rican dignity.

De

Diego saw only statehood or independence as feasible, but statehood
was not desired by either the island or the United States because of
the assimilation problem.37

He successfully urged the Puerto Rican

House of Delegates to tell the new Democratic Congress that its members
did not want United States citizenship.

They rejected citizenship

because it would be a tie between the island and the United States
that would make the achievement of independence more difficult, perhaps
obtainable only in the manner tried by the American South.38

De Diego

urged Puerto Ricans to work for local self-government and to accept
a "Platted" status 1 ike that of Cuba, but in either case he saw it only
in terms of a step toward national independence.39
It was difficult for Puerto Ricans to articulate arguments
opposing the nationalistic appeal of the advocates of independence.
36de Diego, pp. 144-145.
371bid., p. 1 42.
381bid., p. 69.
391 bid.' p. 95.
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Again the most telling argument was economic.

Puerto Rico was too

small to defend or support herself as an independent republic.

The

popularity among independistas of a union of Puerto Rico with Cuba
and the Dominican Republic reflected their answer to this problem.
Hostos saw the economies of the United States and Puerto Rico as incompatible, while the good of the Antilles was identical because their
economies were identical.

He ad\tX:~ed a union of the Antilles.40

De Diego saw such a union as the completion of the dream of Simon
Bollvar. 41

Such schemes were unrealistic and premature, especially

since none of the three islands enjoyed complete sovereignty at the
time.
Despite Quixotic dreams of an Antillean Confederacy, the economic survival' of Puerto Rico remained the nightmare of proponents of
independence.

La Democracia could argue in 1915 that in fact the is-

land was being exploited economically by the United States.
Ricans wanted prosperity but not exploitation.
the island were greater than those received.

Puerto

The benefits given by
The United States did

not protect Puerto Rican sugar and coffee against other competitors,
but American goods had a protected market in Puerto Rico.42

Since

Puerto Rico was not foreign in an international sense, she was within
the protective tariff wall of the United States.
40Hostos, 4:216-217, 241.
41de Diego, p. 123.
42La Democracia, 16 April 1915.

The American Attorney
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General of Puerto Rico stated that the island's businessmen felt they
did not have much to gain even when the tariff was reformed.

Wool,

which was worn in the United States, was put on the free list; cotton,
worn by the islanders and produced in the United States, was not made
free of tariff.

The staple foods of Puerto Rico, rice, beans, and cod,

were all imported from the United States at high prices.43

General

Mcintyre's testimony before the House of Representatives showed the
domination of United States goods in the Puerto Rican market.44

Year

Foreign
Imports

Imports from the
United States

1912

$4,501,928

$38,000,000

.1913

$3,745,057

$33,000,000

1914

$3,838,419

$32,000,000

1915

$2,954,465

$30,000,000

Table 1: Total Dollar Value of Imports into
Puerto Rico, 191 2 - 191 5 . 45
In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1915, Governor Yager reported that
88 percent of the external trade of Puerto Rico was with the United
States.

Over 91 percent of the goods imported into Puerto Rico were

purchased in the United States.46
43wolcott H.. Pitkin, Jr., to Felix Frankfurter, 28 January 1914,
BIA 3377/148.
44 Hearings on H.R. 8501, p. 27.
451bid.

Tabulation from figures in text.

46Arthur Yager, Fifteenth Annual Re ort of the Governor of Porto
Rico (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915 , p. 2.
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Jos~

de Diego took great pains to compute a budget for an inde-

pendent Puerto Rico to demonstrate that it would be $60,000 cheaper
for the island to be independent.47

His argument that Puerto Rico

could afford independence ignored any realistic assessment of the expenses of defense.

It was, in addition, inconsistent with his own

statement that Puerto Rico could not afford statehood.

When Congress

offered independence to Puerto Rico in the Tydings bill of 1936, it
was on terms that virtually guaranteed perpetual poverty for Puerto
Rico.

The Tydings bill had been offered in a spirit of anger.

Rico quickly rejected it. 48

Puerto

Clearly, Puerto Rico could not afford in-

dependence without special aid and consideration from the United States.
In the years before 1917 many islanders realized that their small land
could not escape domination by one imperialistic power or another.
Americans who regarded the islanders as unfit to exercise the
dignities of citizenship and statehood also held them to be unfit for
independence.

Fit or not, Puerto Rico could not receive a promise of

eventual independence like that made to the Philippines.

American

interest in the Caribbean, accentuated by the construction of the
Panama Canal, made retention of the island controlling the Mona Passage
too desirable.

A magazine writer named Frank Fenille was among those

astute enough to equate United States' control of the Panama Canal with
47de Diego, pp. 97, 105,
48Frank Otto Gatell, 11 lndependence Rejected: Puerto Rico and
the Tydings Bill of 1936, 11 HAHR 38 (February 1958):25-44.
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continued control of Puerto Rico,49

The central problem of the advo-

cates of independence was the same as that of those wishing for statehood: Congress did not see fit to grant either,
Advocates of either statehood or independence were willing to
work for self-government within the context of United States domination
of Puerto Rico,

No leading political figure before Luis Munoz Marin,

however, stopped viewing autonomy as a step toward something else,50
Both Governor Hunt and Falkner noted that all Puerto Ricans, of whatever political stamp, wanted increased self-government,51

Governor

Colton warned against the use of the term autonomy because of its special loaded definition in the Puerto Rican political ambient,

Autonomy

meant almost complete self-government without interference from the
United States, especially to the members of the Union party,

It was

true, as Colton stated, that the island Republicans and conservatives
opposed autonomy in this sense,52

Dr. Barbosa and his followers, how-

ever, certainly favored increased democratic participation by the islanders in the running of Puerto Rico,
Autonomy, before the development of the Associated Free State
ideology, was primarily a stop-gap and compromise goal,

It was none

49 11 Porto Rico and American Citizenship, 11 Review of Reviews 38
{_July 1908) : 96'
50Luis Munoz Marin, El status politico de Puerto Rico (Puerto
Rico; Editorial del Departamento de fnstruccion PGbl lea, 1956), pp. 12,
51Hunt, p, 10; Falkner, p, 181.
52colton to Edwards, 15 November 1911, BIA 1286/27.

80
the less ardently wished for by the islanders.

Munoz Rivera, despite

his sentiments in favor of independence, was the leader of the autonomist forces in Puerto Rico until his death in 1916.

He had compromised

with principle in making the pact with Sagasta in order to secure the
Autonomist Charter of 1897 for Puerto Rico.

He would compromise again

in order to obtain as much self-government and privilege for Puerto
Rico as he could in the Jones Act.53

Like de Diego, Munoz Rivera tried

to head off a grant of collective American citizenship without a plebiscite.

Collective citizenship meant that all citizens of Puerto Rico

automatically became citizens of the United States; Puerto Rican citizenship would disappear.

Munoz preferred individual citizenship be-

cause those who wished to remain citizens of Puerto Rico could do so
while those who wanted to be citizens of the United States could apply
to the courts for American citizenship.

Munoz accepted collective

citizenship for himself and for Puerto Rico in order to obtain greater
self-government.
In 1908, Munoz Rivera spoke before the House of Delegates in
defense of Puerto Rico's right to self-government.

His speech argued

against the American opinion that Puerto Ricans were not ready for
self-government.

His conclusion was that the islanders had to ask

for statehood or full qutonomy.

Should their efforts fail, the last

recourse would be a demand for independence.54

Munoz accused the

United States of an unjust abuse of power in denying self-government
53Frank Otto Gatell, "The Art of the Possible: Luis Munoz Rivera
and the Puerto Rican Jones Bill, 11 The Americas 17 (July 1960) :l-20.
5 4Munoz Rivera, Obras, 2:178.
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to Puerto Rico.

Self-government was

modestas aspiraciones. 11 55

11

el estrecho minimum de nuestras

In 1911, Munoz told an American audience

that the United States' own history of opposition to an oppressive
colonialism was the basis for this hope that Puerto Rico would receive
statehood or full autonomy.56

In 1914, he wrote that independence was

preferable to statehood, but statehood would be happily accepted if it
was offered immediately.

Statehood would offer the rights of self-

government the islanders wanted.
independence were impossible.57
self-government.

Munoz noted that both statehood and
His first concern was consistently

He would accept any status that offered autonomy.

He has been criticized for his compromises and for changes in his stand
on status and citizenship.
politics.

He was, however, the giant of Puerto Rican

His changes of attitude reflect changes in Puerto Rican

opinion just as his compromises represent a masterful appreciation of
reality unusual in a poet.
A last important opinion, that of labor leader Santiago Iglesias
Pantln, could be classified as upholding autonomy.
independence hopes as speculative and sentimental.58

Iglesias considered
He opposed inde-

pendence because he believed that the aspirations of the Puerto Rican
551 bid.' 2; 181.
561bid. ' 2:244-5, 248.
'

'

57 Ibid. , 2:265.
58santiago Iglesias Pantln, Luchas Emancipadoras, 2d ed. (San
Juan: lmprenta Venezuela, 1958), p. 394.
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worker would more readily be achieved with the help of the labor movement in the United States and of American democratic principles.

He

thought of statehood as a possibility for the future but held that concern about that eventuality was premature.

Consistently from 1898 to

1917, Iglesias and his labor union, the Free Federation, advocated and
worked for collective United States citizenship.
Rican citizenship to be one recognized nowhere.59

He considered Puerto
His lack of senti-

mental attachment for Puerto Rican citizenship may have been partly
due to the fact that he had been born and raised in Spain.

Iglesias

favored reform of the Foraker Act to increase Puerto Rican self-government, 60 but his lack of trust in the island's prominent leaders influenced him to want full self-government only when literacy and independence of the political machine had been achieved by most islanders.
In 1901, Iglesias succeeded in tying his island labor movement to the
American Federation of Labor.

This was important because the backing

of the A. F. of L. aided him in avoiding additional arrests and harassment in his efforts to organize Puerto Rico's workers. 61

It was im-

portant also because Iglesias had the partnership of Samuel Gompers
and the lobby of the A. F. of L. in pressuring Congress to grant collective American citizenship to the islanders.
59 '· b id., p' 153 '
60tglesias to Gompers 1 29 Apri I 1914, BIA 1286/132.
61Wil I iam G. Whittaker, 11 The Santiago Iglesias Case, 1901-1902;
Origins of American Trade Union Involvement in Puerto Rico," The Americas
24 (April 1968).:378-393.

Transitions in the Citizenship-Status Controversy
The major transition in Puerto Rican sentiment relative to the
citizenship-status question was an increase in the number and virulence
of the supporters of an independent island republic.

Some wily island

politicians may have made much of independence talk more to exert pressure on the colonial power, or to win votes, than to win independence.
Despite this factor of purely strategical rhetoric, Puerto Ricans had
an adequate number of grievances to explain why many would come to reject their tie with the United States.

Changing attitudes toward citi-

zenship reflect this rejection and a growing desire for independence.
In 1900, the Puerto Ricans were disappointed that the Foraker Act did
not make them citizens of the United States.
for citizenship.

They asked repeatedly

Before the outbreak of World War I, however, some

islanders would speak of American citizenship as a chain imposed on
them by the American Congress.
Munoz Rivera's party was the focal point for the expression of
changing Puerto Rican opinion.

The Federal party reacted favorably

to the element of anti-imperialism in the Democratic Platform of 1900
and the campaign of William Jennings Bryan.

At the Caguas convention,

the Federals unanimously supported a resolution in support of Bryan.
They held that he and his program were the hope for autonomous government in Puerto Rico.

Stating that the Federals wanted to be a national

party with full American citizenship, the resolution dee! ined to adopt
the name of Bryan's party because it was not known how the mainland
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Democrats felt about it and because the Puerto Ricans were not yet
Amerfcan citizens.62
Between 1900 and 1904, however, the Federals were the political
"outs" in Puerto Rico.

This was due to many factors, including nonpar-

ticipation by the Federals, favoritism by the administration toward
the pro-American Republicans, and continued popularity of Barbosa's
statehood and citizenship ideal.

When Munoz Rivera reorganized his

followers as the Union party in 1904, its long domination of island
politics began.

The platform of the Union party included the option

of independence.

For the first time, a major statement demanded either

statehood or independence,

The inclusion of independence reflects

growing discontent with the status quo of the Foraker Act. 63

In 1905,

a convention of island teachers sent a memorial to Congress stating
that Borinquen wanted to be either a state of the United States or an
independent republic 1 ike Cuba.6 4

The next year, Matienzo Cintron

wrote that, although Puerto Rico had asked politely for citizenship,
the United States had the right to say that they could not or did not
want to grant it.
humiliating.

But to say that the islanders were not prepared was

Should the Americans deny citizenship, they could not

deny independence.

That would violate the rights of the Puerto Ricans

62La Correspondencia, 2 October 1900.
63L ew i s , p • I 0 4 •

64La Democracia, 3 July 1905,
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and the Monroe Doctrine.65

Matienzo seems not to realize that the

Monroe Doctrine denied new colonies to European powers without denying
them to the United States.
Meanwhile, the islanders received encouragement that their wish
for citizenship would soon be fulfilled.

President Theodore Roosevelt

in his messages of 1905, 1906, 1907, and 1908 asked the Congress to
make the Puerto Ricans citizens of the United States.

In 1906, Roose-

velt appointed a Puerto Rican, Tulio Larrinaga, to represent the United States at a Pan-American Congress.

This was partly motivated by

the President's desire to embarrass Congress into granting citizenship.66

His support for a grant of citizenship to Puerto Rico was

consistent with his Caribbean pol icy.

Puerto Rico should be held be-

cause she controlled one of the major sea passages between the Atlantic
and the Panama Canal.

The Puerto Ricans responded to Roosevelt's en-

couragement by sending a joint resolution of their legislature to Congress requesting American citizenship. 67
a citizenship bill.

Senator Foraker had introduced

Representative Jones supported it.

nents to the measure were few, but they were powerful.

Strong oppoSenator Root

led the Senate opposition to citizenship because he thought that Puerto
Rico should be treated as Cuba and the Dominican Republic were to keep
American pol {cy in the Caribbean consistent.
65Dlaz, Matienzo, 2~109-llQ.
66Morales Carri6n, p. 146.
67Muniz, p. 124,

Speaker Joseph Cannon
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opposed citizenship for Puerto Rico in the House of Representatives.
His attitude toward the islanders can best be described as contemptuous.

The opposition of two powerful Congressmen made it impossible

for less powerful men, like Foraker and Jones, to overcome the indifference of the majority in Congress. 68

As we shall see with regard

to later legislation, the greatest problem in getting a bill for Puerto
Rico passed in Congress was indifference.
ter all, no Congressman's

The Puerto Ricans were, af-

co~stituents.

Many people were aware that Congressional failure to grant citizenship to the islanders was an important cause of discontent.

Ex-

amples of pleas for the passage of a citizenship bill as a panacea for
Puerto Rican criticism of the American regime came both from islanders
and mainlanders.69

Falkner attributed the inaction of the Congress to

a lack of definite policy toward the future of the island.

A grant of

citizenship without a firm policy would be opening up broader questions.70

Bonsal agreed and added that the pol icy vacuum was more dif-

ficult to fill because it involved the future of the Philippines and,
perhaps, Cuba as well as Puerto Rico.71

Many Puerto Ricans, like

68 u.sq Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto
Rico, Hearing, on bill S, 2620, to provide that the inhabitants of Porto Rico should b.e citizens of the United States. 59th Cong., 2d sess.,
190 '
69Manuel V. Domenech to Governor James f. Fielder, 27 June 1913,
Wilson Papers; Hamilton to Wilson 1 5 August 1913, BIA 1286/90; Josi
Aponte to President Taft, 18 December 1911, BIA 1286/35; Roberto H.
Todd to Edwards, 31 January 1912, BIA 1286/40,
70Falkner, p. 180,
71Bonsa1, p. 296.
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Matienzo Cintron, felt humiliated by the American refusal to grant
citizenship because they knew that it was largely due to the opinion
that the islanders were not prepared for citizenship.

This insult to

Puerto Rican pride is a factor in the growth of independence sentiment.
During the last part of the Roosevelt administration and the
beginning of the William Howard Taft administration, Puerto Rican discontent became more pronounced.

Patience with the temporary Foraker

Act and its odious Executive Council was wearing thin.

In December,

1908, the island Republican party sent a delegation to Washington to
request a quick grant of collective American citizenship, an elected
upper house for the legislature, and protection for Puerto Rico's
coffee industry.72

That same year, Munoz Rivera delivered his famous

speech to the House of Delegates threatening an independence movement
if autonomy or statehood was not forthcoming.
In 1909, for the first time, the House of Delegates was entirely
composed of Union party candidates.
the moment for stronger protest.

Munoz Rivera decided that it was

As a result, the House of Delegates

refused to approve appropriations for the coming year.
may be called the first step toward the Jones Act.

This action

Taft and Congress

were outraged at what they chose to call the irresponsibility of the
islanders,

Puerto Rico was suddenly important enough to get a bill

through Congress, but it was simply a bill to negate the protest and
provi'de money for the coming year's government.

The reaction of the

72 Republ ican party Delegation Credentials, 17 December 1908, BIA

719/5.
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President and the Congress further disillusioned Puerto Ricans.

Taft's

Secretary of War, Jacob Dickinson, reported that his investigation
following the crisis indicated that there was a virtually universal
desire among the islanders for American citizenship.

Dickinson, how-

ever, thought that granting citizenship would hurt investments and
development in the island.73
Governor Regis H. Post and the island's Attorney General disagreed.

Post wrote to Secretary Dickinson saying that he and the Attor-

ney General, Henry M. Hoyt, supported a legal suit being brought to
get a Supreme Court determination of citizenship.74

The Governor also

conducted his own poll of about two-hundred prominent islanders to gain
support for his requests to the War Department for citizenship and
other reforms.

The response to Post's poll favored citizenship by a

vote of 188 for and eighteen against United States citizenship.75
After George R. Colton replaced Post, Hoyt continued the Post policy
by advising the new Governor that, since the islanders had the rights
of citizens of the United States, they necessarily were American citizens.76

Governor Colton and Hoyt tried to get an executive department

determination that the Puerto Ricans were American citizens.77

A.Law

Officer in the island's government, Paul Charlton, agreed that the
73wagenhe(m, p. 69.
74Post to Dickinson, 25 August 1909, BIA 1286/10.
75Post report, September 1909, BIA 168/58.
76Hoyt to Colton, 14 December 1909, BIA 1286/12.
77colton to Edwards, 15 December 1909, BIA 1286/13.

Puerto Ricans had the rights of citizens; therefore, their official
designation as such was a matter of sentiment.78

Such arguments that

a grant of citizenship was only a formality did not impress the Supreme Court, the War Department, or the Puerto Ricans.
Despite the efforts of Governor Colton to get citizenship for
the islanders, it was during his tenure that the separatist movement
grew and flourished.

The Republican platform of 1908 had committed

Taft to seeking citizenship for the Puerto Ricans, but the question
of future status was undecided.

During Taft's administration, two

reform bills for Puerto Rico were introduced into the Congress.

The

Olmsted government bill was a bitter disappointment to the Puerto Ricans.

It would allow them to become American citizens, but the self-

government features of the Olmsted bill were only a very slight improvement over the Foraker Act.

Then a citizenship bill was intro-

duced just as Puerto Rican unanimity concerning citizenship was collapsing.

Neither bill was passed by Congress.
While Congress dragged its feet on the Olmsted government bill

and the citizenship bill, the strength of the Union party increased
in Puerto Rico.
two to one.

In 1910, the Union outpolled the Republicans almost

Luis Munoz Rivera became Resident Commissioner.79

His

absense from Puerto Rico after 1910 lessened his control of the Union
party.

The radicals, led by de Diego, gained the upper hand until
78charlton to Edwards, 21 December 1909, BIA 1286/11.
79Aitken, p. 56.
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Munoz was forced to fight down independista sentiments, which he
shared, and reassert autonomous principles.

Autonomy had been the

major goal for defining the relationship of Puerto Rico with Spain.
tt would be more difficult to sell this same goal in a relationship
with the United States.
In July 1911, de Diego, writing as President of the House of
Delegates, asked the Secretary of War for collective United States
citizenship for Puerto Rico.BO

Henry Stimson was more willing than

Dickinson had been to work for it, but he faced the same problem that
had plagued Roosevelt.

It was difficult to get a citizenship bill

through the Congress when most Representatives and Senators were indifferent or hesitant about granting statehood.

Stimson decided to

declare openly what had been donie before more subtlely.

He stated in

December, 1911, that citizenship did not mean statehood someday and
that Puerto Rico would probably never become a state.

But citizenship

without statehood was not exactly what the Puerto Ricans had in mind.
Matienzo Cintron thought that there were already two kinds of United
States citizenship: that of the whites and that of the blacks, who
vote if the whites wish and live if the whites wish.

The Puerto Ricans

would have a third type of citizenship: citizenship for convenience
81
.
. h co 1on1a
. 1.ism an d wit
. hout sovereignty.
.
an d busrness
wit

E1 i hu Root,

who wanted Puerto Rico to be a protected republic 1 ike Cuba, advised

Bode Diego to Stimson, 27 ~uly 1911, BIA 1286/19.
81Dlaz, Matienzo, 2:111-112.
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Stimson that despite his statement that Puerto Rico would never be a
state, the islanders would resent being inferior citizens and eventually would demand the full rights of citizens of the United States.82
Stimson's citizenship-without-statehood idea prompted the
Union party to be critical of a grant of collective citizenship.

Many

preferred that citizenship be granted to all who chose it but not imposed upon everyone.

The War Department opposed individual citizenship

on grounds of practicality.

Processing each individual application

for citizenship in the courts would be time-consuming and costly.

Fe-

1 ix Frankfurter, a law officer of the Bureau of Insular Affairs at
this time, suggested that collective citizenship be granted with the
proviso that it could be declined by registering intent to refuse it
with the courts. 8 3

His idea would become law in the Jones Act but not

before a good fight against collective citizenship by the Union party.
The years 1912, 1913, and 1914 were the flood tide of independence agitation in Puerto Rico.

In 1912, two new organizations aiming

for independence were formed: the Civic Association and the Independence party.

Governor Colton noted that the men forming the Civic Asso-

ciation had been supporters of United States citizenship.
men with prominent positions in Puerto Rico.

They were

Colton concluded that

they had turned to independence because of the inaction of Congress
~nd

the statements of some Americans which caused the islanders to
82Root to Stimson, 7 December 1911, BIA 1286/36 1/2.
83Edwards to Colton, 22 November 1911, BIA 1286/22.
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give up hopes for an end to colonial ism in Puerto Rico.84

Matienzo

Cintron led the formation of the Independence party in Februar~ 1912.
The Independence party was unable to garner enough support to challenge
the Union party and the Republicans in the election of 1912.

It faded

from importance in the Puerto Rican political scene with the death of
Matienzo in Decembe~ 1913.85
De Diego's faction of the Union party retained leadership of
the struggle for independence.

In 1913, the House of Delegates unani-

mously endorsed a memorial asking that the Puerto Ricans, who love
their citizenship as such, be consulted before United States citizenship was given.86

In October, 1913, the House proclaimed the right

of Puerto Rico to national independence. 8 7

De Diego wrote to the War

Department stating his wish that Puerto Rico become a protectorate
like Cuba. 8 8

The November, 1913, convention of the Union party at

Miramar rewrote the platform of 1904.
platform and independence stressed.

Statehood was removed from the
In March of 1914, the Union party-

controlled House of Delegates sent a memorial to the President and
Congress rejecting collective American citizenship.89
84colton to Mcintyre, 2 March 1913, BIA 26429/2.
'

85Manuel Maldonado-Denis, Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historic Inter retatfon, trans. Elena Vi~lo (New York: Vintage Books, 1972 , pp. 9 -99.
86Muniz, p, 121,
87de Diego, p. 33.
88de Diego to Mcintyre and Garrison, 18 November 1913, BIA 26429/
23.
8 9de Diego, pp. 133-134, 197-205.
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In the Fall of 1915, Munoz Rivera left Washington to reassert
his leadership of the Union party.

Jose de Diego was President both

of the Union party and of the House of Delegates.

De Diego rejected

the partial reform represented by the Olmsted and Jones government
bills.

His leadership in Puerto Rico, during the absense of Munoz,

had been important in changing the attitude of the dominant Union
party from one of moderation to one of demands for independence.
Aitken states, without documentation, that Munoz returned because
Woodrow Wilson demanded that independence be taken out of the Union
party platform before reform legislation would be passed.90

I have

been unable to find evidence to either support or refute this contention.

It is plausible because of the time-gap during 1915 on the

Jones bill.

Aitken, however, was the only source to make this claim,

and his work is primarily a biography of Munoz Rivera's son which
would not imply intensive research on a period when Munoz Marin was
~

about seventeen.
Munoz Rivera had, however, become convinced that independence
agitation under qe Diego's leadership was partly responsible for the
delay in the passage of the Jones bill.

Martin Travieso, Jr., the

acting governor of Puerto Rico, reported the discussion at a meeting
of the Central Committee of the Union party on October 9, 1915.

Munoz

crfticfzed de Diego•s leadership of the party because he felt the
Union should be using all of its energies to secure passage of the
Jones bill giving increased self-government and citizenship.
90Aitken, p. 57.

De Diego's
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independence agitation and his plans to visit Santo Domingo and Cuba
did not meet with Munoz' approval.

All of the other members of the

Central Committee supported Munoz, but de Diego refused to back down.91
The full convention of the Union party would decide the issue.
Munoz Rivera reported the results of the Union party convention
held on October 24, 1915.

By a vote of 106 to thirty-five, the Union

decided to pursue a policy aimed entirely at self-government.

Inde-

pendence was retained in the party platform as an ideal for the future,
not an issue for the present.

The Union officially wished to maintain

cooperation with the island's government and that in Washington.

This

w7s the best means to obtain the aspirations of the Union party.92

In

a later explanation to the Union party of his fight with de Diego,
Munoz said that it had been difficult speaking of realities to those
absorbed in visions and dreams.9 3

De Diego was replaced as President

of the Union party by Antonio Barcelo, Munoz' hand-picked successor.
The undaunted de Diego continued in his criticism of the Jones bill
and in plans for a speaking tour of Cuba and the Dominican Republic.
The reasons for the growth of independence agitation are many.
Fundamental reasons for discontent were the failure of Congress to
grant American citizenship and to pass a new organic act without some
of the paternalistic features of the Foraker Act.

The problems of

Americanj'zation and Puerto Rican resentment of their treatment by the
91Travteso to Col. Charles C. Walcutt, 9 October 1915, BIA 719/
37.
9 2Munoz to Yager, 30 October 1915, BIA 719/39.
93La Democracia, 17 November 1915.
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Americans contributed to desires for independence which thrived upon
hispanidad.

There was also the realization that the Puerto Ricans

would be second-class citizens at best.

After years of training in

American procedures and of agitation for self-government, the amount
of reform embodied in the Olmsted and Jones bills seemed much less
than what was expected by the Puerto Ricans.
In addition, complaints about the increasing American domination
of the island's economy became more frequent after 1909.

The ascend-

ancy of the business "Trusts" under Governor Colton, who was anxious
to develop business in the island, was equated with the rise of the
separatist movement.9 4 The Puerto Ricans had tried to salvage their
coffee industry, but hurricanes and a lack of protection against the
competition of cheaper grades of coffee had ruined its prosperity.95
When the tariff was revised in 1913 to put sugar on the free 1 ist,
the plight of the powerful sugar industry in Puerto Rico strained
Puerto Rican loyalty to the United States.
The factors contributing to the growth of independence sentiment were not always understood by Americans.

Governor Yager's per-

sonal analysis of the causes of independence agitation are an example.
He stated:

t thfnk that the independence movement in Porto Rico was built
up upon the foundation of a rather sentimental attitude, caused
by the denial of citizenship, and the cause of it was a political matter, The pol fticians took great interest in the appointment of a certain official there. The official was not appointed.
94Pica Pica, 28 November 1911, BIA 750/9.
951bid.
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An American was appointed instead, and that just furnished
the match to the fuse. They are a very sentimental people.
They can get up a very strong excitement in a few minutes
about matters of really no great importance. That is the
Latin-American temperament, and so they exploded and went
off rapidly and committed themselves in general to a propaganda for independence; then, having gone off, it is not
always easy to get back; but they have gotten back.96
To the Puerto Ricans, of course, the appointment of an American
to a post desired for a Puerto Rican was extremely important.

Such a

situation was clearly an issue of the islanders' lack of control over
the affairs of their island.

It was a denial of self-government.

The years of the strongest independence agitation, 1909 to 1914,
coincide with years during which either an organic act or a citizenship
bill were in the Congressional works.

I think that the stepping up of

pressure for independence in 1912 and 1913 can be tied to the change
of administration in Washington.

Going on previous statements by Wil-

son and Bryan, many Puerto Ricans thought that the United States under
their leadership might give the island its independence if it were
made clear that independence was what Puerto Rico wanted.

Judge Ham-

il ton just assumed that the United States would keep the island.97
Governor Yager, in his inaugural address, flatly stated that the American flag would never be lowered over Borinquen.

The realization that

independence was not a realistic option did diminish the agitation of
some (ndependence advocates,

Independence was not an option because

Wilson and his administration made it clear that they were not considering independence for Puerto Rico any more than Roosevelt or Taft had.
96Hearings on H.R. 8501, p. 9.
97Hamilton to Wilson, 5 August 1913, BIA 1286/109.
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Another reason for the ebbing of independence agitation was
that Munoz Rivera was made to see that the display of pro-independence
and anti-American citizenship feelings in the island only made the
passage of reform for Puerto Rico more unlikely.

Jose Coll y Cuchi

would say that the Union party backed down on its nationalism in 1915
because of World War t.9 8

This seems to be at least partly true.

The

cdming .of World War did encourage Washington to demonstrate its democratic principles by granting some semblance of justice to Puerto Rico.
World War I also made the certain control of the approaches to the
Panama Canal of vital interest in Washington.

In addition, the war

caused the islanders to reconsider the advisability of being cut adrift
from the food supply and protection of the United States.
While the Puerto Ricans accumulated discontent and debated the
future status of their island, the administrators of Puerto Rico and
the Bureau of Insular Affairs continuously pushed to get legislation
through Congress.

If the American government as a whole had no policy

toward its new colony, the people who had to administer Puerto Rico
perforce developed their own.

That pol icy was that the island should

receive United States citizenship and moderate reform of the Foraker
Act.

The growth of the separatist movement coincides with the beginning

of ser{ous attempts to achieve legislation.

Both can be dated from the

approprfations crisis in the Puerto Rican House of Delegates in 1909.

98col I y Cuchi, p. 13.

CHAPTER IV
FAILURE OF REFORM: 1909

~

1913

From 1909 until the passage of the Jones Act, legislation for
Puerto Rico was almost continually before the American Congress.
emergency appropriations amendment was passed in 1909.

An

Apolitical

reform bill and a citizenship bill, however, were not approved.

A-

gainst the background of mounting Puerto Rican resentment, American
political leaders often seemed strangely bl ind to the urgency of the
needs of the colony.

Puerto Rico, unlike the Philippines, had never,

since the conquest, engaged in armed resistance to American rule.

It

wai when the islanders did engage in deliberate obstruction of the
orderly process of civil government that the Americans took speedy
action.

Their action was to legislate away the avenue of obstruction

the Puerto Ricans had used.
The Legislative Crisis of 1909
The most hated feature of the Foraker Act was the Executive
Council,

Thcit body was entirely appointed by the American President.

tt was dominated by Americans,
islanders,

There were six mainlanders and five

The Council was the upper house of the insular legislature

and, at the same time, six of its members were heads of the executive

98
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departroents of the

{sl~nd

government,

Until 1914, the six department

heads were always the six North Americans on the Executive Council.
An assembly of the municipalities of the island met in San Juan in
1905,

It drafted a memorial to Congress which fairly represents the

continuing opinion of Puerto Ricans toward the Executive Council.
While complaining of the power given to Americans who came to the island with no knowledge of its language, traditions or problems, but
immediately decided its fate, the message asked for an elected senate
of fourteen, and for department heads appointed by the governor of
Puerto Rico with the consent of the insular senate. 1 Less politely,
Jose de Diego argued for the same end saying that, in the Puerto Rican
legislature, one branch represented the oppression of a foreign government and the other branch was the only instrument of the will of the
country. 2
In the insular election of November, 1908, the Unionists polled
101,033 of a total 158,134 votes cast.3

The Republicans got 54,962

/

votes and Iglesias' Labor polled 1,327.
was composed of Union party members.

The entire House of Delegates

Two appointed Republicans sat on

the Executive Council, but they could not influence any break in the
solidarity of the Unionists in the House.
1

Willoughby had, in his 1907

L~ Democracia, 25 July 1905,

2de Diego, p . 17.
3cayetano Coll Cuch!, ed., Pro Patria. Relacion documentada de
los trabajos llevados a cabo en ia ciudad de Washington por la Comision
de la camara de de le ados de Puerto Rico con motive de los confl ictos
legtslativos de 1909 San Juan: M. Burillo & Co., 1909 , p. 90.
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article defending the Executive Council, almost predicted the means the
House could use against the Council.

He said that should conflict be-

tween the two branches reach the point where any legislation would be
difficult, "with the exception of the passage of a general appropriation act, ... the injury will be negative rather than positive, the most
critical period of the change from the system of Spansih to American
law and government having now been passed. 11 4

Representatives of the

Council pointed out that it was the usual practice for the House of
Delegates to delay the appropriations bills until the last day of the
legislative session in an attempt to get affirmative action from the
.Council on House bi 11s.5
The opening of the insular legislature in January, 1909, was
soon followed by a joint meeting of the House of Delegates and the Central Junta of the Union party.

On January 12, this joint meeting adop-

ted a resolution saying that it was necessary to work against the Fora;l<.er Act and that the House would vote for laws tending in the direction of increased autonomy for the islanders.6

One action of the

Delegates was to ask the heads of the executive departments of the
government to supply them with reports on their activities.7
4willoughby,

11

The first

Executive Council, 11 p. 569.

5u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto
Rico, Amend(~g Act to Provide Revenues, etc, for Porto Rico, a report
to accompany H.R. 9541, S, Rept, JO, 61st Cong., 1st sess., 1909, p. 10.
6col l, Pro Patria, p, 19,
71bid,' pp. 21,...22.
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serious clash occurred between Munoz Rivera and Governor Post.

On

January 15, Munoz addressed the House complaining of Post's action
in appointing as the alcalde of Caguas a man who, Munoz claimed, had
been recommended by one American instead of the man recommended by
the Union party.

Post replied that he always considered the choice

of the Union when filling a vacancy, but that the responsibility was
his, and sometimes he felt the party choice was one that would benefit
the party rather than the island as a whole.

Munoz responded that

this attitude was tyranny and personal caprice, since the choice of
the Governor should follow the will of the citizens.
Post invited the Unionist Junta to a meeting.

On January 25,

The Governor asked

the Union leaders to soothe the bad feelings in the House because he
felt that extremists only lessened the chance of Congress granting
self-government.

On their part, the Unionists said that bad feelings

~ad been caused by the negative articles about the island appearing

in the American press and because it appeared that the Puerto Ricans
were considered unfit for government jobs, even as tax assessors.a
The sentiments expressed in this confrontation at the opening of the
legislature would be reflected in the major clash which came at the
end of the session.
The appropriations. bill passed by the Executive Council was
ame.nded by the House of Delegates to cut every possible salary and
especf~lly

to strike out all revenue for the Federal Court.

A Puerto

Rtcan account of these amendments says that salaries were reduced
atbid., PP· 21, 25-32.
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following the recommendation of its committee on finance, and that,
while some Federal Court salaries were reduced by 90 percent, only
part of its expense budget was trimmed.9

The Federal Court with its

American judges and Amerfcan legal procedures was a special target
of dislike.

An American account of the House amendments says that

the House cut every salary that had not been fixed by Congress.10
The Executive Council refused to adhere to the amendments made by
the House in the appropriations bills.
On March 10, 1909, the crisis began when the Executive Council
advised the House that it would not approve the budgetary changes of
\

the House and that it had chosen a conference committee.

The same

day the Council altered substantially or rejected completely several
bills introduced by the House.

These bills embodied changes which

the Union party wanted badly because they enhanced Puerto Rican cont~ol.

The islanders tried to put property assessment in the hands of

three assessors chosen by lot from the twenty largest taxpayers instead of local boards under the control of the American Treasurer of
Puerto Rico.

This proposal reflected the influence of the wealthy in

the Union party as much as a desire for control by islanders.

The

Executive Council rejected this proposal on the grounds that the taxpC!yers most able to pay should not be the people to decide how much
they C!nd others should pay,

The Council rejected a House bill for an

agricultural bank because the money called for in the bill was not
91bid,, p. 44.
10Report to accompany H.R. 9541, p. 10.
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available.

A bill to establish a manual training school was objected

to because it put the new school under a department headed by a Puerto
Rican . 11

This bill was amended to put the school under the Commis-

sioner of Education, who had always been an American, because the
Forake.~

Act required that schools be under his jurisdiction.

Two

bills passed by the House were combined by the Council: a bi! 1 to have
the councils, not the governor, fill vacancies in the municipal councils and in the posts of alcaldes, and a bill to replace justices of
the peace with elected municipal judges.

The House of Delegates saw

these last two bills as putting the selection of public servants in
the hands of the people. 12

The Executive Council saw them as putting

this control into the hands of the Central Junta of the Union party.13
The first conference committee of March 10, 1909, met for severa! hours without agreement.

A second committee appointed by each

branch of the legislature met late into the night without a settlement.
March II was the last day of the regular session, and a new conference
committee failed.

Governor Post said that he was told that the radi-

cals in the House planned to push for adjournment without approving an
appropriations bill.

Post quickly agreed to a special session to be-

gin March 12 when representatives of both houses requested it. 14 Before. adjourn{ng, the House of Delegates passed a memorial to the
11 tbid., pp. 10-11.
12col 1, Pro Patria 1 p. 47,
13Report to accompany H.R. 9541, pp. 10-11.
l4lbid., p. 6.
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President and Congress calling the Foraker Act unjust and requesting
an entirely elected legislature with an upper house having the power
to approve the appointments of the governor for heads of executive
departments.15
The special session was primarily intended to work out the
approp.riations impasse.

Governor Post had, however, asked that a

few measures he favored be considered as well.

This left the door

open for the House of Delegates to ask for reconsideration of its
bills.

Over the week end, the Union party held an assembly.

The

Central Junta offered to resign if the assembly did not approve the
actions of the House.

The Unionists gave Munoz Rivera, de Diego,

and the others ovations of support and asked them not to resign.

A

resolution was approved by the assembly of the Union party stating
that the party would continue to push for radical change in the Foraker Act to gain more self-government and that it fully supported the
House and the Central Junta.

Only Hostos' old crony, Dr. Zeno Gandia,

voted against de Diego 1 s suggestion that the resolution also include
a statement of respect for the American people but a determination
to fight against those American functionaries in the island who failed
to contribute to the development of democratic institutfons, 16
Reinforced by the support of the Union, the House of Delegates
was not i.n a mood to back down..
15coll, pro Patria, p. 47.
l61bid" pp. 58.-60, 64.,.65,

The 1as t two days. of the speci a 1
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session, March 15 and 16, saw no solution to the crisis.

The Execu-

tive Council still wanted the appropriations bill passed by the House
without amendments.

The House still wanted its bills approved, es-

pecially the municipal bill taking the power to fill vacancies away
from the governor.

During the special session, Governor Post had

threatened that failure to pass the appropriations bill would force
him to refer the matter to Congress.17

This he would do.

The special

session adjourned with both the Executive Council and the House of
Delegates appointing representatives to tell their side of the story
in Washington.
lhe Council picked three of its American members to represent
it: Wi)l iam F. Willoughby, the Secretary of Puerto Rico, Henry M. Hoyt,
the Attorney-General, and George Cabot Ward, the Auditor.

The Puerto

Ricans on the Executive Council, both Republicans and Unionists, tended
to side with the House of Delegates on the appropriations dispute, even
when they acknowledged that the Council's reasons for opposing the
House bills were val id.

Representing the House of Delegates were Luis

Munoz Rivera, Cayetano Coll Cuch!, and Eugenio Benitez Castano.

The

three Puerto Ricans sailed on March 18, 1909, and arrived in New York
on March 23,

Benitez returned to the island early because of illness,

but Mu"oz and Coll dfd not arrive back in San Juan until May 6.

During

their stay on the mainland, the islanders spent much of their time trying to combat the unfavorable interpretations of the House of Delegates
17Report to accompany H.R. 9541, pp. 6-7.
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action that were appearing in the press. l8

Their main purpose, how-

ever, was to prevent, if possible, a quick joint resolution of the
Congress that would end their chance to have their side of the story
heard.

They wanted to convince as many Congressmen as possible to

back their cause.19
Joined by the Unionist Resident Commissioner, Tul io Larrinaga,
the islanders first important meeting was with the Secretary of the
tnterior, Richard Ballinger, on March 25.
er did not say that the islanders were

Coll reported that Ball in-

right~but

done the same if he had been one of them. 20

that he would have

When they met with Bal-

1 inger on March 29, the representatives of the Executive Council were
also present.
r

Coll and Munoz left this meeting convinced that the

Secretary\ was on the side of the Council in the dispute.2 1

Ballinger

quite succinctly summed up the crisis in his letter to President Taft.
He said that the House of Delegates had refused to approve the appropriations bill unless the Executive Council approved bills giving
greater autonomy and participation to the islanders.

The recommenda-

tions of the Secretary to Taft were important because the President
based his own upon them.

Ballinger saw the administration confronted

18coll, Pro Patria, pp .. 71, 145, 209, 119..,120, and 154-155.
191bjd.

1

p~ 150~

201bid •. , p .. 77.
21 rbid., P·. 96.
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with two questions, that of appropriations and that of self-government.
He suggested that the two be handled separately, recommending that the
appropriations crisis be settled by Congressional amendment similar
to appropriations provisions in previous legislation for Hawaii and
the Philippines.

Self-government could then be considered later.22

The next meeting of the Puerto Rican delegates was with President Taft himself.

Taft's apparent ignorance of what had happened in

the legiflative deadlock surprised the islanders.

Secretary Ballinger

interrupted the President to tell him that his comments did not accurately reflect the situation.
side of the story.

Taft then asked Coll to explain his

When Coll had finished, President Taft told the

islanders to go home and approve the budget.

The President would then,

within a few months, send a commission to the island to investigate
and advise him concerning future reform legislation.

At the end of

the brief interview with Taft, the Puerto Ricans decided to concentrate on trying to bring their argument for reform of the Foraker Act
before Congress.23
On April 2, 1909, Munoz, Coll, and Benitez met with the head of
the Committee on Insular Affairs in the House of Representatives.

He

promised the fuerto Ricans his assistance should the legislative clash
22Affairs in forto R.ico. Message from the President (Taft) inviting the attention of the Congress to legislative difficulties in
Porto R(co, w(th acco.m anyin papers, and recommendin an amendment
to the Foraker Act, S, Doc. 40, 6Jst Cong., 1st sess, Washington,
D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 6.
23col1, Pro Patria, pp, 103-105.
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come bef\re Congress. 24

Senator Chauncey Depew of New York, chairman

of the Senate Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, saw the islanders in his home on April 3.
sympathetic.
Committee.

The Senator impressed Coll as being

He invited the islanders to meet with the full Senate
This meeting of April 6 was a failure because only Depew

and one other Senator came.
tariff to attend.

The other members were too busy with the

Another meeting called for April 8 was better at-

tended, but Coll reported that the Senators put the islanders on the
defensive.25
By mid-April, Munoz and Coll realized that they could not block
the Taft administration's presentation of legislation to overturn the
protest of the House of Delegates.

They also felt that the members

of Congress were too involved in the tariff question to take the time
to 1 isten to them.

For these reasons, they drafted a memorial to all

the Congressmen and decided to return home.

Their long memorial was

intended to inform the Congressmen about Puerto Rico.

It included a

comparison of the Spanish Autonomous Charter and the Foraker Act, as
well as an analysis of Puerto Rico under American rule.

The memorial

was dramatically adressed;
The undersignedt as representqtjves of a people in servitude,
beg of you 7 the repre$entqtjyes of a free people, that before
castfng your vote jn Congress on the question of Porto Rico you
re9d these short page$ and be. convinced that we are simgly asking
for our rights and appealing to your sense of justice.26
24 I, bid, , pp. 111-112 ..
25tbid., pp. 119-120, 123-124.
26MuFioz, Coll, and Benitez,
Box 89.

11

To the Congress," p. l, Jones Papers,
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Essentially, the memorial asked for reform of the Foraker Act to provide for an elected Senate having the power to approve appointments
to be made by the governor rather than the President.
President Taft brought the Puerto Rican question to the attention of Congress in a special message on May 10, 1909.

On April 7,

Taft had asked Attorney General George Wickersham to render an opinion on Section 36 of the Foraker Act to see whether the Executive
Council might approve appropriations without action by the House of
Delegates.27

Wickersham's negative response was embodied in the Pres-

ident's remark that the terms of the Foraker Act left the question in
doubt, but it was too late to overturn the precedent followed since
1900 in giving the House of Delegates a role in the approval of all
expenses except those set by the Congress.28

Following Ball inger 1 s

suggestion, Taft recommended that Congress amend tne Foraker Act to
provide that the budget of the previous year would be effective should
the Puerto Rican legislature fail to approve appropriations for the
next year.

Taft's message showed his interpretation of the appropria-

tions crisis as evidence that the legislature was too irresponsible
to have control of appropriations.

He recited all the financial bene-

f(ts to the island of the Foraker Act and the major improvements made
(n the

area~

of healthf educat(on 1 roads 1 and trade.

The Puerto Ricans

were ungrateful and, the President thought, had been extended too much
self-government too quickly,

Taft, however, did agree that the Congress

2 7coll, Pro Patria, pp, 122-123 .
28 Affairs in Porto Rico, p. 2.
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might soon consider reform of the Foraker Act to change the balance
of power between the Executive Council and the elected representatives
of the islanders.29
Congress, already in special session, acted to pass a bill
amending the Foraker Act in line with Taft's suggestions.

Marl in E.

Olmsted became the new chairman of the House Committee of Insular
Affairs.

Coll thought this was because the Speaker, Joe Cannon, felt

the previous chairman was too friendly to the islanders.30

Olmsted

introduced the appropriations amendment, which would come to carry his
name.

Debate was brief, but one Representative objected to being asked

to punish the House of Delegates for doing precisely what the Congress
did every day.31

After the House of Representatives approved the

amendment, Senator Depew introduced it into the Senate on July 3, 1909.
The first section of the bill enacted the budget carry-over proposal.
Section 2 authorized the President to name one executive department to
handle all the business between the island and the United States.

Pri-

or to 1909, each insular executive department had reported to the corresponding department of the federal executive.32

This second provi~

sion had not appeared in the draft amendment sent to Congress by the
29tb{d,i pp. 2-6.
30coll, Pro Patria, p. 111,
3 1 ,bld,, p, 93.

32Report to accompany H.R. 9541, p. I.
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White House.

It had been inserted by Olmsted.33

The Olmsted amend-

ment passed on July 15, 1909.

Taft's Executive Order on the same day

put the amendment into effect.

He chose to put all of Puerto Rico's

affairs under the War Department and its Bureau of Insular Affairs.34
When the island's Attorney General interpreted the terms of
the Olmsted amendment as making appropriations and authorizing the

gov~rnor

t6 cover the expenses of government from them, the Union par-

ty objected.

It brought a suit asking for an injunction to stop the

governor from making payments.35

This attempted protest failed.

The

following year, the House of Delegates passed the appropriations bill,
but added a protest against the interpretation of the Olmsted amendment given by the island's executive branch of government.
The effects of the legislative crisis of 1909 and the reaction
of the Taft administration and Congress are several.

American opinion,

indicated by the islander's problems with the press, tended to follow
Taft's disapproval of the House of Delegates for acting in an ungrateful and irresponsible way.

As Kal Wagenheim concludes, the Olmsted

amendment did emasculate the protest of the House of Delegates against
the Executive Counci1.37

The House of Delegates in the future would

have less leverage to apply against the Council,
33olmsted to Edwards, 2 r«>vember 1909, BlA 3377/11.
34(Taft) Executive Order, No, 1110, 15 July 1909, BIA 168/50.
35Post to Edwards, 4 August 1909, BIA 168/57.
36Fa 1kn er, p. 188.

37wagenheim, p. 68.

112
Jose Coll y Cuch!, who sat in the House of Delegates in 1909,
was correct in calling the 1909 crisis the beginning of the fight for

\

a new organic act.38

This is true because it brought the islanders•

objecttons to the Foraker Act to the attention of the mainlanders.

In

addition, the incidental consolidation of Puerto Rican affairs under
the War Department resulted in a series of officials who were willing
to work diligently to get a new organic act for the island.

Both Clar-

ence Edwards and Frank Mcintyre as successive heads of the Bureau of
Insular Affairs worked to that end.

Secretaries of War Jacob Dickin-

son, Henry Stimson, lindley Garrison, and Newton Baker were influential advocates of reform legislation for Puerto Rico.
did send a commission to determine the need for reform.

President Taft
The appro-

priations crisis was the first step toward the Jones Act because a
new organic act proposal would be introduced into the Congress within
a year.
The Olmsted Government Bill
In the Fall of 1909, Representative Olmsted wrote to General
Edwards of the Bureau of Insular Affairs asking for an outline of the
changes in the Foraker Act recommended by Governor Post and the Bureau._39
h~d

Edwards repl i.ed that the changes were few but important.

sought the qdv(ce of Post, Willoughby 1 Ward, and Hoyt.
38coll y Cuchl, p, 8.
3901msted to Edwards, 28 October 1909, BIA 3377.

He

Governor

I
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Post had asked the leading island politicians of every party for their
desires.

He had also circulated a questionnaire to several hundred

prominent Puerto Rican lawyers, planters, and businessmen to determine
their ideas on citizenship, the Federal Court, and miscellaneous reforms.

Post, soon to be replaced by Colton, seems to have been the

only one who thought to ask the islanders what they wanted when drawing up his recommendations for reform of the Foraker Act.
General Edwards' letter advised Olmsted that desired reforms
included more power for the governor, especially over his assistants,
so that he would be more responsible to the United States.

Edwards

wanted a sanitation department to consolidate health and sanitation
services under an experienced Army Surgeon.

He advised having the

judges appointed by the governor in order to take the courts out of
politics and to prevent the insular legislature from interfering with
them.

Edwards wanted to restrict the suffrage with a 1 iteracy or min-

imum tax payment requirement.

He pointed out that in the last election

over 100,000 of the 150,000 Puerto Ricans voting could not read in any
language.

Edwards wanted a provision of American citizenship by na-

tural ization whereby any Puerto Rican who asked to be a citizen could
be.come one..

The General s.a id he d i.d not see why the Secretary and the

Auditor should be on the Executive Council but thought this unimportant,

He made no further recommendation relating to the hated upper

house.

Governor Post, Edwards said, was a good man with good ideas,

but his concern for separating legislative and executive functions
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seemed an unnecessary reform.40

General Edwards' previous experience

had been primarily with the Philippines, and some of his recommendations were based upon that experience.

His recommendations did not,

however, reflect the aspirations of the Puerto Ricans for more selfgovernment.
In November, Santiago Iglesias sent lengthy petitions to President Taft on behalf of the Free Federation of Labor.

He complained

of the conditions of the island's workers, the lack of adequate sanitat ion facilities and schools, and the contempt with which the workingmen ·of the island were treated by Americans and Puerto Ricans alike.
Iglesias asked for the application of some American labor legisiation
to the island and for a Department of Labor and Agriculture.

His pe-

titians represented a point of view in sharp contrast to that of the
Union party.

He stated that the islanders wanted to be citizens of

the United States and to be protected as such.

He said:

·~e

do not

ask at this time self-government, because we are convinced that those
who are in a position to rule our affairs would bring slavery, ignorance and disgrace for the 90 per cent of the population."

Iglesias

favored an appointed Executive Council until the literacy of the island was much improved.

He stqted that the dominant Union party was

agalnst labor legislation and added that the island had too many antiAmerf'cqn and reactionary pol iticians,41

The conservative Taft reacted

40Edwards to Olmsted, 30 October 1909, BIA 3377.

s.

41 Iglesias and Abraham Pe~a to Taft, 27 November 1909, BIA 3377/
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more positively to the petition of the socialist Iglesias than he had
to those of the economically conservative Union party politicians because of Iglesias' pro-American stand and, perhaps, his affiliation
with the A. F. of L.

Willoughby, the outgoing Secretary of the is-

land, had to draft a long, detailed report to Iglesias' petition by
request of the President.42
In late December, 1909, Secretary of War Dickinson and General
Edwards sailed to Puerto Rico.

Their purpose was to spend a week

getting a better idea of conditions in the island and to work out a
draft bill for reform of the Foraker Act with Governor Colton.43
The arrival of these dignitaries coincided with a pact between the
Uhion and Republican parties.

Munoz and Barbosa agreed to work to-

gether to achieve American citizenship and change in the Executive
Council.

This agreement was ratified by the governing boards of both

parties. 44 Although the Union party would break the pact regarding
citizenship in January, it was in effect while Dickinson, Edwards,
and Colton were working on their bill.
One of the decisions made by the three American administrators
\
during their meeting was to draft a new organic act rather than amend
the Foraker Act.

On January 3, 1910, Colton mailed Edwards the rough

draft of the bill, commenting that Hoyt was busy correcting it.45

4 2w~ l loughby to Taft, 7 December 1909, BIA 3377/3.
43Edwards to Colton, 16 December 1909' BIA 3377/2.
44Pedreira, pp. 147-148.
45colton to Edwards, 3 January 1910, BIA 3377/11.

116
Hoyt personally did not see any need to change the organic act and
thought that opposition to the Executive Council was based on prejudice ~r ignorance.46

Governor Colton sent a second draft of the bill

to the Bureau of Insular Affairs on January 12.

In this draft, Col-

ton had specified that not more than two heads of executive departments should be appointed to the senate.

This reform stemmed from

the problem of the executive dominating the upper house of the legislature under the terms of the Foraker Act.47

While Edwards and Dick-

inson were debating the final form of the bill to be presented to
the President, Colton had to deal with an angry Union party.
Colton was trying to get the appropriations bill through the
insular legislature before the terms of the new organic act proposal
became known.

The Governor was sure the reorganization of the Health

Department would cause a storm because it abolished a Union party controlled agency.

Colton stopped publication of an article about the

terms of the bill .48

Munoz Rivera had been told that a New York news-

paper had published an article to the effect that Taft would recommend
voluntary citizenship and the Health Department change, but nothing
else.

Colton quickly assured Munoz that the Secretary of War had not

yet made. h{s report to Taft .

He told Edwards that Munoz would control

the House of Delegates barring anything that would cause him to join a
46Hoyt to Edwards, 7 December 1909~ BIA 3377/2.
47colton to Edwards, 12 January 1910, BIA 3377/18.
48colton to Edwards, 3 January 1910, BIA 3377/20.
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stampede of the radicals.

Colton added that Munoz and the islanders

expected comprehensive reform of the Foraker Act.49
A draft of the bill was given to Taft and Olmsted on January
28, 1910.

It was primarily the bill sent to Edwards on the 12th.

The few changes made included complete separation of the executive
and legislative with no department heads in the senate.SO

Important

provisions of the new organic act proposal included protection for
Puerto Rican coffee and individual United States citizenship to islanders who wanted it.

After two years, only citizens of the United

States could vote or hold office in Puerto Rico.

Reorganization of

the executive departments of the insular government included the Department of Labor and Agriculture, which Iglesias wanted, and the
change in the health and sanitation system that Edwards wanted.
legislature would also be reorganized.

The

The senate would be composed

of thirteen men, none of them executive department heads.
the senators were to be appointed by the President.
five senators would be elected by the islanders.

Eight of

The remaining

Voting qualifica-

tions were to go into effect after the next general election.

The

500 acre limit on landholding by corporations was raised to 5,000
acres, but penalties for infraction of the higher limit were provided,
This pr9v(sion of the proposed bill reflected the desire of the growing
sugar interests in Puerto Rico for more land.

All officials of the in-

sular courts were to be appointed by the governor, unless American law
49colton to Edwards, 24 January 1910, BIA 3377/23.
50Edwards to Colton, 28 January 1910, BIA 3377/after 27.
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pro~ided otherwise.5 1 Although this proposed organic act was an improvement on the Foraker Act, especially in the elimination of the
Executive Council, it reflected the wishes of General Edwards more
accurately than those of the Union of Puerto Rico.
The President's recommendations for Puerto Rican legislation
were read to the Congress on January 29, 1910.

Taft transmitted the

Secretary of War's report and asked that his suggestions be

adopted~

He commented only on the plan to provide American citizenship for
those islanders who applied for it and on the need for educational
or property qualifications to 1 imit manhood suffrage in the island.5 2
Secretary Dickinson's report stated that he had sought and received
opinions from numerous individuals and organizations in Puerto Rico.
He cited the communication of the mayor and council of Arecibo as typical of the opinions he received.

The representatives of Arecibo

advised Dickinson that they wanted American citizenship, preferably
collective citizenship.

Arecibo asked for more self-government and

the right of the island to make its own laws via two elected legislat ive houses.

A joint committee of the representatives of the Union

and Republican parties asked Dickinson for collective citizenship and
~n ent{rely elected senate.53

In 1910, the parties agreed that United

51 ''Memorandum of proposed changes in the Organic Act of Porto
R(co," BtA 3377/27,
52conditions in Porto Rico. Message from the President (Taft)
of the United States transmitting a report by the Secretary of War
upon conditions existing in Porto Rico, H. Doc. 615, 61st Cong., 2d
sess. (Washington, D.C. ~ Government Printing Off ice, 1910), p. 1.
531bid., p. 3.
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States citizenship should be granted collectively.

All citizens of

Puerto Rico automatically became American citizens with a grant of
collectfve citizenship.

Individual citizenship required that every

islander who wanted to be an American citizen would have to make application.

Processing the applications alone would take much time.

Dickinson then noted that many prominent islanders and Americans
thought that the self-government desired by Arecibo and the leading
parties of the island would be a disaster for the political and economic development of Puerto Rico and would retard investments.54
Secretary Dickinson said that American citizenship should be
grantedi

He preferred individual, not collective, citizenship be-

cause of the Spaniards in Puerto Rico who did not want to be citizens
of the United States.

Dickinson also thought it better to give in-

dividual citizenship with citizenship as a voting qua! ification than
to give everyone American citizenship and then restrict the suffrage
of the new citizens.

He suggested that those who applied voluntarily

for citizenship should have the right to vote subject also to literacy,
property, or tax-paying.

Dickinson did not think that it would be

wise to give in to the demand for an elected senate.

He suggested a

compro~{se of eight appointed and five elected members.55

The draft

of the proposed new government bill was attached to his report.56
54 tb id•. ' p. 4'
55tbid., pp. 4-6.
561bid., pp. 9-25.
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About the same time, Congress received a memorial from the
House of Delegates asking that the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court of Puerto Rico be changed.

In the Foraker Act this court

had the same jurisdiction as any American District Court.

On March

2, 1910, Congress had enacted an extension of this jurisdiction to
include civil cases in which either party was a citizen of the United
States or a foreign state or when the dispute involved more than onethousand dollars.

The House of Delegates objected to the extended

power of the Federal District Court because it represented a low
opinion of the honesty and capability of Puerto Rican judges.

In

addition, the House thought American judges without knowledge of
Spanish law or the language of the island were not qualified to exercise the power of the Federal Court.57

Governor Colton pointed out

that the American lawyers in the island represented American money,
and they wanted the Federal Court.

Colton thought the Federal Dist-

rict Court did adequately protect non-resident investors.5 8

Section

74 of the Olmsted bill did not decrease the powers of the Federal
Court.

It did, however, provide that in the future the salaries and

expenses of the court would be paid by the revenues of the United
Stqtes 1 not those of the island,59

The insular legislature would no

57 11 A Memorjql to the Congress of the United States, adopted
on the 14th day of January, 1910, but the House of Delegates of Porto
R{'co 1 11 Jones Papers, Box: 89.,
·
58 colton to Edwards, 22 February 1910, BIA 3377/45.
59condttions in Porto Rico, p. 23.
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longer be able to slash the funds of the Federal District Court as it
had tried to do in the appropriations bill of 1909.
Puerto Rican reaction to the Secretary of War's recolTVTlendations
for a new government bill came quickly.
reaction "rather puzzl ing. 11

Governor Colton found this

He commented:

As might be supposed, the radicals and the Unionist leaders
were very indignant over (1) the election of delegates by
districts; (2) the abolishment of the Unionist political
department (Health, Charities and Correction); (3) the fixing
of elections at intervals of four years; (4) the appointment
instead of .election of municipal judges; and o~her provisions
which will tend to reduce political agitation. 0
Colton noted that many islanders, including conservatives and
the Republicans, objected to two provisions of the bill.
that the bill be

c~anged

He suggested

so that franchises would not be granted with-

out the approval of the island legislature and that Army officers
would not be appointed as the heads of executive departments with the
possible exception of an Army Surgeon as Commissioner of Health.

Col-

ton said that these changes would make the bill acceptable to most
islanders.

The radicals and Unionists had been trying to stage mass

meetings and protest rallies, but without much success. 61

Governor

Colton considered provisions of the bill as reducing political agitation.

These same provisions were seen by the islanders as reducing

self-government.
Jose de Diego characterized the Olmsted government bill as an
attack on Puerto Rican 1 iberties.

He drafted a protest of the House

60colton to Edwards, 21 February 1910, BIA 3377/37.
61 1bid.
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of Delegates to Representative Olmsted.62

Testifying before the Com-

mittee on Insular Affairs, Munoz Rivera said that the Union party had
always asked for citizenship.

American citizenship was the universal

desire of the islanders, but Munoz himself had changed his mind because of the unanswered pleas of the Puerto Ricans.

He thought it

beneath the dignity of his people to have to beg repeatedly for what
was their

ri~ht. 6 3

Munoz told Colton that the islanders had not ex-

pected their prudent attitude to be met by such a disappointing bill.
The Olmsted bill, Munoz said, would delay Americanization and leave
the islanders bitter.

Colton thought that such were the feelings of

the radicals, but not the substantial people of the island.64
Cayetano Coll Cuchl told the Committee on Insular Affairs that
both the Republican and Union parties had agreed to work for an elected senate and American citizenship.
nadian example for his island.

He thought in terms of the Ca-

Coll wanted the Foraker Act left the

way it was except for an elected upper house and separation of the
legislative and executive parts of the government.

He was a Unionist

in favor of the statehood plank in the party platform, but he thought
the Canadian type of parliamentary government was what had existed
in Puerto Rico when the Americans landed.

The islanders had been

62Jose de Diego, "Speech before the House of Delegates," 10
February 1910, BIA 3377/36.
63u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Hearing
upon the Bill proposing to amend the present Organic Law of Porto Rico,
61st Cong., 2d sess., 1910, pp. 144-145.
64colton to Edwards, 21 February 1910, BIA 3377/37.
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satisfied with that.

Coll said that no bill was better than the Olm-

sted bill as it stood.
of Delegates.

He forwarded amendments suggested by the House

These included the retention of Puerto Rican citizen-

ship, the appointment of department heads from among Puerto Rican citizens by the governor, and an entirely elected legislature.65

Colton

told Edwards that Coll was a "political shyster" having no standing
with the substantial people of Puerto Rico.66

Governor Colton's ref-

erences to the "substantial people" occur frequently in his letters.
He seems to mean those who had a leading part in the business community.

Quite probably, the members of the business community with

readiest access to the Governor's ear were Americans.
Colton's evciluation of the Union party leaders was roughly the
same as that of labor leader Iglesias.

Like him, Colton saw the Puer-

to Rican people as oppressed by their leaders because these leaders
had no interest in the material well-being of their constituents.
politicians 1 ived in San Juan.

The

They had 1 ittle knowledge of the people

they were supposed to represent or concern for the improvement of agriculture and business.67

Colton said that the salvation of Puerto Rico

depended upon taking despotic power away from a few bosses.

He felt

the new election provisions in the Olmsted bill would accomplish this
goa1.68

The Governor argued that protests against the Olmsted bill
65 Hearing upon the Bill proposing to amend, pp. 147-163.
66colton to Edwards, 21 February 1910, BIA 3377/34.
67colton to Edwards, 9 March 1910, BIA 3377/65.
68Colton to Edwards, 23 February 1910, BIA 3377/40.
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were staged by Munoz' political machine, but the people generally were
not very interested. 69

Opposition to the Olmsted bill was a struggle

for government by boss Munoz instead of the people of the island,
according to Colton.

Intelligent island professionals and businessmen

were afraid to express their opinions because of the power of the po1 itical machine.

Self-government for the islanders could be protected

by giving the educated Puerto Ricans free representative government.
Free government was impossible without breaking the machine.

Colton

thought that the machine could be broken by the Olmsted bill's restrictions on the suffrage and changes in the electoral districts.70
ene Puerto Rican of whom Colton approved was Eduardo Giorgetti,
Chairman of the Porto Rico Association, a businessman's group.
getti was a friend of Munoz and a Unionist, but he was a
enough businessman.

11

Gior-

substantial 11

A cable from Giorgetti to Brigidier General Ed-

wards requested that control of franchises remain with the insular
senate and that Section 72 of the Olmsted bill be revised.7 1 This
section covered the limitation on landholding.

Giorgetti's changes

would make the law inapplicable to individuals or to individuals as
stockholders or unincorporated firms.

Governor Colton forwarded the

cable with his recommendation for its approval because local business
people were often stockholders or directors in several sugar f irms.7 2
69colton to Edwards, 24 February 1910, BIA 3377/41.
7°colton to Edwards, 27 February 1910, BIA 3377/44.
71Giorgetti to Edwards, 24 February 1910, BIA 3377/68.
72colton to Edwards, 26 February 1910, BIA 3377/42.
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Colton cabled Edwards stressing the concern in the island among influential people about Section 72.

Edwards replied that the bill, as it

would be reported, would not restrict individual land ownership.73
Governor Colton asked General Edwards to make Section 61 of the
Olmste~

bill, which would divide the island into thirty-five districts,

applicable to the next election.

This would cause a favorable state-

ment about the bill from the Republican party of the island.74

Sec-

ti on 61 's change in the electoral districts would insure representation of the Republican party in the insular legislature.

The Gover-

nor 1 s efforts were rewarded with a statement of the Republican party
by Jose de Guzman Benitez.

The statement said that the Republicans

were generally pleased by the Olmsted bill.

They did, however, want

collective American citizenship and an entirely elected senate.

To

give the intelligent Puerto Ricans participation in their government,
the Republicans wanted the electoral changes in the bill to assure
their own party some minority representation in the legislature.

The

Republicans approved of appointed court officials but asked that only
the Sanitation Department be under an Army officer and that the funds
of the insular government be deposited in the island's banks.75

Bar-

bosa and his paper, El Tiempo, tended to side with the Union party
against the bill despite general Republican support.

El Tiempo printed

73colton to Edwards, 8 March 1910; Edwards to Colton, 8 March
1910, BIA 3377/56.
74colton to Edwards, 28 February 1910, BIA 3377/47.
75Jose de Guzman Benitez to Dickinson, 3 March 1910, BIA 3377/

51.
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Puerto Rico.79

Olmsted redrafted the bill, including amendments by

the Committee on Insular Affairs, to avoid debate on amendments on
the floor of the House of Representatives.

He omitted the tariff

sections of the bill because strictly this matter belonged to
Ways and Means Committee, not Insular Affairs.

~he

Olmsted hoped to

_;

avoid opposition from Ways and Means or prolonged debate on the tariff.80

Representative Olmsted told Edwards on March 22 that the

bill might be reached on a calendar Wednesday in four or five weeks.
Without a special rule authorizing consideration of the government
bill, however, the House could well decide to give other legislation
precedence and the session would run out.81
A minority report on H.R. 23000 was submitted by Representative
William A. Jones on April 1, 1910.

Jones and six other members of the

Committee on Insular Affairs, including Tulio Larrinaga, objected to
the Olmsted bill.
ungenerous.

They called the bill restrictive, reactionary, and

Individual citizenship upon application could require

years of processing by the courts.

Only about 200,000 of the more

than one million islanders would be eligible for citizenship.
insular senate should be entirely elected by the people.

The

Those sec-

tions creating a public-service commission were poorly written.

The

minority did not think the 500 acre limit on corporate landholding
should be raised because there were only about 200,000 acres on the
791bid.
80olmsted to Dickinson, 22 March 1910, BIA 3377/74.
81Edwards to Colton, 22 March 1910, BIA 3377/after 71.
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island suitable to sugar cultivation.

Half of this acreage was al-

ready under cultivation, and most of it was held in large parcels.
Jones and his supporters also objected to the excessive powers of the
executive department of the federal government having jurisdiction
over Puerto Rico. 82

The War Department was not specified, but Colton

argued that the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department was
an advantageous executive department because it was removed from party
politics in the United States.83

Representative Jones' dissenting

opinions about the Olmsted bill mirrored Puerto Rican objections.
Jones' stand in 1910 would lead the islanders to expect much from him
when he became chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs.
On April 12, Secretary Dickinson asked President Taft to try
to influence a special rule to bring the Olmsted bill onto the floor
of the House.

As Olmsted suggested, without such a rule, the bill

would be delayed enough to prevent passage in the Senate.8 4 General
Edwards saw the consideration of the bill as still four or five weeks
off in mid-April.

He had persuaded Olmsted to try to put a protective

tariff on coffee entering Puerto Rico, but the General decided to wait
8
until the bill reached the Senate before asking for further changes. 5
82u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Civil
Government for Porto Rico, H. Rept. 750, part 2, Views of the Minority
to accompany H.R. 23000, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 1910.
83colton to Munoz, 1 April 1910, BIA 127/2.
84Dickinson to Taft, 12 April, 1910, BIA 3377/86.
85Edwards to Colton, 14 April 1910, BIA 3377/81.
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Senator Chauncey Depew told Edwards that he would not be able to get
the bill through his Committee because Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
thought the bill a bad precedent for the Philippines and because Senator Moses E. Clapp completely opposed it.

Edwards thought that pass-

age by the House of Representatives and the influence of the President would get the bill through the Senate.86
Governor Colton decided to go to Washington to work on a compromise intended to end agitation in the island and to promote Americanization.

This plan was to grant collective citizenship and an el-

ected senate to meet the islanders' demands, but to retain enough
executive power in the government to insure its efficiency. 87

Justi-

fying his compromise proposal, Colton said he saw the future of Puerto
Rico from a business perspective.

He felt that a political ambient

acceptable to all the parties and the people would be important in
solving the "Porto Rican problem. 11

All parties and factions agreed,

for the first time, on wanting collective citizenship and an elected
senate.

Colton thought that commercial progress would be great if

the political aspect of insular 1 ife were more satisfactory.

The

limited suffrage and redistricting of the island would break the control of the bosses.

Therefore, Colton was completely willing to take

•
f or recommending
.
•
88
all o f the respons1. b •1l 1ty
t h e compromise.

The

decision for approving the compromise was referred to President Taft.
86Edwards to Colton, 16 April 1910, BIA 3377/after 83.
87colton to Taft, 20 April 1910, BIA 3377/85.
88(Colton),

11

Confidential Memorandum, 11

BIA 3377/86.
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Colton waited in Washington for the decision that would tell him whether to go ahead with the compromise or go back to Puerto Rico.

Dick-

inson asked Taft to let the Governor know whether he would consider
changing his mind and increase the number of elected senators.89

As

demonstrated in Taft's remarks concerning the Olmsted appropriations
amendment the year before, the President thought that extreme care
should be exercised in giving increased self-government to the
sponsible islanders. 11

11

irre-

Colton went back to Puerto Rico.

House Resolution 591 was approved giving special status to the
Puerto Rican government bill.
the bill through the House.

Olmsted by late May said he could get
Colton hoped this was true because, if

it failed, Munoz Rivera would claim credit for the defeat of the
bill.90
1910.

Olmsted was right.

The bill passed the House on June 16,

Mcintyre reported that Olmsted had managed it beautifully.

All the amendments he wanted were passed but none that he opposed.9 1
Colton 1 s hopes were high.

The manager of the Central Aguirre Sugar

Company asked Senator Lodge to end 1 imitation on corporate landholding.
The Governor hoped that this problem would be taken out of the government bill to be treated separately.

This, Colton believed, would end

opposition to the Olmsted bill in the Senate.9 2

La Democracia praised

the efforts of the islanders to amend or defeat the bill, unsuccessful
89D ickinson to Taft, 29 April 1910, BIA 3377 /86.
90colton to Dickinson, 20 May 1910, BIA 33 77 /88.
91Mclntyre to Colton, 16 June 1910, BIA 3377 /91.
92colton to Dickinson, 20 May 1910, BIA 3377/88.
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as they had been.

It predicted that although the bill had passed the

House of Representatives, it would not pass the Senate.93

The second

session of the Sixty-first Congress ended on June 25 without action
by the Senate on the Olmsted bill.
Governor Colton wasted no time in urging the Bureau of Insular
Affairs to continue its efforts to get the Olmsted bill passed.

The

day after the November election, Colton penned another argument for
passage to Edwards.

He noted that the Union party had again won every

seat in the island's legislature and that Munoz Rivera had easily won
the race for Resident Corrmissioner.

Colton was pleased that the elec-

tion in the island had been conducted without incident.

He also re-

ported that the attitude of Munoz and the Union party had been much
less antagonistic in this campaign.

The reconciliation was so total

that Colton claimed a new party of radicals was forming to take over
the role of opposition to the government.9 4

Edwards responded that

he was already at work trying to get Taft to push for passage of the
Olmsted bill in the Senate.
However, Edwards said it was generally believed that the bill
would not pass.

The Senate objected to the landholding provision of

the bill and to the partly elected senate.

Edwards hoped that the

land question would become a separate measure; otherwise, it could
defeat the Olmsted bill.

During the House debate on the bill, the

proposal for the insular senate had been amended so that the number
93La Democracia, 29 June 1910.
94colton to Edwards, 9 November 1910, BIA 3377/99.
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of elected members would be gradually increased.

Many Senators, ac-

cording to Edwards, thought it too much of a concession having any
elected senators in the island.95

President Taft also opposed the

progressive increase in the number of elected senators, but he re commended passage of the bill in his message to Congress.96
Giorgetti cabled Dickinson requesting that the provision limiting agricultural landholding be stricken from the Olmsted bill for
separate consideration.97

Colton forwarded to the Senate a statement

that the agricultural and business interests of the island agreed that
section 65 of the Olmsted bill should give corporations the right to
own or control 5,000 acres of land for cultivation plus extra land
for pasturage.98

The House of Representatives had amended the Olmsted

bill to make the limitation 3,000 acres rather than the 5,000 of the
original bill.

The Senate Committee hearings on the Olmsted bill are

conspicuous for the absense of testimony by persons without an interest in sugar.

Job E. Hedges argued against the acreage limitation.

He was echoed by the manager of the Santa Ysabel Sugar Company, the
president and counsel of the Central Aguirre Sugar Company, the vicepresident of the Fajardo Sugar Company, and the secretary of the South
Porto Rico Sugar Company.
fied.

Resident Commissioner Larrinaga also testi-

He said that he had been raised on a sugar plantation which
95Edwards to Colton, 1 December 1910, BIA 3377/after 99.
96Taft quoted in Calicott, p. 274.
97Giorgetti to Dickinson, 19 December 1910, BIA 3377/100.
98colton to Dickinson, 2 January 1911, BIA 3377/103.
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made him knowledgable on the subject.

Speaking for the people of Puer-

to Rico, he said that the islanders considered the 3,000 acre limit of
the House bill as settled.

Since the island was primarily agricultur-

al, the I imitation on investing in more than one corporation meant
that islanders would have to invest abroad.
porations would then be left to outsiders.

Investment in island corLarrinaga concluded that

the effects of the law would be absentee ownership which he termed
11

the curse of colonies. 11 99
General Edwards attended the meeting of the Committee on Paci-

f ic Islands and Porto Rico on January 20.
some amendments. 100

He succeeded in preventing

The same day, the bill was reported by Depew to

the Senate with amendments but without unanimous approval of his committee.

Larrinaga cabled de Diego that the bill came before the Sen-

ate calling for an entirely appointed insular senate.

'been

It also had

amended so that, excepting cane and sugar manufacturing corpora-

tions, agricultural corporations were limited to 3,000 acres.

Sugar

corporations would be allowed 5,000 acres plus any land held on leases
shorter than twenty years.

The House of Delegates approved an immedi-

ate protest and agreed to adjourn as a demonstration of protest. 101
The five islanders on the Executive Council sent a statement that an
99u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, Hearing on the bill (H.R. 23000) to provide a Civil Government for Porto Rico, and for Other Purposes, 61st Cong., 2d sess, 1911.
100Edwards to Colton, 20 January 1911, BIA 3377/after 103.
101 11 Resolution of the House of Delegates, 11 23 January 1911, BIA
3377/109.
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elected senate was desired in Puerto Rico but that the upper house
should certainly not be more restrictive than that which passed the
House of Representatives. 102

Governor Colton remarked that the ap-

pointed upper house feature of the Senate bill caused a sensation
among the island politicians but that the people were not much interested except in a better health and sanitation law. 103

The Governor

apparently felt that the people would be interested only in those matters that he knew would benefit them directly.
The Secretary of War thought the Olmsted bill still had some
good features, such as the bill of rights, American citizenship, and
a sanitary service.

He urged Depew to aid in passing the bill.104

Colton was surprised that the bill had gotten out of committee.

He

wrote that citizenship, sanitation, and appointed judges were the really crucial needs of the island.
passed as a separate bill. 105

Perhaps, he said, they could be

On March 7, 1911, Colton was advised

that:
The Olmsted bill went quietly to sleep in the Senate.
Senator Root was opposed to the citizenship clause, Senator
Lodge opposed to the elective senate, and a number of senators
in opposition had been lined up against the proposed land holding section, as well as any modification of the bill looking
toward an appointive senate. At the end of the session it was
perfectly apparent that the bill could not be passed and that
any effort to pass it would be used by those opposed to the
102Barbosa, et al~ to Secretary of War, 25 January 1911, BIA 3377/
11 o.

103colton to Edwards, 25 January 1911, BIA 3377/108.
104oickinson to Depew, 25 January 1911, BIA 3377/104.
105colton to Edwards, 31 January 1911, BIA 3377/107.
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administration simply to take time and prevent the passage
of the measures which were being urged by the administration. 106
Edwards did not think the extra session would consider Puerto
Rican legislation.

He reported that Clapp would be the new head of

the Senate Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico.
be chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs.

Jones would
Several of

the Republicans gone from the Senate and House committees had been
friends of Puerto Rican legislation in the past.107
The newspaper Pica Pica wondered whether the defeat of the Olmsted bill was due to the greed of the sugar corporations, the efforts
of the Puerto Ricans, or the hand of God.108

Muniz, whose disserta-

tion is based largely upon the partisan La Democracia, attributed the
demise of the bill to the fact that it did not represent the just
hopes of the islanders. 10 9

It did not, of course, but protests from

the Puerto Ricans defeated the Olmsted bill only to the extent that
their friends in Congress would not push a bill the island did not
want.

Taft's influence and the opinions of important Senators against

increased self-government for the island were more important factors
in the failure of the Olmsted bill.
Lewis noted that sugar defeated the bill as much as the islanders or President Taft.

Senators with trust-busting convictions

106Edwards to Colton, 7 March 1911, BIA 3377/111.
1071bid.
108Pica Pica, 11 March 1911, BIA 3377/113.
109Muniz, p. 80.
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refused to give in to the demands of the sugar interests for land. 110
There was a deadlock between the anti-trust faction in the Senate and
the supporters of the sugar lobby.

Colton and Edwards had been car-

rect in their judgment that the Olmsted bill had a better chance of
passing if they could take the land acreage 1 imitation provision out
of the bill.

In what would become time honored practice, the Governor

9nd the Bureau of Insular Affairs quickly forgot the last failure of
reform legislation and began working for the next bill in the next
Congress.
The Jones Citizenship Bill
In November, 1911, Governor Colton wrote to General Edwards
emphasizing the importance of granting American citizenship to the
islanders.

He attributed much of the discontent in Puerto Rico to

Congressional failure to make the islanders citizens of the United
States.

Colton added that agitators and those displeased with the

government could always use the citizenship issue to arouse support.
He claimed that anti-American statements by Puerto Ricans and other
Latin Americans implied that citizenship had been withheld because
the American government viewed Latins as a race inferior to the North
Americans.

Colton commented that the new Secretary of War, Stimson,

was planning to urge a grant of citizenship coupled with a definitive
statement that the island would never become a state in the United
11 OLew is, p. 92.
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States. 111

The Governor's remarks show that the strategy of the ad-

ministrators of Puerto Rico for the next Congress was aimed at a grant
of citizenship, not another government bill.
Stimson's report to the President argued that the tie between
the United States and Puerto Rico was permanent and had always been
so regarded.

It was, therefore, time to grant citizenship as a bond

and to work for the greatest possible self-government in the island
using the British Commonwealth system as a model. 112

Munoz Rivera

congratulated Stimson on his idea for self-government on the Commonwealth pattern.

The new Resident Commissioner added that Congress

should not legislate on sanitation, courts, or electoral redistricting.
These subjects would be better left to the island's legislature.

Munoz

stated that his island would 1 ike United States citizenship but not
citizenship without self-government. 11 3
son as

11

He signed his letter to Stirn-

L. M. Rivera," a form he would also use with President Wilson

and other North Americans.

This practice did not prevent him from

criticizing Martin Travieso for using the Anglicized

11

Jr. 11114

The Bureau of Insular Affairs had given two bills to Representative Jones for introduction into the House: a collective citizenship
bill and a sanitation bill.

General Edwards reported that Jones was

11 1co1ton to Edwards, 15 November 1911, BIA 1286/27.
112stimson, quoted in Munoz to Stimson, 20 December 1911, BIA
1286/36.
113Munoz to Stimson, 20 December 1911, BIA 1286/36.
114Munoz Rivera, Obras, 2:317.
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in favor of the citizenship bill but that some of the members of his
Committee on Insular Affairs opposed it because they felt that citizenship was necessary in order to get a general government bill through
the Congress.

According to Edwards, when Mcintyre told Jones that the

Puerto Ricans wanted citizenship, Jones replied that this was not so.
Munoz Rivera had told Jones that the elective senate was more important to the islanders than citizenship.

Mcintyre commented that Munoz

wanted an elected senate more than other Puerto Ricans did because an
elected senate meant a senate appointed by Munoz.

Jones thought that

the citizenship bill could be gotten through the House easily, but he
wanted to work with his own committee to get its complete support before bringing the bill onto the floor of the House.

Edwards said

that Munoz had lunch with Secretary Stimson and that the Secretary
told Edwards that he was very favorably impressed with the island
leader. 115
The House of Delegates passed a message to the House Committee
on Insular Affairs when the members learned that Jones had introduced
a citizenship bill without additional reforms.

Their cable asked the

Congress not to approve a citizenship bill without including self-government.

Governor Colton decided not to forward their cable.

He

called de Diego for an interview in an attempt to get the House of
Delegates to rescind their message.

Speaker de Diego told Colton that

the House felt that if citizenship was passed alone, self-government
reform would not follow.

Colton reported that he convinced de Diego

115Edwards to Colton, 10 January 1912, BIA 3377/115.
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of the harm the message would cause to friends of the island in Congress.

De Diego and Giorgetti agreed to meet in a closed session of

the House and get the message withdrawn. 116

They were able, with the

exertion of considerable pressure, to get the official message withdrawn, but the House sent the same statement of its views to Munoz.
Governor Colton explained the stand of the Union party leaderI

ship to General Edwards.

The Republicans in the island, he said, had

always wanted citizenship and eventual statehood, but the Union party
had stood for autonomy.
Colton thought the

11

What they wanted most was an elected senate.

substantial 11 working and business people di_d not

want a great increase in self-government because this would mean boss
rule.

This was Iglesias' view.

were very proud.
and do it well.

Colton added that the Puerto Ricans

They wanted to seem to run their island themselves
The Governor felt that an elected senate would be

good if the governor had an absolute veto, but unwise without it.
Colton said few islanders were unaware of their incapacity for complete self-government.
~-

An elected insular senate, Colton thought,

would be conservative in their handling of business but would incur

r

f.
\

the same fault as the House of Delegates in disregarding the interests
of the island's workers. 11 7
Representative Jones introduced the citizenship bill on February 13, 1912, as H.R. 20048.

In his committee report to accompany

the bill, Jones cited the 1908 platforms of both American parties as
116colton to Edwards, 17 January 1912, BIA 1286/38.
117colton to Edwards, 20 January 1912, BIA 3377/121.
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favoring a grant of citizenship to Puerto Rico.
collective citizenship to all islanders.

The bill would give

A proviso that anyone could

apply within six months to retain his previous citizenship was ineluded in the bill "to avoid the possibility of its being said now,
or hereafter, that American citizenship was forced upon the people
Of Porto R·1co. 11118

J ones to ld Ed war d s t hat he was comm 1· tte·d to ··rr'l:t!"lo-

ducing a general government bill regardless of the fate of the citizenship bill.

Munoz and Jones had agreed to try for a good sanita-

tion bill from the island's legislature.

Failing passage of such a

bill in the island, Jones would introduce the sanitation bill into
Congress. 11 9
The citizenship bill passed the House of Representatives easily
on March 4, 1912.

Jones recalled later that only ex-Speaker Cannon

had spoken against it and thought only Cannon had voted against it. 120
H.R. 20048 went without amendment to the Senate.

There it languished

in the Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico.
Munoz Rivera made it clear that the island still wanted more
self-government. 121

Iglesias, however, worked to get the citizenship

bill through the Senate.

He persuaded the labor unions of New York to

118u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Citizens of Porto Rico to be made citizens of the United States, H. Rept.
341 to accompany H.R. 20048, 62nd Cong., 2d sess., 1912, P· 3.
11 9Edwards to Colton, 16 February 1912, BIA 3377/after 124.
120u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, A
Civil Government for Porto Rico, Hearings on H.R. 13818, 63rd Cong.,
2d sess., 1914, p. 70.
12 1Munoz to Stimson, 30 March 1912, BIA 127/15.
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pressure their Senator, Root, to pass the bill. 122
ton to help get citizenship.
recommend the bill. 123

He went to Washing-

He wrote to President Taft asking him to

Taft's secretary asked Edwards whether the

President had said anything about it.124
citizenship for Puerto Rico publicly.

Taft had already recommended

He wrote to Iglesias that, al-

though he favored the granting of citizenship, he also thought it the
duty of the United States to allow the island to develop its own traditions.

Therefore, self-government could be increased only as fast

as the Puerto Ricans developed traditions of self-government. 125

The

American Federation of Labor sent an appeal to the Senate requesting
United States citizenship for Puerto Rico. 126

Fifty-seven Senators

replied that they were favorably considering a vote to give citizenship to the island, but three said no.

The bill was still in com-

mittee, so Iglesias asked Taft to assist it again.127
In May, acting-chairman Moses E. Clapp explained to the Secretary of War why the citizenship bill was still in his Committee on
Pacific Islands and Porto Rico.
William Lorimer, of Illinois.

The chairman of the committee was
He was in Chicago, he was ill, and

1221glesias to Colton, 9 March 1912, BIA 25142/1.
12 31glesias to Taft, 4 April 1912, BIA 1286/with 45.
124charles D. Hilles to Edwards, 8 April 1912, BIA 1286/45.
125Taft to Iglesias, 15 April 1912, BIA 1286/46.
126u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, A People Without A Country, S. Doc. 599, 62nd Cong., 2d sess.,
1912.
12 7tglesias to Taft, 19 July 1912, BIA 1286/66.
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was about to be tried on charges that would cost him his seat in the
Senate.

Clapp was having trouble getting a quorum of the committee

since he was only its acting head.128

Stimson wrote to eight Senators

asking them to attend the meeting of the committee Clapp was calling
for May 7, 1912. 12 9

The War Department drafted a long memo for the

conmittee meeting to explain why citizenship was desirable from the
points of view both of the islanders and the United States. 130

The

meeting of May 7 was held, but the citizenship bill was not reported
out, despite the personal pleas of Stimson.
Stimson wrote directly to Senator Lorimer saying that Senator
Clapp felt out of Congressional courtesy that he could do no more
without word from Lorimer.

The Secretary of War had to write two

more letters before he received a response other than a letter from
Lorimer 1 s secretary saying he was ill.

Lorimer finally answered that

he would have to look at the citizenship bill.

If he could not return

to Washington, Lorimer would tell Clapp to go ahead and push for the
passage of the bill. 131
The Senate took no action on the bill.

National party conven-

tions in the summer of 1912 kept the Senators busy.

49.

Lorimer's case

128clapp to Stimson, 1 May 1912 and 2 May 1912, BIA 1286/48 &
Lorirner's election was invalidated because of corruption.

129stimson to Poindexter, Fletcher, et al., 4 May 1912, BIA
1286/49.
130war Department Memorandum, 6 May 1912, BIA 1286/52.
131stimson to Lorimer, 16 May 1912, BIA 1286/55.
Stimson, no date, BIA 1286/58.

Lorimer to

143
was voted upon on July 7.

Mcintyre, now the acting head of the Bureau

of Insular Affairs, hoped that with the Lorimer issue settled, the citizenship bill would progress. 13 2

Lorimer was replaced by Senator Clapp.

General Mcintyre reported that Clapp told him it was still hard to get
a quorum of the committee.

The Senate roll-call on July 15 showed six

of the eleven members absent, apparently out of town.

Senator Clapp

told Mcintyre that he did not want to report the bill without the formal support of his committee because he knew that Senator Root opposed
the bill. 133
attended.

Clapp called one committee meeting in July, and no one

He was planning another for July 27, and it was noted that

eight members of the committee were actually in Washington. l34

Mein-

tyre cabled Charles D. Hilles in New York asking him, as Chairman of
the Republican National Corrmittee, to aid in getting a quorum at the
committee meeting.

Hilles answered that he could not help because he

was in New York.135
The discouraged Secretary of War told President Taft that the
only thing that could help the citizenship bill was a Senate committee
chairman who was really interested in it. 136

Taft wrote personal

letters to three Senators asking them to vote for the citizenship
132Mclntyre to Carrel, 14 June 1912, BIA 1286/after 60.
133Mctntyre to Stimson, 16 July 1912, BIA 1286/64.
134war Department Memorandum, 25 July 1912, BIA 1286/with 65.
l35Mctntyre to Hilles, 26 July 1912.
July 1912, BtA 1286/67.

Hilles to Mcintyre, 26

136stimson to Taft, 24 July 1912, BIA 1286/65.
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bill. 1 37

The convention of the Puerto Rican Republican party cabled

Taft asking for the passage of the citizenship bill.138

On August 10,

1912, Stimson and Colton both greeted the new chairman of the Committee
on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, Miles Poindexter, with letters
urging the passage of the bill even though the end of the session was
near. 139

A few days later, Mcl.ntyre told acting-Governor Carrel that

the weather was hot and the Senators tired.

The Senate would adjourn

without action on the citizenship bill.140
The election in the United States in 1912 resulted in a Democratic victory.
over soon.

A new administration and a new Congress would take

In Puerto Rico, the Republican party did somewhat better

than it had in the previous two elections.

The Union party, however,

was still dominant and Munoz Rivera still the political titan of the
island.

Governor Colton reported that the election had again gone

off smoothly.14l

The Democratic victory did not dampen the hopes of

the Republican administration in Washington and in Puerto Rico to get
the citizenship bill passed in the next session of Congress.
Willis Sweet, a prominent island Republican and editor of The
Porto Rico Review, published a Jong article in favor of the passage of
137Taft to Fletcher, et al., 26 July 1912, BIA 1286/69.
138carrel to Taft, 30 July 1912, BIA 1286/after 70.
139stimson to Poindexter, 10 August 1912, BIA 1286/70.
to Poindexter, 10 August 1912, BIA 1286/after 70.

Colton

140Mclntyre to Carrel, 13 August 1912, BIA 1286/after 70.
141colton to Mcintyre, 6 November 1912, BIA 1028/25.
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the citizenship bill.

He repeated the rumor that the Senate committee

would report the bill favorably and that a majority of the Senators
would support it. 142
Secretary Stimson.

Governor Colton forwarded the Sweet article to
Colton told Stimson that it was still very impor-

tant to get the bill through for American and Republican prestige in
the island and in Latin America.

The Governor added that many islan-

ders were so discouraged that they were joining the disappointed
office-seekers in favoring independence. 143

The citizenship bill was

not reported out of committee when Congress reopened because Senator
Poindexter was in Panama.

Stimson planned to see him about the bill

as soon as possible after his return on January 11, 1913. 14 ~
One Senator who had not made up his mind about the citizenship
bill was James P. Clarke.
bill.

Mcintyre wrote urging Clarke to support the

He told the Senator that the pressure for the passage of the

bill from the American Federation of Labor was due to Iglesias' zealous
determination to get citizenship for Puerto Rico.

Clarke's criticism

of A.F. of L. pressure was the major reason for his hesitation.

Mcin-

tyre assured Clarke that 90

perc~nt

and wanted citizenship. 145

Mcintyre told Colton that Iglesias' activ-

of the islanders were pro-American

ity had hurt the chances of the bill in the Senate.

On February 11,

142rhe Porto Rico Review, San Juan, 11 December 1912, BIA 1286/
143colton to Stimson, 13 December 1912, BIA 1286/85.
144Mclntyre to Colton, 28 December 1912, BIA 1286/86.
145Mclntyre to Clarke, 17 January 1913, BIA 1286/after 91.
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Mcintyre was sure the bill would not pass because the Taft administration did not now have enough influence to get it through.146
had not yet given up.
of committee.

Stimson

He kept asking Poindexter to get the bill out

Stimson also secured the promise of Senator Root that

he would allow the bill to come to a vote should it get out of committee. 147
The Senate committee decided to report the bill on February 21,
although there was opposition.

Mcintyre hoped no messages against the

bill would come from Puerto Rico.148

Colton said he was now sure the

bill would not pass, since the House of Delegates cabled the Senate
asking that no action be taken.149

H.R. 20048 was actually reported

by Senator Poindexter without amendment on February 24, 1913.
bill was to be called on March 3.

The

Mcintyre again asked Senator Clarke,

the senior Democrat on the committee, not to oppose the bill. 1 50

Ig-

lesias also asked President-elect Wilson to intercede with Clarke, of
Arkansas.151

On March 3, the Congressional Record shows two messages

asking that the citizenship bill not be passed.
Diego as Speaker of the House of Delegates.
Munoz Rivera as Resident Commissioner.

One was from Jose de

The other was from Luis

The tenor of these messages

146Mclntyre to Colton, 11 February 1913, BIA 1286/98.
147stimson to Colton, 15 February 1913, BIA 1286/97.
148Mclntyre to Colton, 21 February 1913, BIA 1286/after 98.
149colton to Mcintyre, 19 February 1913, BIA 1286/102.
150Mclntyre to Clarke, 28 February 1913, BIA 1286/af ter 103.
151 Iglesias to Wi 1son, 25 February 1913, BIA 1286/104.
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was that the islanders wanted to be consulted before a hasty grant of
United States citizenship.

They said they were loyal to the United

States but had to speak for the respect due to the sovereignty of the
Puerto Rican people.15 2 The islanders of the Union party did not want
the bill to pass because they hoped for self-government or better from
the new Wilson administration.
After the letters from the Puerto Ricans were read into the Congressional Record, the Senate took up the question of paying someone
to write a history of the Sixty-second Congress.

This session of the

Senate did not take up the Puerto Rican bill again.

In April, Mcintyre

told Iglesias that the special session soon to start would not consider
the bill either.

It had been called to take up revision of the tariff

and, possibly, currency reform.

It would have no time for Puerto Ri-

co.153
Puerto Rican dissatisfaction with the Foraker Act, especially
the Executive Council, found expression in the appropriations crisis
of 1909.

Munoz Rivera led the protest of the House of Delegates that

would initiate an investigation by the Taft administration.

Recommen-

dations for reform of the Foraker Act resulted in the Olmsted bill,
which was disliked by the Puerto Ricans because it did not offer any
real increase in self-government.

The failure of the Olmsted bill

prompted an attempt to pass a citizenship bill for Puerto Rico.

This

152u.s., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record 62nd Cong., 3d
sess., 49:4746.
153Mclntyre to lglesias, 7 April 1913, BIA 1286/107.
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bil 1 also failed.

It was also opposed by Puerto Rican leaders, in-

cluding MuRoz Rivera.
The change of administration in Washington in 1913 caused the
Union party to hope for reform in the direction of autonomy or independence.

The Bureau of Insular Affairs saw in the change a chance

to get a government bill through Congress.

Jones' citizenship bill

and the Olmsted government bill had both passed the House of Representatives easily.

Both had drifted out of existence in the Senate.

A

better result for reform legislation for Puerto Rico was expected from
the new administration and Congress.

The Democrats and William Jen-

nings Bryan, especially, were, after all, the champions of anti-imperi a 1 ism.

'

l•

CHAPTER V
A REFORM BILL FOR PUERTO RICO
The factors that contributed to the failure of reform legislation for Puerto Rico during the years of Republican administration in
Washington would also delay legislation under the Democrats.

Import-

ant among these factors was the relative unimportance of the island in
the thinking of many Congressmen.

American leaders continued to disa-

gree about the pol icy that should be adopted toward the insular posf.

sesions.

The asumption that Puerto Rico would be retained by the Uni-

ted States while the Philippines would be given independence predominated.

The islanders presented conflicting requests to the mainland

leadership.
Sugar, landowning 1 imitations, and the tariff would complicate
the campaign for reform legislation in Puerto Rico under the Wilson
administration as they had the Congressional history of the Foraker
Act.

Foraker 1 s bill had, however, been a Republican measure.

Demo-

cratic opposition to the bill and to imperialism committed the Wilson
administration to reform.

One analyst commented that the Congress of

Wilson's first term produced more positive legislation than at any
time since Alexander Hamilton. 1 The majority of this legislation was
]Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the
Men Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), P· 258.
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markedly in the nature of reform measures.

Wilson himself, the Demo-

cratic takeover after so many years of Republican domination in Washington, and the influence of the Progressive movement, made reform
the order of the day.

The islanders and the American administrators

of Puerto Rico had every reason to expect that a new government bill
would be among the reforms adopted.
Shaping A Government Bill
The commitment of the Democratic party to the enactment of a
new government bill for Puerto Rico dated from the Foraker Act of
1900.

That first organic act, which was termed

title, had been opposed by Democrats in 1900.

11

temporary 11 in its

Congressman William A.

Jones, now the chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs,
had been one of the most vocal opponents of the Foraker Act in 1900.
His personal concern with the replacement of the temporary Foraker
Act was indicated by his introduction of a government bill while his
citizenship bill was still before the Congress.

In May of 1912, he

introduced H.R. 24961, which generally followed the lines of the Olmsted bill, although it included a wholly elected upper house for the
insular legislature.2

No action was taken by the Congress on this

bill, and the new administration would draft a new proposed organic
act,

tslanders remembered the stand taken by William Jennings Bryan,

now Wilson's Secretary of State, against the imperial ism of the
2News cable to Colton, 31 May 1912, BIA 3377/126.
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Republicans in his campaign of 1900.3
Governor Colton, who would remain in office until the expiration
of his term in November, 1913, had organized the customs services for
the Philippines and the Dominican Republic before his appointment as
governor of Puerto Rico.

With his years of experience in Latin America,

he sought to advise the new Democratic administration about the island's
need for a new government bill.

In a personal memorandum to the new

Secretary of War, Lindley Garrison, Colton stressed the importance of
granting American citizenship to the Puerto Ricans as soon as possible.
He also recommended an elective upper house for the insular legislature
to be tempered by an absolute veto power for the governor.

He sugges-

ted a Public Service Commission composed of the six executive department heads plus three elected members, to take over the executive
duties of the Council established by the Foraker Act.

Lastly, he

repeated his suggestion that the island be divided into thirty-three
districts for the election of the members of the insular lower house
to assure minority party representation.4
The Governor forwarded his memorandum with a long
letter explaining his thinking to Garrison.

11

Personal 11

Colton, in a markedly

patronizing tone, remarked that he 1 iked Latin Americans, especially
the Puerto Rican lower classes which he termed "charming."
f!rst of all

realize~':.'

he wrote,

11

"We must

that we are dealing with a race whose

3pedro Gomez Lassere to Bryan, 11 October 1913, BIA 26429/32.
4colton to Garrison, 5 April 1913, BIA 3377/130 1/2.
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moral and other standards and ideals are as different from ours as
possible among human beings, 11

He thought the Foraker Act had given

too much self-government because the islanders

11

are, almost without

exception, lacking in basic honesty, truthfulness and moral courage. 11
Politics brought out the worst characteristics of the Latin, who
tended to identify patriotism with partisan politics, according to
Colton.

Despite what he regarded as a too rapid grant of self-govern-

ment in 1900, he advised Garrison that in 1913 the governmental system
of the island should be adapted as much as possible to the aspirations
of the Puerto Ricans.

He knew the aspirations of the islanders inclu-

ded a large increase in self-government, especially in regard to the
insular senate.

The veto of the governor and the Public Service Com-

mission were intended to be the American guardians of the majority
of the island's people against the oppression of the minority of the
ruling class.

Governor Colton illustrated the importance of this

need by relating his experience with a charity school as an example
of the lack of concern of the Puerto Rican upper classes for the welfare of the people.

He had been thoroughly shocked by conditions he

found in a boys' charity school staffed with Puerto Rican administrators,

He was still more shocked when the island politicians responded

to his criticism of the school by considering the political impl icatfons of trying to reform the school,5
Governor Col ton's evaluation advising a grant of self-government
5colton to Garrison, 5 April 1913, BIA 3377/130 1/2.
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to the islanders coupled with the retention of the last word in American hands was based upon several years of experience in Puerto Rico.
About about a week of experience, Judge Peter Hamilton told President
Wilson that a grant of anything 1 ike self-government would have to be
slow. 6

Islanders advised the new administration differently.

Munoz

Rivera wrote to President Wilson that the islanders had progressed in
their ability for self-government in the past fourteen years.

He

stated that the Puerto Ricans wanted either statehood or independence,
but they demanded at least a quick grant of self-government.7

Antonio

Barcelo, whom Munoz would choose as his heir to leadership of the Union
party, told President Wilson that the island hoped the new administration would be just and grant self-government without undemocratic
l imitations.8
The preparation of the first draft of the government bill of
the Wilson administration was done by Frank Mcintyre, Chief of the War
Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs.
of 1913.

Mcintyre had it ready in July

The draft was shown to Munoz Rivera, who objected to several

provisions of the bill.

Munoz told Mcintyre that biennial assemblings

of the legislature served to ruin the power of the upper house to confirm executive appointments.

The Unionist leader felt that the insu-

lar governor and legislature, and not the president, should appoint
the civil service commissioner.

Munoz also objected to the committee

6Hamilton to Wilson, 18 April 1913, Wilson Papers.
7Munoz to Wilson, 1 May 1913, BIA 26429/10.
8Barcelo to Wilson, 2 June 1913, BIA 26429/14.
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in charge of the approval of franchises being dominated by appointees.
Since his own generation was Spanish in its background and thinking,
Munoz said that future generations should decide the question of the
final relationship of the island with the United States.

He told Mc-

lntyre that the lack of a citizenship provision in his draft bill was
good because it did not close the door entirely on the rising independence sentiment in Puerto Rico.9
General Mcintyre explained the reasoning behind the provisions
of his draft bill to Secretary Garrison.

He saw an advantage in

drawing up a constitution for Puerto Rico in its homogeneous and
compact population.

The disadvantages were more numerous.

The is-

landers lacked both experience in self-government and a deep belief
in popular government.

Puerto Rico had two classes: the educated and

the totally uneducated.

Government must be in the hands of the edu-

cated, but they had no interest in the well-being of the uneducated
class.

Lastly, the islanders dealt with government without honesty

and therefore without confidence.

Mcintyre also noted that there was

a problem of Puerto Rican prejudice against the Americans and their
institutions wherever they were different from traditional ideas.
Mcintyre said that the Foraker Act had given twelve years of
efficient government.

A few changes were necessary in the interest

of eff icfency, but the Foraker Act was not satisfactory to the Puerto
Ricans interested in government.

Those interested were few in number,

but Mcintyre argued, they were the only group through which an appeal
9Mclntyre, Memo, 22 July 1913, BIA Luis Munoz Rivera, personal
file.
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for popular support could be made.
Puerto Ricans and Americans.

His draft bill would displease both

The Federal Court was abolished in Mein-

tyre's draft because he thought it caused unfriendliness towards the
United States, since it was a special court open to Americans.

Puerto

Rico would retain its Puerto Rican citizenship because the insular
House of Delegates had opposed American citizenship in its last session.

Mcintyre thought that the Congress should not again consider

American citizenship for the island until the representatives of the
people of Puerto Rico should petition that it do so. 10
Also in July, 1913, Senator Poindexter introduced a Puerto Rican government bill, S. 2712, which was like the bill Jones had introduced into the House in 1912. 11

This bill, also like Jones', would

be forgotten in committee while the administration prepared a bill.
Early in his last month on the island, Colton advised Garrison
that the political leaders of Puerto Rico were to have an important
meeting.

He wrote:

The principle leaders of all political elements in the island
consisting of not more than twelve persons, who represent and
control pol iti~al public opinion therein, realizing the impossibility of obtaining satisfactory revision of the organic act
while the questions involved are subject of general public discussion in Porto Rico have decided to hold a conference during
the present month to agree on fundamental principles which they
desire incorporated in the law.12
lOMemo "Proposed Act Creating A Constitution for Porto Rico,"
BtA 3377/130. ' File tndicates memo from Mcintyre to Garrison, 1913.
11 u.s, Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto
Rtco, Civil Government for Porto Rico, s. 2712, 63rd Cong., 1st sess.,
1913.
12colton to Garrison, 2 September 1913, BIA 168/63.
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Colton added that the confidential meeting would give its ideas
to one person for transmittal to the Secretary of War.

The island

leaders involved in the conference would agree to stop any interference from Puerto Rico with the passage of a bill incorporating their
aspirations.

Since he would soon no longer be governor, Colton offered

his services as transmitter and supporter of efforts to get such a bill
passed. 13
The leaders of all political elements failed to reach a complete consensus.
1913.

Munoz Rivera arrived in Puerto Rico on October 16,

He reported to President Wilson that the islanders'

11

deep dis-

gust'' with the government of the Foraker Act caused them to celebrate
the Democratic victory in 1912 because Democratic congressmen and
newspapers had always favored the island's right to greater privileges
and more freedom than had been granted by the Foraker Act.

During his

trip to the island, he told Wilson, he had concentrated on heading off
declarations from independence-minded islanders and reaffirming his
confidence in the Democratic administration.

He stated that the coming

Union party convention would be moderate in tone and that he felt that
public opinion favored moderation.

He ended with a plea for action con-

forming to the dignity of Puerto Ricans and the principles Democratic
pol it(cians had previously stated. 14
On the same day that Munoz wrote to Wilson, La Democracia
13tbjd,
14Munoz to Wilson, 18 November 1913, BIA 26429/33.
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published an editorial defining the Unionist leader's position on the
status issue.

Munoz had not wanted to make a statement before the

~·

Union convention but had decided to point out that he believed what
he had always believed.

He was a defender of the independence of the

island eventually and of autonomy immediately.

The article noted that

island leaders knew that Puerto Rico would never be a state, and, therefore, they were not insisting on statehood.

They did insist upon auto-

nomy and, if that were not granted, they would insist upon independence. 15
The next two years of island politics revolved around Munoz' continuing efforts to moderate the demands of the independence faction of
[

the Union party led by de Diego.

The struggle began as the convention

of the party was held in San Juan on November 22, 1913.
was to amend the platform of the party.

Its purpose

The young Martin Travieso, Jr.,

already an American citizen and soon to be Secretary of Puerto Rico,
submitted one proposed amendment.

He called for a form of autonomous

government, including a popularly elected senate and house with powers
over instruction, taxation, and the well-being of the working classes.
His plan was silent on the question of the future status of the island.
Josi de Dfego 1 s plan also demanded autonomous government, but it stated
t:

~

that autonomy was to be prepatory to independence.

Munoz Rivera sup-

'·

ported a third plan call fng simply for the continuance of the platform
of the previous year.16
15La Democracia, 18 November 1913.
16Travieso to Mcintyre, 26 November 1913, BIA 26429/36.
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The fight in the convention was between Travieso and de Diego.
Travieso reported that Munoz Rivera decided to support de Diego's
amendment because he was put in the position of having to choose between his old friend and the younger party men led by Travieso. 17
De Diego•s amendment to the Union party platform carried easily.
Despite the fact that the Union party convention had not been
as moderate as Munoz had promised, President Wilson included Puerto
Rico in his first annual message to Congress.

On December 2, 1913,

he said:
We can satisfy the obligation of generous justice toward the people of Puerto Rico by giving them the ample and familiar rights
and privileges accorded our own citizens in our own Territories. 18
The President noted that legislation for Hawaii and Puerto Rico
might be based on the assumption that a permanent bond with the United
States was possible, but legislation for the Philippines should envision eventual independence.19

Wilson had responded to the requests

of the Puerto Ricans, including Munoz, by recommending reform legislation for the island.

It might be noted, however, that the rights and

privileges of citizens in territories before their admission to statehood were not necessarily much of an improvement on what the islanders
already had in the Foraker Act.

Governor Arthur Yager, a Kentucky

educator and an old friend of Wilson, wrote the President reporting

l8u.s., Congress, Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2d sess.,
1913, 51:75.
191bid.
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the good impression created by his remarks to Congress.

Yager added

that he felt reform of the Foraker Act would determine the success of
his administration.

He was willing to work very hard for such reform

and pointed out that the island politicians had agreed to put aside
factional squabbles to concentrate on securing reform.

He was opti-

mistic enough about quick reform to suggest that vacancies in off ices
not be filled until new legislation had been passed.20
Although Mcintyre's draft bill had been ready months before,
the Bureau of Insular Affairs chief forwarded it to the new governor,
noting that the Secretary of War had not yet had time to review and
approve it.

Mcintyre told Yager that his plans were based upon the

Olmsted government bill, the Jones bill of 1912, his survey of legislation for the territories, and suggestions from various sources.

He

added that he thought the proposal to increase the number of executive
department heads appointed by the governor rather than the president
was a mistake.

Mcintyre put it in because he felt it necessary to

yield to the sentiment for autonomy in the island.

The proposal for

reform was sent to Yager for his opinion before Garrison's approval
because a bill would have to be introduced soon to be passed during
the present

~essjon

of Congress, and Mcintyre thought Garrison would

not give final approval until Yager's views were known. 21
Yager reported tha.t he was most favorably impressed after his
tour of the island by the prosperity of its industries, the patriotism
'

i~

20yager to Wilson, 3 December 1913, BIA 3377/132.
21Mclntyre to Yager, 10 December 1913, BIA 3377/after 131.
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and efficiency of its officials, and its people.
been well received by the islanders.

He noted that he had

Yager's inaugural statement that

he thought the American flag would wave indefinitely over Puerto Rico
had caused some dissatisfaction among the radicals.

The governor said:

But the independence people, and even Mr. de Diego and his crowd,
have generally acquiesced in it and told me that it suited them
exactly. Mr. de Diego insists that he never for one moment thought
otherwise. All they want or profess to want is a larger share in
the insular government; that is, some form of self-government that
would be entirely consistent with the continuation of American
supremacy and contro1.22
Yager 1 s views on reform of the insular government were that simple amendments to the Foraker Act would be better than an entirely new
organic act.

He suggested the following reforms: an elected senate,

redistricting the island into thirty-three or more districts for delegates to the house, a purely administrative Executive Council retaining
control of franchises, and an absolute veto for the governor.

He also

recommended appointment of executive department heads by the governor,
modification of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and individual
citizenship upon application by islanders who desired American citizenship.

He thought these reforms would satisfy all but a very few

extremists, whom he described as either among the Spanish or American
elements in the island. 23
Governor Yager's thinking reflected the ideas of Governor Colton
and the members of his administration, who were holdovers from the
22vager to Mctntyre, 13 December 1913, BIA 3377/134.
23vager to Mcintyre, 15 December 1913, BIA 3377/134.
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previous governorship,

The intention of the reforms was basically to

alleviate the most serious of the islander's grievances against the
system of the Foraker Act, while buttressing American control to avoid
any pitfalls that might come with increased self-government by making
the governor powerful.

After receiving Mcintyre's draft for a new

organic act, Yager said that a new constitution would be quite satisfactory.

He told Mcintyre they had the support of Senator 011 ie M.

James and of Harvey Helm of the Insular Affairs Committee.24
M. Drew Carrel, who wanted to resign as Secretary of Puerto Ri-

1.

I

co, wrote to Mcintyre that the political situation in the island was
most favorable to passing new legislation.

Carrel echoed Colton and

Yager in saying that the island politicians realized a bill could
never pass the Congress while they interfered.

They agreed not to in-

terfere, provided the new bill granted increased autonomy.

Carrel re-

ported that the Republicans, as always, wanted American citizenship.
The Union party leaders could not endorse American citizenship for po1 itical reasons but would not oppose optional citizenship. 2 5
In the fall of 1913, the island political leaders had agreed to
adopt a cooperative attitude among themselves and with the new administration to achieve reform of the Foraker Act.

Munoz wrote to de Di-

ego in January, 1914, however, that should the Sixty-Third Congress
fa(l to pqSS legislation for Puerto Rico, there would be an inevitable
24vager to Mcintyre, 19 December 1913, BIA 3377/135.
25carrel to Mcintyre, 7 January 1914, BIA 3377/141.
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surge of majority support for the "national 1 ife of Puerto Rico,"

He

added that he did not think reform would come so quickly because President Wilson planned to push only legislation reflecting the platform
on which he had been elected.
about Puerto Rico.

The Baltimore platform said nothing

Munoz told de Diego that he thought they had lost

the opportunity to turn home rule into a fact that would lead to independence.26

Munoz had also been busy preparing his own draft of a

new organic act for Puerto Rico.

It had been completed in December,

1913, and Representative Jones and the Union party were given copies.
Attorney General Wolcott H. Pitkin, Jr., 1 ike Governor Colton,
took it upon himself to transmit to the War Department the views of
the business interests of the island.

Pitkin was a Harvard educated

lawyer from New York, who had spent the years before his appointment
as Attorney General of Puerto Rico as an assistant U. S. attorney.
He would end his career as general attorney and director of 1.T.T.
Corporation.

He expressed these views in much greater detail than

had the governor.

Since the opinions that were most often heard in

Washington were those of the politicians, Pitkin felt those of the
business community, which were heard only in private conversation,
should be considered.

The businessmen, according to Pitkin, did not

consider the citizenship issue especially important but would 1 ike
the. privflege of optional American citizenship granted, although Puerto
Rican cttizenship was sufficient for busfness purposes.

Pitkin reported

26MuAoz to de Diego, 23 January 1914, La Democracia, 2 November
1915,
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that the businessmen felt that statehood would harm the island financially through the loss of the use of all its own revenues.

The busi-

nessmen told Pitkin that talking about independence was a waste of
time.

They thought, however, that independence might be advantageous

in allowing the island to seek its imports from other countries.

They

noted that the reduction in the tariff had not been extended to cotton,
which islanders wore, but had been to wool.

Also, the beans, codfish,

and rice, which were the staples of the Puerto Rican diet, were all imported at high prices from the United States.

Although Pitkin agreed

that greatly increased autonomy was desired by all of the Puerto

Ri~

cans, the businessmen of the island had more confidence in an American
governor's integrity than in that of a Puerto Rican governor.27
After Carrel had studied the terms of Mcintyre's draft bill
for Puerto Rico, he submitted to Governor Yager a memorandum containing
some points of clarification, omission, and error.
are reflected in Yager's analysis of the bill.

Carrel's comments

The question of citi-

zenship was left completely out of the December draft.

Yager argued

that this issue should be settled and citizenship granted with the
new organic act.

Carrel had recommended that Section 41 concerning

landholding by corporations be stricken from the bill.

Yager referred

to the land section as one he had not had time to consider.

He did

not know the Intention of this section, but commented that the tariff
revision on sugar had caused distress to the industry on the island.
27pitkin to Frankfurter, 28 January 1914, BIA 3377/148.
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He thought a further burden unwise. 28
In the reform of the tariff that had made the Senate too busy
to consider Jones• citizenship bill in 1913, Puerto Rico's hold on a
share of the United States sugar market was shaken by a tariff reduction that made her less able to compete with Cuba.

A 1903 agreement

gave Cuba a twenty percent reduction in the tariff on sugar.

Sugar

and wool were the two important and controversial items put on the
free 1 ist in the tariff reform.

The duty on sugar was reduced from

1 2/3 cents to 1 1/4 cents per pound.
free of duty after May 1, 1916.

In addition, sugar was to be

In 1916, however, the 1 1/4 cents

duty, which was 1 cent on Cuban sugar, was retained by the Congress.29
Cuban sugar was more cheaply produced than was Puerto Rican sugar.
Cuba's formidable production capacity became a threat to the smaller
island's place in the American market when the tariff was reduced.
President Wilson insisted that sugar and wool be on the free list.
His administration was determined to overturn the Republican protective tariff, especially on raw materials consumed in vast quantities
by the American people.30
Wilson's first term.

Y~ger

Tariff reduction was a basic reform of

Cotton was not included in the tariff reform

28carrel memorandum to Yager, 28 January 1914, BIA 3377/154;
to Mctntyre, 28 January 1914, BIA 3377/138.
29p. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, 8th

ed~, (New York; Augustus M.. Kel ley 1 Publishers, 1967}, pp. 425-427.

30Arthur S. Unk, Amer icc:in Epoch (New York~ Alfred A. Knopf,
1959L p. 128.
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because Puerto Rico was not considered when the bill was drafted.
mainland still produced much of its own cotton.

The

Puerto Rico was the

importer.
Governor Yager also commented on the draft bill's destruction
of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in Puerto Rico.

He said he

had not reached his own conclusions on the Court issue but reported
that many Americans in the island were afraid that any change in the
competency of the Court would "affect injuriously their interests and
ultimately the interests of the island in general. 11 31

Judge Hamilton

from 1913 to 1917 would write a flood of letters combating every rumor
that the powers of the Federal District Court were to be decreased or
the Court abolished.

His letters usually constituted a plea that new

legislation for Puerto Rico raise his salary to one equivalent to that
of Federal Court judges on the mainland.

In January, 1914, Hamilton

wrote one such letter to Representative Jones.

Hamilton argued that

the insular Supreme Court could not be allowed to replace the Federal
Court because his court was the only one using the jury for civil
cases and because admiralty, equity, and bankruptcy law could not be
handled in the insular courts based on Spanish legal precedent.

The

judge pointed out that the three greatest sugar centrals were American, and they produced one~half of the island's sugar.

In addition,

the (~land's merchants. were mostly Spaniards or other foreigners, and
the grow~ng fruit C\nd new industries were American owned.

These econ-

omic facts made the need for a separate Federal District Court apparent
31yager to Mcintyre, 28 January 1914, BIA 3377/138.
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to Hamilton.3 2 Americans did consider the Federal District Court in
the island as the special protector of their interests.

This is why

the Puerto Rican press and House of Delegates particularly disliked it.
Governor Yager went to Washington to discuss the final draft
of the administration bill.

Mcintyre, Garrison, and he met and exam-

ined the latest draft of the bill.

The bill they agreed upon included

giving the citizens of Puerto Rico the option of becoming American
citizens without delay or cost.

The Governor described the provisions

of the bill as an attempt to give the islanders more self-government
without threatening the stability or efficiency of the administration
of the island.

He argued that the bill should he passed quickly be-

cause the Puerto Ricans had already been greatly disappointed that
the Congress had not recognized the improvements in the development
and education of the people.
changes had been a

11

Secondly, he noted that the new tariff

crushing blow 11 to the sugar industry, making it

even more appropriate for Congress to gratify the Puerto Ricans.
Liberal izaion of the island government was in line with the platform
and history of the Democratic party and also, he thought, important
in view of American relations with Latin America.33
Secretary Garrison forwarded Yager 1 s remarks to President Wilson.

The Secretary stressed the losses to the island economy because

of the elimination of a tariff on sugar.

lt was, he noted, embarras-

s.(ng that the economic crisis caused by the new tariff made it almost
32Hamilton to Jones, 30 January 1914, Jones Papers, Box 89.
33vager to Garrison, 13 February 1914, BIA 3377/with 142.
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impossible to raise the money that had already been appropriated for
improvements in the island.

Garrison told the President that he ag-

reed with the bill Yager favored.

It was essentially the Bureau of

Insular Affairs• bill, prepared by Mcintyre but amended to include
Yager 1 s suggestions.
{

Garrison asked Wilson whether he wanted the

bill brought up before Congress, where it would consume much time.34
President Wilson answered his Secretary of War saying that he did
want a 1 iberal ization of the island government from the current session
of Congress, if possible.35
The fifth draft of the proposed government bill was taken to
Capitol Hill by Governor Yager.36

Secretary Garrison sent a copy to

President Wilson noting that the bill had been gone over by Munoz Rivera, Yager, and the executive department heads in the island government.37

Charles Hartzell, one administrator in the insular govern-

ment, had been the special advocate for the protection of American
business in Puerto Rico.

He was a lawyer whose career prior to his

appointment as Secretary of Puerto Rico had been in Colorado Republican politics.

Mcintyre cabled him that the Federal Court would be

retained in the new bill and that it would say nothing about landholding,38

Hartzell sent his approval of these terms of the bill to
34Garrjson to Wi 1son, 16 February 1914, Wilson Papers.
35wil s,on to Garr j'son, 18 February 1914, Wilson Papers.
36B l'A
memo ' 17 February 1914, BIA 3377/with 129.
.
37Garrison to Wilson, 19 February 1914, BIA 3377/144.
38Mclntyre to Hartzell, 18 February 1914, BIA 3377/143.
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Senator Shafroth.39

Attorney General Pitkin was particularly concerned

that the suffrage be restricted because he believed the substantial
islanders• votes were meaningless while the majority of the voters were
ill iterate and propertyless.

His special plea to Yager noted that:

The American interests in Porto Rico, who ought to be alive to
the importance of this particular consideration, have apparently
lost sight of it completely, and seem to have expended all their
energies in fighting the landholding restrictions against sugar
companies, which appear to have been eliminated from the bill,
and the provisions for the abolition of the Federal Court, which
seems 1 ikewise to have been el iminated.40
American interests had gotten their two most important changes through
the intercession of the island administrators, including Yager, with
the Secretary of War and the head of the Bureau of Insular Affairs.
As Garrison noted, Munoz Rivera had also gone over the draft
of the new bill.
on February 12.

The island leader had met with Yager and Mcintyre
During this meeting, Munoz Rivera had especially

stressed the desire of the islanders for an entirely elected legislature and an insular cabinet appointed by the governor with the advice
and consent of the island's upper legislative house.

Munoz Rivera

later succeeded in getting three amendments to the administration
bill.

The first two increased the number of members in both branches

of the legislature, and the third made it possible for the insular
legislature to have effective approval of appointments. 41
consulted~

Munoz was

as he had been by Mclntyre the previous summer, but the

39Hartzell to Shafroth, 19 February 1914, BIA 3377/145.
40Pitkin to Yager, 23 February 1914, BIA 3377/156 1/2.
41Muniz, pp. 92 and 98.

changes he influenced were not as great as the leader of the island
might have expected.

He had approved Mcintyre's exclusion of a citi-

zenship provision in the early draft of the bill, but citizenship
was included in the final draft sent to Congress in February, 1914.
The Wilson administration's government bill for Puerto Rico was
prepared by Frank Mcintyre.

Citizenship was included primarily due to

the advocacy of Governor Yager.

The landholding and Federal Court

provisions were changed because of the pressure from Americans on the
island.

Munoz Rivera suggested changes tending toward greater repre-

sentation and self-government for the islanders.

The administration

bill was ready for Congress, where it soon acquired the name of the
Jones bi 11.
The Jones Bill in the House
On February 24, 1914, President Wilson advised Garrison that he
thought the Puerto Rican government bill too important to be squeezed
onto the crowded Congressional calendar when there would not be enough time for discussion.

He suggested that the good intentions of

his administration be illustrated by getting the bill considered by
the committee and reported out to the House.

No attempt to get the

bill passed in the present Congress was to be rnade. 42

On the same

day that Wilson wrote to Garrison, Representative Jones introduced
the admi.nistrati'on b(l l into the House of Representatives.

The next

day, Senator Shafroth introduced his bill into the Senate.

Munoz

42Wilson to Garrison, 24 February 1914, BIA 3377/147.
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Rivera introduced his own bi 11 into the House on February 27, 1914.
The House Committee on Insular Affairs quickly held hearings
on the Jones bill, H.R. 13818.

Yager, Garrison, Mcintyre, Munoz Ri-

vera, and Frank Martinez, the vice-president of the Union party,
testified before the Committee.

Yager stated that the Jones bill

had been prepared with the collaboration of himself, Mcintyre, Garrison, and

11

Mr. Rivera. 11

He added that the purpose of the Jones bill

was to give the islanders more self-government and noted that the
Jones bill differed from the bill prepared by the administration in
its citizenship provision.

Jones had inserted the citizenship pro-

vision of previous legislation he had sponsored: collective American
citizenship to all islanders who did not formally decline it within
six months.

Yager did not approve of Jones' citizenship section and

said it was the only part of the bill to which he objected.

He pre-

ferred that American citizenship be granted to the islanders individually upon application, as was provided in the administration draft
of the bill and in Senator Shafroth 1 s bill.
-·l

Representative Finis J.

Garrett, of Tennessee, questioned Yager as to whether it was wise
for the United States to announce that it was going to keep Puerto
Rico and not absolutely assure that the islanders become American
citizens,

Yager responded 1

11

11

We have done i t. 43

Secretary Garri.'son echoed Yager's statements r.egarding the
urgency of p~ssfng leg{sletton for Puerto R{co.

He pointed out that

43u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, A Civil
Government for Porto Rico. Hearin s before the Committee on Insular
Affairs on H.R. 13 18, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1914, pp. , 5 and 7.
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Yager opposed the grant of collective citizenship because of the islanders' political attitudes that would accept optional citizenship,
but rejected the idea that citizenship be forced upon them.

For him-

self, Garrison said that since there was no sentiment in the United
States for the independence of Puerto Rico and no thought that the
annexation of the island was other than permanent, it would be best
to settle the question by a collective grant of citizenship.

Garrison

did not oppose Jones' plan for collective citizenship with the right
of denouncing it, but his preference was for granting citizenship to
anyone who simply registered on the voting roll as such.

Garrison's

plan included the proviso that only American citizens could vote or
hold office after the second election.44
Munoz Rivera testified before the Committee on Insular Affairs
that he had introduced his bill to express the aspirations of Puerto
Rico rather than to conflict with the Jones bill.

He stated that his

93,000 constituents wanted the question of citizenship left out of
the bi! 1, as they would regard citizenship without statehood as second-class citizenship.

Munoz Rivera opposed the absolute veto of the

governor, appointees having a vote in the senate, dividing the island
as the governor's appointees might decide, and a pub! ic service commission composed only of bureaucrats.
l~nd's

He also objected to the is-

funds being deposited outside of Puerto Rico,

He urged the

Congress to amend the Jones bill by strik[ng out the features he
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opposed.

With such amendments, he regarded the Jones bill as

11

a step

toward the attainment of genuine home rule, to which we are entitled
and which we have and will claim always in conformity with your democratic and republican principles. 11 45

Frank Martinez agreed with his

party's leader that the citizenship issue should be postponed.

He

thought compulsory citizenship, which he called any system that gave
only American citizens the vote, might imply incorporation of the
island as a Territory.

Territorial status would be costly to the

island, which could not afford to send its revenues to the Federal
Government. 46
The Jones bill, when it appeared as H.R. 13818, had changed
from the administration draft in more than the citizenship clause.
Mcintyre had intended that the spelling of the island's name revert
to the historic form of Puerto Rico.

When he first noticed that

H.R. 138:18 used Porto, Mcintyre was not sure whether this was Representative Jones' wish or a printers' error.47

Jones had spoken

against the arbitrary Porto spelling in Congress in 1900.

If it

was a printers' error, this error reappeared in new drafts of the
Jones bill as H.R. 14696 and H.R. 14866, despite the intention of
Mcintyre and Yager to restore the Spanish spelling.

In addition

to substituting his own citizenship section, Representative Jones'
bill oJTii.tted Section 40 of the administration draft, which provided
45tbi.d., pp, 54 .. 55,
46tbjd., p. 67.
47Mclntyre to Hamilton, 26 February 1914, BIA 3377/with 152.
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that after a set date no islanders could hold office unless they were
U.S. citizens.

Mcintyre commented that this provision was crucial

if the bill were to have Jones' collective citizenship provision.
The Bureau of Insular Affairs head thought that Section 40 was omitted because Jones had not used the same final draft that had been
sent to the President.48
his own.

Jones made one other intentional change on

Section 36 in H.R. 13818 on appropriations was Jones' con-

struction of the existing law.49

The interpretation of the powers

of appropriation had been debated in Puerto Rico since the 1909 crisis
over legislative appropriations.
The tasks of the Committee on Insular Affairs during the second session of the Sixty-Third Congress were to amend the proposed
government bill and to choose between the various bills offered.
Munoz Rivera's bill, H.R. 13979, had been, as one commentator notes,
submitted for the record.SO
the islanders.

Its author called it the aspirations of

Munoz' bill retained Puerto Rican citizenship for the

islanders, who would form a body politic together with the American
citizens resident in Puerto Rico.
overturned by a
islatiye

two~thirds

br~nche~.

The veto of the governor could be

vote of both of the entirely elective leg-

The redistricting of the island would be done by

a board that included representatives from the Union and Republican
parties ..

MuAoz' bill proy{ded for the election of two Resident

48Mctntyre to Garrison, 25 February 1914, BIA 3377/149.
49charles c. Wallcutt, Jr., to Daniel D. Walton, 26 February
1914, BIA 3377/with 152.
50Gattel l, "Luis Munoz Rivera, 11 p. 9.
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Commissioners.

In general, Munoz' proposed organic act embodied the

amendments he wished made to the Jones bill and restricted the power
of the appointed governor and administrators while enhancing that of
the local legislature.51
The proposed government bills for Puerto Rico, which were intraduced into the Senate, were never considered by the House Committee on Insular Affairs.

They were, however, important as alterna-

tives to the Jones bill while the House discussed the terms of the
new organic act.

Outside of the Congress, interested persons could

debate the merits of the Senate and House bills for Puerto Rico.
The bill introduced by Senator John F. Shafroth as S. 4604 was practically identical to the Jones bill.
Missouri in 1854.

He became

Senator Shafroth was born in

a lawyer and represented Colorado in

'!

the House of Representatives from 1895 to 1905.

He refused to serve

the term in the 58th Congress to which he had been elected because
the election of 1904 had been full of allegations of fraud.

He was

governor of Colorado from 1909 until 1913 when he entered the Senate.
Shafroth 1 s bill provided for individual citizenship, and it
was essentially the administration bill before Jones changed the
citizenship clause.

Munoz' bill had been introduced for the record.

That of Shafroth was introduced to keep the question of individual
citizenship open,

Even more,

think the purpose of the Shafroth

bill was to avoid the pitfall of the Senate, where Puerto Rican
legislation had ended in the past.

Shafroth 1 s purpose was to get a

51u.s., Congress, House, A Bill to Provide Civil Government
for Porto Rico. H.R. 13979, 63rd Cong., 2d sess., 1914.
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bill working through the Senate before the House sent up its island
legislation.

President Wilson had already given up the idea of the

Sixty-Third Congress passing Puerto Rican legislation, but many of
his fellow Democrats had not yet done so.
Senator Shafroth understood that the Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico would face quorum problems, as it had in the
past when the busy senators did not have the time to consider legislation for Puerto Rico.

For this reason, he requested Garrison and

others to submit their views in writing.

Garrison quickly sent his

response to Shafroth so that his ideas on the necessity of new legislation for Puerto Rico would be available to the members of the Senate committee.

He restated the views he had given the House.52

Shafroth's quorum fears were well founded.

He gave a hearing to one

islander, Benigno Fernandez Garcia, which was attended only by Shafroth and one other Senator from the committee.53
Mcintyre was concentrating on getting the Jones bill through
the House of Representatives.

He provided Jones with a comparison

of the Foraker Act with both the Jones and Shafroth bills.

Mcin-

tyre added a memo outlining the proposed changes in the organic law.
These (ncluded the restoration of the Puerto Rico spelling and an
extensive Bill of Rights,

The latter was taken from the Olmsted

bill and was also included in Munoz Rivera's draft bill.
52Garrison to Shafroth, 2 March 1914, BIA 3377/after 152.
53Mctntyre to Yager, 10 March 1914, BIA 3377/after 156.
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Mcintyre commented on Munoz' concern that no island funds be
in banks outside of the island.

He said that large deposits had been

in the United States in former years, especially from the sale of
$4,000,000.00 in irrigation bonds.

There were no deposits of Puerto

Rican funds in the United States during the period from July to
December, 1913.54
The Bureau of Insular Affairs chief was much encouraged by the
good attendance and interest shown by the members of the House Committee on Insular Affairs during the hearings and by the attitudes of
Munoz and Martinez.

The Union party would have political problems

because of the terms of the Jones bill.
~

'~

'

Still, Mcintyre stated, the

two leaders would be happy to have the bill passed.

Their hope was

for quick passage, however, and they implied that the bill might be
less acceptable the following year.55
On March 9, the House committee decided to set up a sub-committee to continue their review of the Jones bill section by section.

Three men were chosen for that task: Jones, Garrett, and Hor-

ace M. Towner, of Iowa,
the Jones bill,56

All three sub-committee members favored

Jones had wanted the sub-committee because he was

very discouraged by the amount of time consumed while the full committe.e rev{ewed the bill,

Mcintyre noted that there was no opposi-

ti.on from the Republ jean members of the Committee on 1.nsular Affairs
54Mclntyre to Jones, 3 March 1914, BtA 3377/with 152.
55Mclntyre to Yager, 3 March 1914, BIA 3377/after 152.
56Mclntyre to Yager, 10 March 1914, BIA 3377/after 156.
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to the proposed bill.

He added that Jones felt only a special rule

allowing only four hours for consideration of the bill by the full
House would make passage in the current session possible.57
Governor Yager hoped that the Shafroth and Jones bills would
be passed swiftly in their respective branches of the Congress.

This

would leave only the citizenship question to be settled by a conference committee of the House and Senate.5 8

Meanwhile, he forwarded

the comments of several American administrators in the island on the
bills.

Their suggestions tended towrad the smoothing out·of termin-

ology and the legal implications of some provisions of the bills.59
A sanitation service official, Dr. W. F. Lippitt, sent his views on
citizenship.

He said

he favored collective citizenship and thought

that it was "the desire of the nine out of ten of the better class
of people on the island and they are really the only ones that ought
to be considered. 11

He went on to say that the Union party was the

majority in the island.

Perhaps Yager was correct that the Union

party should be allowed to save face on the citizenship issue, especially since the leaders had all agreed to apply quickly for citizenship when the bill had been passed. 60
The. sub-committee of the Committee on Insular Affairs completed
57Mclntyre to Yager, 6 March 1914, BtA 3377/after 156.
58'('ager to Mclntyre, 11 March 1914 1 B!A 3377/161,
59!bid, 1 and Yager to Mcintyre, 12 March 1914, BIA 3377/168.
60Lippitt to Mctntyre, 11 March 1914, BIA 3377/166.
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its discussions of the Jones bill on March 16.
Jones introduced it as H.R. 14694.

The following day,

It was to replace the bill in-

traduced by Jones in February but was primarily just a corrected
version.

Collective citizenship unless denounced before a court

within six months was still in the new bi11.6l

The suggestions on

refinement of terms and legal implications transmitted by Yager had
been incorporated into H.R. 14694.6 2

Mcintyre noted that the pro-

vision that only American citizens could hold office or vote was
back in the bill.63

The General said that the change in the bill he

most regretted was that taking executive department heads out of the
legislature.

He felt that separation of powers had not been success-

ful in Latin countries.

Mcintyre reported that Senator Shafroth's

quorum problems continued, but Jones, Towner, and Garrett thought
they could get the bill through the House easily enough.64

H.R.

14694 was to have an even shorter 1 ife than the February Jones bill.
It was referred back to the Committee on Insular Affairs on March 17,
1914.
Munoz Rivera and Martinez appeared again before the House committee on March 18,
bill,

They argued for several amendments to the Jones

Their cirguments _against the governor's veto power did not

6lu.s .. , Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, H.R.
14694? 6Jrd Cong._, 2d sess,_, 1914.
62Mclntyre

tq

Y9ser, 17 March 1914, BIA 3377/159.

63BtA Memo initialed F.M. l., 17 March 1914, BIA 3377/159·
64Mclntyre to Yager, 17 March 1914, BIA 3377/161.
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prevail.

Martinez got a voice, but not a vote, for the executive

department heads in the insular senate.

Munoz Rivera succeeded in

getting the mental asylum and bl ind school put under the jurisdic{

tion

of the Commissioner of Health rather than Education.

He also

got an amendment fixing a firm date for annual sessions of the insular legislature.65
'

By the time the full committee finished amending

the bill, Jones found it expedient to reintroduce it as H.R. 14866
on March 20, 1914.

H.R. 14866 was the bill of the full committee,

but no major changes had been made.66
Senator Shafroth had gone from two to three Senators attending
his committee hearings.

He asked the Secretary of War to write to

all members of the Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico requesting their cooperation in getting legislation for Puerto Rico
passed.

Senator Clapp had raised the question of the indirect conse-

quences of granting citizenship to the islanders.

Garrison enclosed

a lengthy legal opinion by Felix Frankfurter in his letter to the
Senators to reassure them on this point.67

Garrison was happy to

comply with Shafroth 1 s request because he was hopeful now and was
urging action.

Mcintyre feared that there were too many other issues,

(ncluding Panama Canal tolls, before the Senate.68
65Muniz 1 pp. 99~111,
66u.s., Congre?s, House, Committee on lnsular Affairs, Civil
Government fo~ Port6 R(co, H.R: 14866 1 63rd Cong., 2d sess., 1914.
67Mc,'ntyre to Shafroth, 22 March 1914, BIA 3377/171.
68Mclntyre to Yager, 20 March 1914, BIA 3377/170.
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H.R. 14866 was reported out of the Committee on Insular Affairs
on March 26.
House.69

Mcintyre did not see any problem for passage in the

The committee report recommended passage of the Jones bill.

The committee thought that the important provisions of the bill were
the Bill of Rights and the grant of American citizenship.

An elected

senate of nineteen was another reform that the committee said the
people of Puerto Rico could be trusted with, especially since the
governor had an absolute veto power.

The bill also created new exec-

utive departments of agriculture and labor, and of health.

There

were to be no property or literacy requirements for voters already
registered.

In the future, however, only American citizens over 21

who were 1 iterate or owned taxable property could register to vote.70
The citizenship issue was beginning to stir up controversy in
Puerto Rico, despite the truce called by the political leaders in
~

1913.

Rumors that MuRoz Rivera had consented to collective citizen-

ship caused confusion and consternation in the Union party.7 1

lgle-

sias forwarded the demands of his labor union to the War Department.
These included collective citizenship and a department of agriculture
and labor, both of which were in the Jones bill.
an

eight~hour

Labor also wanted

day, protect[on for child labor, and civil rights

69Mclntyre to Yager, 27 March 1914, BIA 3377/177.
70u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Civil
Government for Porto Rico, H, Rept, to Accompany H.R. 14866, 63rd
Congq 2d sessq 1914,
71yager to Mcintyre, 18 March 1914, BIA 3377/174.
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written into the bil1.72

Like Iglesias' followers, Barbosa's Repub-

1 icans also wanted collective citizenship.

Munoz had testified that

the Republicans received 58,000 votes to the Union party's 92,000
in the last election and thus were a val id representative of public
opinion in the island.73

Iglesias and Barbosa were not a part of

the arguing in Puerto Rico.

A split in the heterogeneous Union party

was responsible for the breach in the calm, united stand of the islanders.
The Union party on March 9 adopted resolutions which were also
adopted by the House of Delegates on March 18, 1914.
Barcelo

De Diego and

forwarded these resolutions to the effect that Munoz Rivera's

bill alone satisfied the islanders' aspirations toward autonomous
government.

The resolutions opposed the end of Puerto Rican citizen-

ship but said that optional individual citizenship, as in the Shafroth
bill, was acceptable.
t

The absolute veto of the governor was also

attacked, but the Shafroth bill was still regarded as a positive step
that retained Puerto Rican personality.74
Noting that the island Republicans had chosen a delegation to
press for a grant of collective American citizenship, Mcintyre commented that the House of Delegates was composed of Union party men.
He regarded the House memorial as an action intended for the benefit
72 tgles{as to Mc~ntyre, 14 March 1914, enclosing memo, BIA
33771176~

73Hearings, on H;R. 13818, p. 53.
74de Diego and Barcelo to Yager, 24 March 1914, BIA 3377/184.
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of local political consumption.75

He found island reaction di scour-

aging: "This is simply following the precedent of several years and
making it difficult for men already somewhat puzzled to find out
11

what Porto Rico desires to meet the wishes of the people. 76
nor Yager thought that the Union party leaders were being
the citizenshfp fssue.

11

Gover-

foxy

11

on

De Diego and Barcel5 had given him verbal

agreement, but Yager had not been able to get a written promise that
they would not interfere with individuals choosing to declare for
American citizenship.77
Antonio Barcel5, speaking as president of the Union party,
gave an interview opposing the absolute veto of the governor in the
Jones bill.

He stated that like Munoz Rivera, he preferred inde-

pendence, but would accept statehood if it were offered immediately.78
Munoz also stressed his opposition to the absolute veto and to the
date of the insular senate sessions being left to the governor's
.,

.,

discretion.79

The Democratic Club of Ponce expressed its opposition

to the absolute veto, although it asked for collective citizenship.SO
President Wilson declared in 1914 that the Philippine Island bill
should give the governor a conditional veto power with an absolute
75Mctntyre to Garrison, 16 April 1914, BIA 3377/187.
76Mctntyre to Y~gert 17 Aprfl 1914, BIA 3377/after 187.
77y'ac;er to Mcl_ntyre, 25 March 1914, BIA 3377/182.
78La CotrespoMdeMcfa, 3 April 1914.
79Mctntyre Memo, 22 May 1914, BtA 3377/200.
80ponce Democratic Club Resolution, 5 April 1914, BIA 3377/193.
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veto for the President.81

Later it would be Wilson who would decide

to give the Puerto Ricans their wish and take the absolute veto of
the governor out of the Jones bill.
Although the Jones bill had already been reported from the comcittee to the House, debate on various provisions continued.

Yager

did not like the change in the latest draft of the bill which lowered
the property qual ificatfons for the insular senate to $1,000.00.
stated:

11

He

1 think ft is generally desired in Porto Rico that the elec-

tfve senate should represent the conservative classes and those who
have property interests more especially. 11 82
jury system should not be extended.83

He also argued that the

Yager wanted the Jones bill

amended so that literacy and property qualifications for the vote
would apply immediately to all islanders, even those who had already
been voting.84
The Governor favored these undemocratic changes because of his
paternalistic attitude toward the islanders which was greatly influenced by his subordinates in the island and their concern that reform
for Puerto Rico would not endanger American interests there.

He and

these other men experienced in the problems of governing Puerto Rico
attributed the problems to the unpreparedness and incapacity of the
uneducated is landers..

Mc l:ntyre said that the changes Yager wanted

8JJones to Wilson, 25 June 1914, Wilson Pcipers,
82'('?iger to Mcintyre, 31 March 1914, BtA 3377/185.
83yager to Mcintyre, 19 June 1914, BIA 3377/212.
84yager to Mcintyre, 14 October 1914, BIA 3377/218.
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could be made easily,B5
The Customs Servfce objected to a provision of the Jones bill
that was intended to protect the island's high-quality coffee from
cheaper grades being transshipped as Puerto Rican coffee.B6

The Cus-

toms Service won their point that special services to protect island
coffee·would involve duplicate customs organizations.

American sani-

tation officials also argued over the terms of the quarantine provision of the Jones bil1.B7
Senator Shafroth intended to let Jones get his bill through
the House before taking any action on Puerto Rican legislation in the
Senate.BB

The year of the Sixty-Third Congress remaining after the

report of the Jones bill was filled with frustration for those who
also waited for the Jones bill to pass the House.
Saulsbury, of Delaware, introduced S. 5B45 in June.

Senator Willard
He was a lawyer,

businessman, and banker who served in the Senate for only one term.
His bill differed from the other government bills already introduced
primarily in making Puerto Rico a Territory.

Territorial status im-

plied future statehood, so the island Republicans supported Saulsbury 1 s bill.

This support did not succeed in getting the bill out

of the Senate committee any more than Union party support had gotten
Munoz

Rivera~s

bill out of committee in the House.

Neither bill was

B5Mctntyre to Yager, 23 October 1914, BIA 3377/21B.
B6wn l jam McAdoo to W{lson, 17 June 1914, Wilson Papers.
B7McAdoo to Jones, 27 March 1914, Jones Papers, Box B9. The
Sanitation Service objected to strfngent rules on administrative grounds.
1n
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ever seriously considered by the Congress.
The Jones bill had been reported unanimously by the Committee
on Insular Affairs.

Yager and Mcintyre continued to push and hope

that the Sixty-Third Congress would pass it.

Even the House, which

had been quick in passing earlier legislation, failed to consider
the Jones bill in 1914.

Judge Hamilton and Governor Yager hoped the

President's troubles with Mexico would provide impetus for the passage of the Jones bill.

Yager pointed out the usefulness of a Puerto

Rican brigade in the event of war.89

Neither trouble in Mexico nor

the outbreak of war in Europe aided the Jones bill in 1914.
events complicated the atmosphere in Washington.

Both

They probably wor-

sened the chances of the bill because they brought a heavy load of
legislative business which caused the Jones bill to languish.
Representative Jones was himself another reason why the House
did not pass his government bill for Puerto Rico.
Warsaw, Virginia, in 1849.

He was born in

He became a lawyer, but his career was

in the House of Representatives where he represented the 1st Virginia district from 1891 to 1917.

Jones died on April 17, 1918.

Luis Munoz Rivera told Mcintyre in May that Jones was cool toward
the bill,

Mcintyre said this was due to complaints from the island

about the bill.90

Jones was trying to find a time for the bill in

June, but h(s qbsence from the Capitol slowed it up~9 1

Mcintyre

89Hamilton to Wilson, 22 April 1914, Wilson Papers; Yager to
Mcl:ntyre 1 20 April 1914, Bl:A 3377/194.
.
90Mctntyre Memo, 22 May 1914, BIA 3377/200.
91Jones to Wilson, 26 June 1914, Wilson Papers.
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in September sometimes thought the bill could still be passed if Jones
were really interested.

Jones, however, was in bad health and was

more interested in his bill for the Philippines than in that for Puerto Rico.92

Yager and Mcintyre usually attributed Jones' attitude to

the frustrations involved in attempting to please the divided Puerto
Ricans who could not agree on what they wanted from Congress.
President Wilson had intended to help the Jones bill provided
it did not threaten to prolong the session of Congress.93

The bill

got on the Union Calendar and could be called for consideration at
any time.9 4

A caucus of the House Democrats in May decided to concen-

trate on anti-trust legislation and appropriations for the rest of the
session.95

Representative Garrett tried to get a special rule from

the Rules Committee that would bring the Puerto Rican government bill
up for consideration.

Jones believed that the bill could be gotten

through with this special rule, since the session of Congress would
continue into the Autumn.9 6

Garrett was unable to get a quorum of

the Rules Committee, and Jones was not in Washington to help.97
Wilson had assured his friend Hamilton that "You may be sure
that if there is the least scrap of room for the legislation about
9 2Mc l:ntyre to Yaser 1 16 September 1914, BIA 3377/215.
93Yciser to Mcintyre, 27 March 1914' Bl.A 3377/178.
94Mclntyre to Yager, 5 May 1914, BIA 3377/after 194.
95y·ager to Mcintyre, 20 May 1914, BIA 3377/202.
96Mclntyre to Yager, 12 June 1914, BIA 3377 /207.
97Mclntyre to Y.ager, 22 July 1914, BIA 3377/214.
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Porto Rico thfs session, I will press it. 1198
bill did not develop.

That room for the Jones

No one in Washington was prepared to offer any

appreciable amount of opposition to the Jones bill, with the exception of Munoz Rivera.
favored the bill.

The administration and Congressional leaders

It did not pass the House of the Sixty-Third Con-

gress because it was not considered important enough to be squeezed
into an unusually busy session.

Reform for Puerto Rico would wait

for the Sixty-Fourth Congress.

98\-Hlson to Hcimi_lton 1 18 June 1914, Wilson Pcipers.

CHAPTER VI
PASSAGE OF THE JONES BILL

'.

The Sixty-Fourth Congress would pass the Jones bill during the
last few weeks of its existence.,

After a year of virtual inactivity,

the House of Representatives passed it in May, 1916.
not follow suit until February, 1917.

The Senate did

An important factor contribu-

ting to the success of the Jones bill was the attitude of President
Wilson.

His decision to push for quick passage of the bill and the

determined efforts of the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, ended
stagnation in the Congress.
Passage in the House
Early in 1915, the Puerto Rican House of Delegates scored an
impressive victory.

It drafted a memorial to Washington that did not

simply disappear after polite acknowledgment of its receipt.
memorial of March 9, 1915, asked for five specific reforms.

The
Most im-

portant among them was a legislature composed to two entirely elected
branches.

This was a reform provided in the Jones bill.

Appointment

of executive department heads by the governor with the approval of
the insular senate was requested.

The Jones bill stated that four of

the six department heads would be so selected.
188

The islanders wanted
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their local legislature to have full powers in local matters.
Jones bill provided for this generally.

The

In addition, the House of

Delegates wanted the governor to have a conditional, not an absolute,
veto power, but the Jones bill gave the governor broad powers, including an absolute veto.

Lastly, the island's House requested that the

granting of franchises for public and quasi-public works be approved
by a committee of the legislature.

The Jones bill put franchises in

the hands of a public service commission of appointed officers. 1 The
franchise question is an example of the Puerto Ricans' desire to gain
control of matters important in the development of the island.

Their

desire conflicted with American determination to keep such important
matters out of the island's party politics.

Franchises were an issue

for the same reason that control of the Department of Education and
the office of the Auditor were an issue.

De Diego's cable transmit-

ting the memorial pointed out that the House of Delegates was composed
of both Union and Republican party members who agreed on the requests
of the memorial.2
Governor Yager stated that the absolute veto power of the governor had been written into the Jones bill to gratify the estimated
three to five thousand Americans resident in Puerto Rico.
an entirely elected legislature without a veto.3

They feared

Garrison sent the

lwar Department Memorandum for Secretary of War, 22 March 1915,
BIA 3377/225.
2de Diego cable to Wilson, 10 March 1915, quoted in Garrison
to Wilson, 12 March 1915, Wilson Papers.
3Hearings, on H.R. 8501, p. 17.
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memorial to Wilson commenting that the Jones bill provided for an
absolute veto, but "It might be well to grant him a conditional veto,
with absolute veto in the hands of the President, as was done in the
Philippine bill. 11 4

President Wilson answered that he thought the

Jones bill was "likely to satisfy all reasonable present demands in
the island.''

Wilson decided, however, that the next Congress should

amend the bill to make the governor's veto for Puerto Rico like that
for the Phil ippines.5

Mcintyre explained to Yager that this meant

that the President would have a definite veto should the legislature
overturn a veto of the governor.6

The decision had been made to gra-

tify the islanders in their virtually unanimous opposition to an absolute veto power in the hands of the governor by giving them no more
than what the rebellious Philippines were to receive in this regard.
The Congress took no further action on the new government bill
for Puerto Rico during 1915.

~

Judge Hamilton urged President Wilson

to make the Jones bill an administration measure to get it passed.7
Hamilton was interested in amendments to the sections of the bill
concerning the Federal District Court.

In August, 1915, he restated

his plea of June that the Jones bill be passed swiftly because of
the discontent in the island.8

An English language periodical in

\

4Garrison to Wilson, 12 March 1915, Wilson Papers.
5wilson to Garrison, 15 March 1915, Wilson Papers.
6Mclntyre to Yager, 19 March 1915, BIA 3377/224.
7Hamilton to Wilson, 15 June 1915, Wilson Papers.
8Hamilton to Mcintyre, 21 August 1915, BIA 3377/226.
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Puerto Rico also expressed concern over the independence speeches being made by de Diego and the adverse effect these might have on the
Jones bill.9

As Gatell's article notes, there was no legislative

progress on the Jones bill during 1915, but the year was noteworthy
for a struggle in the Union party that resulted in the defeat of de
Diego and the official withdrawal of independence demands by the party.10

Munoz Rivera returned to Puerto Rico and reasserted his lead-

ership at a convention of the Union party.

De Diego would resign as

President of the party when the Union concurred with Munoz' asser~-

tion that the immediate demand of the Puerto Ricans was for self-government, not independence.

The publication in 1916 of de Diego's

articles and speeches from 1913 to 1916 and of his collection of
poetry indicate his continuing struggle for independence.

The poe-

try was filled with images of the United States' eagle victimizing

f

the Puerto Rican lamb.11

rl

;;;:

~

;~.

In November, 1915, Governor Yager wrote to President Wilson

''.:

about getting Puerto Rican legislation through the next session of
the Congress.

Yager had the Bureau of Insular Affairs draw up a new

bill for introduction into Congress.

The new bill was the same as

the bill that had been reported favorably by the Committee on Insular
Affairs in 1914 in all but two ways.

The changes made taxes collected

9Porto Rico Progress, 11 August 1915, BIA 26429/44A.
10Ga te 11 , p. 12.
llJose de Diego, Cantos de Rebeldia (Barcelona: Casa editorial
Maucci, 1916).
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on Puerto Rican cigars in the United States return to the island
treasury.

More important was the new provision that qualifications

for the right to vote in Puerto Rico would apply immediately upon
passage of the Jones bill rather than application to future registrations of voters. 12

Wilson replied to Yager's request that he make

the Jones bill a party measure and mention it in his message to Congress by saying that "You may be sure that I will take the deepest
interest in the programme for Puerto Rican legislation and shall try
in every way to promote its passage. 11 13

The President also promised

Munoz Rivera that Puerto Rico would be mentioned in his message. 14
With President Wilson's support, prospects looked good for the
passage of the Puerto Rican government bill in 1916.
with both Shafroth and Jones.

Mcintyre met

He reported that the Senator did not

approve of all of the amendments Yager wanted in the Jones bill, but
he was anxious to introduce and push the bill through the Senate.
Shafroth was trying to get the members of the Committee on Pacific
Islands and Porto Rico to agree to amend from the floor of the Senate
in order to avoid the quorum problems of the committee.

Jones told

Mcintyre that he expected no problem in getting the bill passed in
the House of Representatives.

Mcintyre noted, however, that Jones

did not seem in as much of a hurry as Senator Shafroth was.
12yager to Wilson, 2 November 1915, Wilson Papers.
13Wilson to Yager, 8 November 1915, Wilson Papers.
14Wilson to Rivera, 30 November 1915, Wilson Papers.
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senior Republican on the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Judge
Horace M. Towner, of Iowa, favored the Jones bill.

Towner had tried

to give the Puerto Rican bill preference over Jones' bill for the
Philippines, but Jones had blocked his attempt.15

Jones had written

to Yager that he planned to push the Philippine bill first, but that
both bills, he hoped, would be passed quickly.16

Jones was simply

more interested in the Philippine bill, as Towner was more interested
in the Puerto Rican bill.
Now that it seemed the Jones bill would be passed, the Puerto
Ricans again stepped up their demands.

Vicente Balbas Capo printed

an article that would be a model for dissident island polemicists in
the future.

Balbas contended that the United States was interning

belligerent vessels in San Juan harbor, thus jeopardizing the island's
neutrality.

He added that the islanders wanted peace, but heard that

Wilson planned to put 150,000 of them into the American army.

A grant

of citizenship under these conditions, Balbas thought, would be an
iniquity.17

Foreign merchant vessels that had been trading with Puer-

to Rico were interned during the war.

General Mcintyre mentioned the

President of the Hamburg-American Line specifically but did not name
the place of internment. 18

Balbas' figure of 150,000 men would rep-

resent all of the Puerto Ricans eligible for the draft.
15Mclntyre to Yager, 10 December 1915, BIA 3377/after 230.
16vager to Mcintyre, 17 December 1915, BIA 3377/237.
17Heraldo Espanol, 13 December 1915, BIA 3377/with 238.
18Hearings, on H.R. 8501, p. 26.
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de Diego forwarded another memorial from the House of

Delegates to the President and Congress.

This memorial repeated the

requests of the March message but added two more.

The House of Dele-

gates wanted a provision in the Jones bill that only bona fide residents of Puerto Rico be eligible to hold public office.

They also

asked that the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court be transferred to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.19

Opposition to the U.S.

Court and to American off ice-holders had a long history in the island.
Mcintyre and Yager met to go over the new draft bill.

The

final proposal was prepared under Yager 1 s direction in Puerto Rico.
He brought it with him to Washington in January, 1916.20

Jones intro-

duced the new draft of the bill as H.R. 8501 on January 10, 1916.
The Committee on Insular Affairs held hearings on the new draft of
the Jones bill within a few days.
Governor Yager testified before the Committee on Insular Affairs on January 13 that both political parties in the island favored
a grant of United States citizenship.

The Republicans had always

wanted citizenship, and the Union party had recently ceased to oppose
it.
tion.

Munoz Rivera took the opportunity to clarify his party's posiHe prefaced his remarks by stating that in the November 1914

election the Republicans got 83,000 votes and the Union party 118,000.
He said that the Union party still stood for ultimate independence,
although this had been relegated to the position of a future goal.
19de Diego to the President and Congress, 10 December 1915,
BIA 3377/235A.
20Yager to Mcintyre, 22 December 1915, BIA 3377/238.
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For thfs reason, the Union party wanted the question of citizenship
to be left open for the present because it would be an embarrassment
to the United States if citizenship were granted and, later, the independence of Puerto Rico were given.

Even before Munoz made his state-

ment, however, an exchange between Yager, Garrett, and James H. Davis,
a former Populist from Texas, made it clear that a grant of citizenship would be a part of any bill for Puerto Rico.

The congressmen

pointed out emphatically that the Constitution had no place in it for
subjects, only citizens.21
On January 15 the committee went into executive session to consider H.R. 8501.

In 1914, the committee in the Sixty-Third Congress

had been composed of fourteen Democrats and seven Republicans.

During

the Sixty-Fourth Congress there were thirteen Democrats and eight Republicans.
1916.

Munoz Rivera was listed as a member of the committee in

In addition to Jones, seven Democrats were on the committee

during both Congresses.

They represented Tennessee, Kentucky, lndi-

ana, Oklahoma, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.
served on the committee during both Congresses.
Minnesota, Ohio, North Dakota, and Maine.

Five Republicans
They were from Iowa,

The changes in the person-

nel of the committee seem to represent no real difference, except
that a representative from Louisiana, a state with an important beetsugar industry, was no longer on the committee. 22

t

I

21Hearings, on H.R. 8501, pp. 7, 8 and 10.
22tbid., p. 2.

The Committee on
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Insular Affairs could be expected to report the Jones bill favorably.
Jones introduced the committee's replacement for H.R. 8501 on
January 18.

The Jones bill was reported out of committee as H.R.

9533 on January 15, 1916.

H.R. 9533 was identical to H.R. 14866 ex-

cept for some amendments, primarily those Yager wanted.

Among the

latest changes were the conditional veto for the governor with an
absolute veto for the President.

A further concession to the House

of Delegates had been made by increasing the number of members on the
public service commission to allow for three elected representatives
of the islanders to control franchises for public works.

The last

change considered of substantial importance by the committee was a
further liberalization of the already generous policy of reserving
the tax revenues of the island for its own use.

In this case, all

internal revenue taxes were to go to the island treasury, whether
they were collected in the island or in the United States, if they
were collected on Puerto Rican goods. 23

Jones and his committee had

gotten the bill in a new form reported to the House of Representatives
in record time.
While the House committee had been working on the Jones bill,
Senator Shafroth 1 s Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico held
hearings at which Barcelo and Coll Cuchi spoke for the Union party.
Shafroth, however, intended to go little further until the bill was
passed in the House.

He then planned to substitute the House bill

23u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Civil
Government for Porto Rico, H. Rept. 77 to Accompany H.R. 9533, 64th
Cong., 2d sess., 1916, pp. 1-2.

r

r

198
however, "worried by the contentions from Porto Rico - one committee
opposing the citizenship provisions of the bill, and the other committee opposing practically everything else except citizenship. 11 26
Barcelo and Coll Cuchi were in Washington arguing against the
collective citizenship provision and for further democratization in
the Jones bill.

Judge Willis Sweet and Roberto Todd represented the

island Republicans arguing for Saulsbury's bill, which would make
Puerto Rico an organized, incorporated Territory of the United States.
The House of Delegates drafted a resolution on February 15 asking for
amendments to the Jones bill, including requests that the salaries of
appointed officials not be increased and that Spanish, as well as
English, be the official language in the Federal District Court. 27
The House of Delegates later sent a unanimous petition to Jones asking that the Federal District Court be abolished.

They argued for

the abolition of the Court citing precedent in the Territories.

Also,

the House of Delegates said the Federal Court disregarded the civil
law of Puerto Rico and that abolishing it would be economical. 28

In

the Territories there were Federal judges appointed by the President
to administer United States law, but there were no Federal District
Courts.

The Court had been stricken from the Philippine bill.

The

'

l

Puerto Ricans wanted the Presidential appointees on the island's

I

26Mclntyre to Yager, 18 February 1916, BIA 3377/247.
27puerto Rico, House of Delegates, Resolution, 8th Assb., 2d
sess., H.D. l, 1916.
28Herminio Diaz to Jones, 17 April 1916, Jones Papers, Box 89.
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Supreme Court to take over the duties of the Federal District Court.29
Mctntyre in 1913 had planned to abolish the Court for economy in the
island government.

Iglesias was the one who was against everything

in the Jones bill except citizenship.
All of the requests from Puerto Rico, coming as Mcintyre and
Jones were anxious to push the Jones bill through Congress, only
tended to irritate the General and Jones.

Jones, according to Mein-

tyre, "does not seem to be impressed by any of the testimony which
has been submitted against certain features of the bill.
Jones, of course, this is an old story. 11 30

To Mr.

Governor Yager told Mein-

tyre that people in Washington could not see the real situation from
which the contentions of the islanders arose.

Yager advised that a

bill be passed quickly based on the best judgment of the Congress and
ignoring "the squabbles and factional controversies of the various
leaders of various groups all of whom have some political or personal
motive and many of whom are insincere in their opposition to the various features of the bilJ. 11 31

In view of the attitudes of Jones, Mc-

lntyre and Yager, it is surprising that the islanders were able to
influence as many amendments to the Jones bill as they did.
On March 2, Jones gave Mcintyre news both good and bad.

The

good news was that the Philippine bill passed the Senate and would
return to the House without amendment.

Jones also told the General

29Hearfngs, on H.R. 8501, p. 25.
30Mcfntyre to Yager, 25 February 1916, BIA 3377/250.
31Yager to Mcintyre, 29 February 1916, BIA 3377/254.
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there would be an attempt to attach an amendment to the Puerto Rican
bill enacting the prohibition of alcoholic beverages.

Mcintyre asked

Yager whether he would prefer to drop the bill should the prohibition
clause be added to it.32
hibition.33

Yager wanted the bill passed even with pro-

Jones was still confident that the Puerto Rican bill

would get through the House.

Mcintyre, however, continued to keep

Jones and Towner constantly aware of the importance of passing the
bill.

There seemed to be very 1 ittle interest in the reform bill

for Puerto Rico among the Senators, and this worried Mclntyre.34
Shafroth 1 s secretary told Mcintyre that there would be little Senate
opposition to a prohibition amendment to the Jones bill.

Jones, how-

ever, planned to join Yager in fighting against prohibition.

He re-

garded it as strange to give Puerto Rico increased self-government
and then legislate a prohibition of alcohol for the island.

Mcintyre

said Jones had been receiving requests from Puerto Rico for prohibition.

One from a gentleman with an American name claimed that all

the labor troubles and strikes in the island were caused by rum.35
On March 24, 1916, a caucus of the Democrats in the House of
Representatives put the Jones bill for Puerto Rico on the 1 ist of
nine measures to be passed in the current session.36

The Sixty-Fourth

32Mclntyre to Yager, 2 March 1916, BIA 3377/after 253.
33yager to Mcintyre, 10 March 1916, BIA 3377/257.
34Mclntyre to Yager, 17 March 1916, BIA 3377/after 256.
35Mct ntyre to Yager, 24 March 1916, BIA 3377/after 258.
36Mclntyre to Yager, 25 March 1916, BIA 3377/after 258.
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Congress was composed of 230 Democrats and 196 Republicans, but the
Republicans had shown 1 ittle disposition to oppose the Jones bill for
Puerto Rico.

Making the bill a Democratic measure would make passage

by the House only a question of time.
tyre, had been chosen by Wilson.

The time, according to Mein-

It was to be passed after the Phil-

ippine and shipping bills and if adequate progress had been made on
the appropriations bills.37

The Puerto Rican government bill came up

before the House on May 5, 1916.

On May 2, Jones had asked for unani-

mous consent to consider the bill on the 5th.

The consent was given

with the proviso that debate would be limited to three hours with
Jones and Towner each controlling half of the time.
Rivera twenty-minutes of the time he controlled.
speech was a famous appeal for his island.
~

Jones gave Munoz

Munoz Rivera's

He asked Congress to give

Puerto Rico a truly republican form of government with which the islanders could show their fitness for independence in the future.38
After the speeches of May 5, debate on the Jones bill in the
House of Representatives took place primarily on May 22.

Meyer Lon-

don, a socialist congressman from New York, moved that the bill be
amended to strike the provision of Section 26 that required senators
to own taxable property in Puerto Rico with a value of at least $1000.
London argued that this provision was reactionary, that it created
37Mclntyre to Yager, 17 April 1916, BIA 3377/after 260.
38u.s., Congress, House, Congressional Record, 64th Con§.~··1st
sess., 1916, 53:7281-2, 7470.
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divisions among the Puerto Rican people, and that it gave the propertied class the power to rule.

His motion was defeated by a vote of

four in favor to forty-two opposed, despite the fact that no one spoke
in defense of the .$1000 property qua! ification for members of the island senate.39
Congressman R. Wayne Parker, a Republican from New Jersey,
wanted to amend the Jones bill to give the Puerto Rican legislature
the power to impose tariffs on trade between the island and the United
States.

Parker argued that the prosperity of the island might depend

upon her ability to defend her economy from that of the United States.
His proposal would have allowed the imposition of only a small percentage of American tariff rates.

Richard W. Austin, a Republican from

Tennessee, spoke against Parker's plan.

Austin said:

This is true, but we want absolute free trade between our country and its colonial possessions, as we have between the different states. We sold $7,500,000 to the Philippines, Porto Rico,
and the Hawaiian Islands under foreign flags, and last year
under our flag we sold $85,000,000, because of our tariff laws,
which g~ve us an opportunity to go in without paying custom
duties.40
Parker's amendment was not adopted by the House of Representatives.41
Most of the debate in the House was, however, concerned with
Section 35 of the Jones bill, which determined who would have the
right to vote in Puerto Rico.

Representatives Jones and Towner drew

up a substitute for the original Section 35.
39,bfd., p. 8460.
40tbid.' p. 8474.
41tbid.
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That the qualified electors of Porto Rico, for any election
whatsoever, shall consist of those citizens that will be hereafter registered in accordance with the terms of this act and
of the laws of Porto Rfco hereafter enacted. That no person
shall be allowed to register as a voter or to vote in Porto
Rfco who ts not a citfzen of the United States, over 21 years
of age, and who is not able to read and write, or who is not
a bona fide taxpayer in his own name in an amount of not less
than $3 per annum.42
The substitute Section 35 read:
That the qualified electors of Porto Rico shall consist of all
male citizens of the United States, 21 years of age or over
(except insane or feeble-minded persons and those convicted in
a court of competent jurisdiction of an infamous offense since
the 13th of August, 1898} who are able to read or write either
the Spanish or English language, and who shall be bona fide
taxpayers in their own name and in an amount not less than $3
per annum.43
Jones said the change was made primarily because the property
qualification was not intended to be additional to literacy but an
alternative.

The only difference in the property qualification word-

ing is, however, a change in connective from
tion of the word

11

11

or 11 to

11

and. 11

lnser-

male 11 is the major change in the two sections.

R. Mann, of 111 inois, moved to strike out the word
"without regard to sex. 11

11

James

male 11 and insert

Jones said there was no desire for woman-suf-

frage in Puerto Rico,44 but Munoz had supported it as early as 1908.45
Mann's motion carried by a vote of fifty-one to thirty-six.

London

then moved that the 1 iteracy and property qua I if ications be stricken.
After long debate, his motion failed by a vote of nine ayes and
42 t bid. ' p. 8464.
431b id.
44tbid., p. 8465.
45Munoz Rivera, Obras, 2:176.
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fifty-nine noes.46
An attempt to strike the property qualification was withdrawn
after it was explained that it was not a further restriction on the
vote.

It was an alternative intended to give the vote to taxpayers

who might be illiterate.

Jones tried to withdraw his substitute

Section 35 because Mann's woman-suffrage amendment had been added
to it, but Mann prevented withdrawal.

Republican Frank W. Mondell,

of Wyoming, proposed the insertion of a proviso that all Puerto Ricans who had previously voted retain the privilege.

Before his mo-

tion was considered, there was a long discussion of the evils of voting machines in lieu of ballots, as demonstrated by elections in Chicago.

When Mondell 's motion came to a vote, it was defeated twenty-

seven to fifty-one.

Democrat George Huddleston, of Alabama, offered

an amendment to strike out the literacy and taxpaying requirements,
even though such a motion had already been defeated.

Huddleston said

that the congressmen knew very little about Puerto Rico, and, therefore, the islanders should decide the qualifications for voting.
amendment was defeated.

The

When Jones' substitute Section 35 came to a

vote, it was defeated by a vote of thirty-eight to forty-nine.47

The

original Section 35 stood without amendment.
The Jones bill passed the House of Representatives without the
necessity of a roll-call on May 23, 1916.

No prohibition amendment

had been attached in the House because Secretary Baker had persuaded
46congressiona1 Record 53:8465-8468.
471bid., 8468-8473.
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North Carolina Democrat, Edwln Y. Webb, not to introduce a prohibition amendment because Puerto Rico's revenues would suffer terribly
should prohibition be enacted. 48

Woman-suffrage in Puerto Rico was

defeated when the substitute Section 35 was voted down.

The governor

lost the power to appoint immigration and customs officials.

The

Federal District Court remained unchanged except that its jurisdiction was changed from disputes involving $1000 or more to those invalving $3000 or more.
the limit was $3000.

In the District Courts of the United States
The House of Representatives made no other

major amendments to the Jones bill. 49
Although the House of Representatives had 426 members, fewer
than one-hundred of them had cast a vote during the debate on the
Jones bill.

The Jones bill passed the House easily.

It would be

difficult to argue that the bill had been passed easily because the
congressmen were especially interested in reform legislation for Puerto Rico.

J,

As a Democratic measure with the support of President Wil-

son, the Jones bill was assured of passage by the House.

r
Passage in the Senate
The Jones bill was reported to the Senate on May 24, 1916.
Senator Shafroth intended to speed it through the Committee on Pacific
tslands and Porto Rico.SO

Several amendments Yager wanted made in the

48Baker to Webb, 15 May 1916, BIA 3377/after 268.
49Mclntyre to Yager, 23 May 1916, BIA 3377/after 269.
50shafroth to Baker, 24 May 1916, BIA 3377/271.
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bil 1 were accepted by Shafroth, who had a few amendments of his own
in mind.

One of Shafroth's changes was the insertion in the bill of

rights of detailed procedures for the passage of legislation.

Mcin-

tyre thought this change unobjectionable, although it embodied avoidable rigidity.51

Governor Yager, however, opposed this change.52

Discussions of various minor changes continued after the passage of
the Jones bill by the House.

There were only two major issues: the

franchise and prohibition.
Senator Shafroth told Mcintyre that Senator James K. Vardaman,
of Mississippi, had decided to insist upon a prohibition amendment.
Vardaman was on the Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico.

He

had been the one Senator besides Shafroth to show any real interest
in the Puerto Rican government bill.

Shafroth also reported receiv-

ing many protests against the restrictions on the right to vote in
the Jones bill.

The Senator wanted to amend the bill so that the

property and 1 iteracy requirements would not apply for ten years.
Mcintyre tried to assure Shafroth that they had considered this problem, but the last election in Puerto Rico had convinced Yager and
Pitkin that the situation needed immediate change.

Despite his con-

cern with the prohibition and franchise problems, Shafroth intended
to report the bill.

He had, however, already called several meetings

of the committee which were attended by three or fewer members.
51Mclntyre to Yager, 2 June 1916, BIA 3377/after 273.
52vager to Mcintyre, 14 June 1916, BIA 3377/275.
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total of twelve Senators were on the committee.
~

Shafroth was going

to try to report the bill with the individual concurrence of the
twelve members. 53
Yager and Baker had their own plan for combating the indifference of the Senate to the Jones bill.

Yager sent a cable to Wilson

stressing the need for settling the Puerto Rican question in view of
the crisis in Mexico.

Comments such as this by Yager, and the fact

that a Puerto Rican Brigade was being organized, contributed to the
plausibility of the "cannon fodder" theory, which holds that the islanders were made United States citizens in order to draft them into
the armed services.

Baker forwarded the cable to Wilson with the

comment that Shafroth was anxious to pass the Jones bill, but the
Senate was not interested.
Senate.5 4

Yager 1 s cable might help Shafroth in the

The President took the hint.

He sent the cable to Shafroth

with a note stressing his concern with the passage of the Jones bill
as of the "utmost importance. 11 55

The Senate of the Sixty-Fourth

Congress had fifty-six Democratic and forty Republican members.

Wil-

son's decision had gotten the Jones bill through the House within two
months.

The Senate was even more strongly Democratic, but it was less

responsive.
Senator Shafroth reported the Jones bill from committee to the
Senate on July 3, 1916.

The Senate committee had made a number of

53Mclntyre to Yager, 22 June 1916, BIA 3377/275.
54saker to Wilson, 24 June 1916, BIA 3377/278.
55wrlson to Shafroth, 26 June 1916, Wilson Papers.
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amendments to the bill passed by the House.

The most important one

was the committee's try at a compromise on the issue of qualifications
for the suffrage in Puerto Rico.

A ten-years grace period was to be

granted before the literacy or property qualifications were enforced.
Mcintyre had not convinced Shafroth that immediate limitation on the
suffrage was needed.

Another amendment, to strike out a phrase in

the section defining the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court,
concerned Mcintyre.
diction of the Court.

The Senators had intended to broaden the jurisMcintyre thought the new section would tend to

give Americans resident in Puerto Rico privileges in the Court that
would not be available to the Puerto Ricans.56

Mcintyre had become

sensitive to the islanders' opposition to the Court as the special
protector of American interests.
Willis Sweet, Roberto H. Todd, and Manuel F. Rossy signed a
message on behalf of the island Republicans stating their satisfaction
with the Jones bill as it was reported from the Senate committee.
They urged passage of the bill, but hoped that prohibition would be
left to the island's legislature.57

Jose Celso Barbosa thought that

the Jones bill was anti-democratic in some features, especially the
limitations on legislative power.

By June, 1916, however, Barbosa

was anxious that the bill be passed.58

He wanted American citizen-

ship, as always, and had given up hope of influencing a more liberal
56Mclntyre to Towner, 17 July 1916, BIA 3377/283.
57Mclntyre to Shafroth, 18 July 1916, BIA 3377/282.
58Barbosa, 4:127-128.
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reform measure.

Antonio Barcelo sent a letter pleading with Wilson

for quick passage of the Jones bill to give justice to his island.59
Munoz Rivera also asked Wilson to use his position to get the bill
through and avoid another disappointment to the Puerto Ricans.60
Whatever objections they still had to the features of the Jones bill,
the island's political leadership all wanted the bill passed quickly
in the summer of 1916.

The notable exception was Jose de Diego.

He

was thoroughly disenchanted by the provisions of the Jones bill, which
he called an imperialistic bill.6l

tn 1916, he no longer held any

position of power within the Union party and, therefore, he could
even criticize Munoz' La Democracia for calling the Jones bill more
1 iberal and just than the Foraker Act when so large a percentage of
the voters would lose its privilege to vote.6 2
Secretary of War Baker advised President Wilson of continuing
criticism in the island, especially that of de Diego.

Baker thought

that a grant of citizenship would quell the independence agitation.63
Wilson's reply was:
bill.

11

Thank you for your letter about the Porto Rican

ft furnishes me with just the ammunition I want. 11 64
59Barcelo to Wilson, 19 July 1916, Wilson Papers.
60Munoz to Wilson, 19 July 1916, Wilson Papers.
61de Diego, Nuevas Campanas, pp. 244-261.
621bid., p. 258.
63Baker to Wilson, 21 July 1916, Wilson Papers.
64wilson to Baker, 24 July 1916, Wilson Papers.
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had been the source of Baker's information.

He noted that Baker had

responded with more interest in the passage of the bill than in the
past.65
Senator Robert F. Broussard had four intended amentments to
H.R. 9533 printed for circulation in the Senate.

He was from Louisi-

ana, where his brother was a prominent Progressive.
amendments were aimed at Puerto Rican sugar.

Broussard 1 s

The first would enforce

the landholding limitations on corporations passed in 1900.

The sec-

ond restated the five-hundred acres limit and prohibited corporations
from dealing in real estate.

The third set up a court jurisdiction

to handle forfeiture of lands held in excess of the law.

The last

provided for annual reports of land held by corporations to be

inclu~

ded in the governor's report to Congress.66
Mcintyre did not think these amendments would be adopted by the
Senate.

He was concerned, however, because they might "introduce that

element which defeated the bill some years ago and which I feel will
continuously defeat it.

It was only by omitting all reference to ag-

ricultural land holdings that I felt we had a good chance of passing
the bill . 11

"That element" was "The big sugar people in Porto Rico. 11 67

Munoz and Mcintyre were working in concert to get the Jones
65Mclntyre to Yager, 26 July 1916, BIA 3377/289.
66u.s., Congress, Senate, Amendments to H.R. 9533, 64th Cong.,
1st sess., 1916 ..
67Mclntyre to Yager, 26 July 1916, BIA 3377/289.
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bill through the Senate,

Mcintyre asked Munoz to see Broussard, with

whom he was acquainted, to block the sugar amendments.68
met with Mcintyre.

They agreed that the Jones bill

passed without help from Wilson.

mi~ht

Munoz later
not be

Munoz' concern for the passage of

the bill was communicated to Baker who called two Senators who might
help, Vardaman and John W. Kern, of Indiana.
personally to see Baker the next morning.

Both were asked to come

Both Senators did come to

visit Baker and promised to help get the Jones bill through. 69
Time was running out on the first session of the Sixty-Fourth
Congress.

1916 was a major election year.

There would be no contin-

uation of Congress into October as there had been in 1914.
made a last minute effort.

Shafroth

He was promised time for the Puerto Rican

bill, if not too much time was necessary.

The Jones bill might not

take much time in the Senate if prohibition were not brought up.
Shafroth tried to get an agreement from Senator Asle J. Gronna, of
North Dakota, who was the leader of the prohibition forces in the
Senate.

Gronna refused to agree to Shafroth's proposal that the pro-

hibition of alcohol be submitted to the Puerto Rican electorate at
the first election after passage of the Jones bill.

Then Shafroth

suggested that prohibition be voted upon by the islanders whenever
10 percent of them so requested.

This too was declined.

Senator

Gronna and his supporters wanted time in the Senate to be heard.69
68Mctntyre to Yager, 28 July 1916, BIA 3377/after 290.
69Mclntyre to Yager, 4 August 1916, BIA 3377/after 290.
70Mctntyre to Yager, 7 September 1916, BIA 3377/after 293.
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Congress adjourned on September 8, 1916.

The same day, Wilson

signed a bill that postponed the November, 1916, election in Puerto
Rico until another date was fixed.71

The purpose of the bill, which

was effective only if the Jones bill did not pass, was to protect
supporters of the bill from denunciations that the administration was
really uninterested in passing the Jones bill.72

Postponement of the

election was interpreted as a capitalist conspiracy by Manuel F. Rojas, an island socialist.

Yager was sure that the major parties in

Puerto Rico did not interpret the postponement the same way.

He was,

however, quick to send Samuel Gompers a copy of Rojas' pol ice record
in order to discredit both Rojas and lglesias.73
Munoz Rivera took advantage of the recess of Congress to return
to Puerto Rico.

He intended to work with the Union party but became

ill, and died on November 15, 1916.
great leader.

The islanders mourned their

Even Representative Jones kept preserved among his

papers those copies of Porto Rico Progress which reported Munoz' death
and the respects paid to him.74

Gatell concluded that Munoz' import-

ant contribution to the Jones Act was in keeping the Union party from
a radical course and suppressing independence agitation.75
71Mclntyre to Yager, 8 September 1916, BIA 3377/after 293.
72Mclntyre to Yager, 7 September 1916, BIA 3377/after 293.
73Yager to Mcintyre, 12 September 1916, BIA 1028/46.
74Jones Papers, Box 89.
75Gatell,

11

The Art of the Possible, 11 p. 20.
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Gatell's conclusion would be more convincing if he had shown
that the attitude of the Union party and independence propaganda had
been of primary importance in delaying the Jones Act.

His article is

based on many of the same sources used in his paper, and his failure
to prove that agitation in the island delayed legislation is understandable in view of the relative silence of the sources on this point.
Mcintyre and Yager told Munoz that the islanders were delaying legislation.

They added that Representative Jones became more interested

in the Phil ippfne bill because of the attitude of the Puerto Ricans.
The evidence provided by Yager and Mcintyre may well have been due
more to their desire to keep Munoz and his party in line than to the
fact that they were really harming the Jones bill.

Although I agree

that the aspect emphasized by Gatell was one contribution, Munoz' contribution to the Jones Act cannot be isolated so easily.

In addition,

Munoz had been the leading spokesman for reform of the Foraker Act al,most since its passage.

He was also the planner and executor of the

appropriations crisis of the House of Delegates in 1909.

This event

was the first step toward the Jones Act.
Antonio Barcelo inherited Munoz' leadership of the Union party,
as Munoz had intended.

The leader's death prompted an agreement be-

tween Barcelo, Giorgetti, and Travieso to heal the rifts in the party
ranks and work together.76
built and Jed.

Munoz' death did not end the party he had

Nor did ft end the determination of Yager and Mcintyre

to get the Jones bill passed.

President Woodrow Wilson agreed to

76Travieso to Baker, 16 November 1916, BIA 3377/295.
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"try to interest myself continuously in the matter until something is
accompl ished. 11 77

The Democrats would have fewer seats in the Senate

of the Sixty-Fifth Congress.

This probably reinforced Wilson's wish

for quick passage of the Jones bill.
The problems of prohibition and the franchise still had not
been settled.

Iglesias protested against limitations on the fran-

chise in Puerto Rico.78

Mcintyre met with the labor leader and

gathered the impression that Iglesias' protest was so vigorous because he felt he could now command more votes among the illiterate
with Munoz Rivera dead.79

The General 1 s cynical imputing of lglesi-

as' motives, however, does not invalidate the argument that giving
United States citizenship with one hand and taking away the right
to vote with the other was inconsistent at best.
President Wilson's message to Congress put the Puerto Rican
bill among the three pieces of legislation of "capital importance."
Wilson said the bill must be passed because the laws in effect were
unjust.

He added it should he passed "at once. 11

problem was prohibition.

The only serious

Shafroth thought the Jones bill could not

pass without a prohibition amendment.BO

Baker gave Shafroth a copy

of Mcl.ntyre's study showing how greatly the revenues of the island
77Wilson to Yager, 27 November 1916, Wilson Papers.
78tglesias to Wilson, 23 November 1916, Wilson Papers.

r
;

79Mclntyre to Yager, 1 December 1916, BIA 3377/after 308.
80Mclntyre, quoting Wilson, to Yager, 5 December 1916, BIA
33 77 /after 300.
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would suffer if the prohibition of alcohol were passed.81

Mcintyre

said that the prohibition forces in the Senate were more uncompromising than ever.

They were anxious for a test of their strength

in Congress, and the Jones bill served as a perfect opportunity.82
Yager hoped that even should the Senate pass the prohibition amendment the House Conference Committee would strike prohibition from
the Puerto Rican bill as they had from the Philippine bill.83
Yager chose a bi-partisan commission of islanders to go to
Washington and present a united stand in favor of the Jones bill to
the Senate.

Barcelo for the Union party and Manuel Domenech for the

Republicans headed the group.

They were under strict orders from the

parties, and the members had been carefully chosen.

Yager assured Mc-

Intyre that they would behave and thought the islanders would learn
at first hand the difficulties against which he and Mcintyre had been
fighting to get the bill passed.

The visit would

be·~

good schooling

for them, provided they really work and endeavor to use their opportunity.1184

Mcintyre reported that the members of the commission "could

not have behaved better. 11 85

Yager and Mcintyre had for years worked

diligently to get citizenship and increased self-government for the
Puerto Ricans, to whom they referred in a manner appropriate for
81Baker to Sha froth, 4 December 1916, BIA 3377/300.
82 Mclntyre to Yager,
5 December 1916, BIA 3377/after 300.
83vager to Mcintyre, 6 December 1916, BI A 3377/305.
84Yager to Mcintyre, 19 December 1916, BIA 3377/311.
85Mclntyre to Yager, 22 December 1916, BIA 3377/309.
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children.

Their paternalism explains their continued support for veto

powers and 1 imitations on the r_ight to vote.

They might have sup-

ported prohibition if such a measure did not imply economic disaster
for the government of a sugar island.
In January, 1917, Mcintyre reported that Senator Shafroth was
confident that the Jones bill would pass the Senate.
that Wilson could be counted upon to assist.
son's assistance would be necessary.

Baker was sure

Mcintyre thought Wil-

The Committee on Pacific Islands

and Porto Rico held a meeting to consider the proposed amendments of
Broussard concerning limitations on corporate landholding.
Senators were present, but Broussard was there.
~-

Only three

Mcintyre felt that

Broussard had been convinced to drop his amendments.B6
Wilson had asked several times that the Democratic leadership
in the Senate make the Jones bill a party measure.

Mcintyre thought

that any changes Yager wanted should be left to the good graces of
the House Conference Committee, thus avoiding additional complications
in the Senate.B7
~

Mcintyre had already enlisted William A. Jones' ser-

vices as champion of
ference.BB

Yage~'s

cause when the bill would come to con-

In January, 1917, it seemed certain that the Jones bill

would pass if only Shafroth could get the Senate to consider it.
On January 29, 1917, Shafroth asked for the unanimous consent
of the Senate to consider the Puerto Rican bill on the next day.
86Mctntyre to Yager, 17 January 1916, BIA 3377/318.
87Mclntyre to Ya~er, 25 January 1916, BIA 3377/320.
88Mclntyre to Yager, 2 February 1917, BIA 3377/326.
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J. Gronna objected.

Later Shafroth moved that the Jones bill be the

special order for January 30.

After a long debate on the time that

would be needed for the bill, Shafroth was asked to withdraw his motion because Gronna's proposed amendment to the bill would make it
impossible to finish ft the next morning.89

On January 30, Shafroth

asked for unanimous consent to consider the Jones bill.

Senator Wes-

ley L,Jones, of Washington, objected because Gronna was not present.
Shafroth then moved that the Jones bill be the special order for the
evening session.

A roll-call vote of fifty ayes and three nays made

the Jones bill the special order.

Among the forty-three Senators

who did not vote was Gronna, although he was present.90
During the evening session of January 30, the Senate discussed
the proposed grant of collective United States citizenship to the
Puerto Ricans.

Reed Smoot, a Republican from Utah, argued that it

would be better to have all of the Puerto Ricans who wished to become citizens make a declaration to that effect.

Smoot thought

it strange to ask them to make a declaration if they did not wish to
be citizens of the United States.

Albert Fall replied that in all

previous acquisitions of territory by the United States collective
citizenship was granted.

The Senator from New Mexico pointed out

that the previous grants of citizenship to new territories also had
the provision that someone could decline citizenship within a
89congressional Record 54:2161-2162.
90tbid., 2220-2223.
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year.~' Senator Vardaman, from Mississippi, questioned the wisdom of

granting citizenship to the island because he was convinced that the
prevailing sentiment there was for eventual independence.

He made a

point of saying that the Puerto Ricans were not receiving good
treatment from the United States.

en~ugh

Part of his remarks seemed most

sympathetic to the cause of the islanders.

He added:

We considered the matter carefully, and while I have no desire
in the world to coerce them, I really had rather they would
not become citizens of the United States. I think we have
enough of that element in the body politic already to menace
the Nation with mongrelization, but if the Porto Ricans are
going to be held against their will, as we are holding them
now, then we ought to legislate for their interests. We should
make the coercion as palatable as possible.92
Gronna agreed with his fellow prohibitionist.

He thought

granting citizenship under the circumstances did not represent government by consent of the governed for Puerto Rico.

Apparently he did

not realize the inconsistency in his views because he insisted upon
imposing prohibition without the previous consent of the island.

The

Senate passed an amendment making the time during which citizenship
!,

could be declined one year instead of six months.93
in the citizenship section were not made.

Further changes

During the rest of the ses-

sion, the amendments of the committee to the bill were quickly agreed
to by the Senators present.

There was little discussion of any issue

except that of secret sessions of the legislature.
91 tbid.
.
' 2250-2251.
9 2 1bid., 2250.
'

931 bid.' 2251.
941bid., 2252-2265.
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On January 31, Shafroth tried to get permission for the special
order calling up the Jones bill to continue.

Senator Smoot, although

be thought Shafroth could get the Puerto Rican bill passed, objected
because the regular order for the day included an appropriation bill.
Harry Lane, a Democrat from Oregon, also objected.

He said the ses-

sion the night before had been a waste of the Senate's time because
only six Senators attended and because the bill needed too many corrections.95

The record of the evening session shows that at least

twelve Senators were present.
spoke during the session.

There was no roll call, but that number

On February 1, Shafroth tried to get the

bill considered at an evening session.

A roll-call vote of thirty-

five to twenty was short of the two-thirds Shafroth needed.96

On the

third, Shafroth asked unanimous consent that the Puerto Rican bill be
the special order for February 5.

Again he did not get enough votes.97

He asked that the bill be considered Monday.

Wesley Jones said that

would be acceptable, but only if a quorum were present at the time
the session opened.

Shafroth argued against making a quorum a condi-

tion for consideration of the bill.

He said: "The reason is that

there are not enough Senators interested in the measure to come here
at night. 11 98 When the evening session of February 5 opened, only
951bid., 2309.
96!bid., 2360.
971 bid., 2538.
981 bid. , 2616.
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twenty Senators were present so the Senate adjourned.99
Shafroth was able to bring the bill up before the Senate again
on February 10.

James E. Martine, a Democrat from New Jersey, suc-

cessfully blocked an attempt to restore the $1000 value in taxable
property qualification for members of the senate in Puerto Rico.

Mar-

tine also stopped an amendment making a $500 property requirement for
senators.100

Broussard's original four amendments to enforce rigidly

limitations on landholding had been dropped.

He insisted that a state-

ment of principle, at least, be put into the Jones bill.
ment was next approved by the Senate.

This amend-

The provision stipulated that

the 500 Acre law was still in effect, that the governor would report
annually on agricultural real estate, and that the right to legislate
on this matter was reserved to Congress.101
Martine objected to the property requirement for the vote, but
Shafroth said he had a new Section 35 to offer.

The substitute pro-

vided that all who had voted previously in Puerto Rico retained that
right, but literacy in Spanish or English or status as a taxpayer to
the amount of not less than $3 per year would be qualifications in
the future.

All voters had to be citizens of the United States.

Wil-

liam E. Chilton, a West Virginia Democrat, agreed wi·th Martine that a
property requirement was unacceptable.

Martine and Chilton remained

unconvinced, even though it was carefully explained to them that the

99 t·b id.'

2630.

lOOl'bid., 3005.
101 tbid.' 3006.

----
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$3 in taxes in fact enfranchised more of the islanders.

Hoke Smith,

of Alabama, was the primary defender of the taxpaying alternative requirement in Section 35.

When Martine said he also opposed the liter-

acy qualification, Albert Fall gave a long speech.

He insisted that

there were already too many aliens in the United States and wanted the
bill to insure that Puerto Ricans would become assimilated.
ship and I iteracy were necessary to Fall for this purpose.

CitizenApproval

of the whole of Section 35 was not due for a vote as yet.- The Senate
approved the amended part of the section which allowed previous voters
to retain the franchise.102

A few more amendments by the committee

were quickly agreed to on February 10.

The bill was then dropped be-

cause Senator Fletcher insisted that executive business be taken up. l03
The Jones bill came up for consideration again on February 12.
Much of the time available for it was consumed in arguments about the
amount of the salary of the governor of Puerto Rico.104
then introduced his prohibition amendment.

A. J. Gronna

It read:

That one year after the approval of the act, and thereafter it
shall be unlawful to import, manufacture, sell, or give away,
or to expose for sale any intoxicating drink or drug: Provided,
That the (Puerto Ricanl legislature may authorize and regulate
importation, manufacture, and sale of said liquors and drugs
for medicinal, sacramental, industrial, and scientific uses
only. The penalty for violation of this provision with reference to intoxicants shall be a fine of not less than $25 for
102tbfd., 3007-3010.
l03tbid., 3010-3011,
104tbid., 3070-3072.
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the first offense, and for second and subsequent offenses a fine
of not less than $50 and imprisonment for not Jess than one month
or more than one year.105
Gronna's arguments for the adoption of prohibition consumed the balance of the time available for the Jones bill on February 12.
Now that the controversial prohibition issue was definitely
attached to the Jones bill, Shafroth again began to have difficulties
in getting the bill called up for the attention of the Senate.

On

February 16, he asked unanimous consent to proceed to H.R. 9533.

Hen-

ry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, objected because the bill was important and would require too much time in the Senate.

He thought

debate on the imposition of prohibition without a referendum would be
lengthy. 106

On the 17th, Poindexter made a motion for immediate con-

sideration of the Jones bill.

Several Senators objected because they

disagreed with Poindexter's assertion that the Jones bill would require only about twenty minutes of the Senate's time. 107
Shafroth sought assistance from Secretary Baker.
that he did not know what to suggest.

Baker said

He thought that:

The procedure in the Senate seems to give to individual Senators
the right not only to press their views but to postpone more or
Jess indefinitely the consideration of measures in which they have
reason to believe their views will not be reflected.108
Baker added an interpretation of the Wilson administration's
lOStbid,, 3072.
106 tbid., 3386-3387.
107fbid., 3482.
108Baker to Shafroth, 16 February 1917, BIA 3377/after 327.
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view of the importance of the bill for Puerto Rico.

He said:

The whole moral dominance of the Government of the United States
in the American Mediterranean is involved in our treatment of
the people of Porto Rico, and these unfortunate delays give agitators not only opportunity but illustration for argument as to
our neglect of the real interests of the peoples associated with
us. If we are really to face Jn any short time a large international crisis, the contentment of the people of Porto Rico is
of the utmost importance, and I confess that the thought of
teasing their impatient desire for citizenship by further delay
fills me with grave apprehension.109
The urgent appeal of the Secretary of War prompted Shafroth to
attempt a compromise with Gronna on prohibition.

He hoped to get the

Jones bill passed in the Senate on February 17 by agreeing to include
prohibition.

Ten percent of the island's voters could petition for

a plebiscite which could overturn the amendment.110

Gronna•s pro-

hibition amendment was agreed to in the Senate on February 17 with
the added proviso that the Puerto Ricans could petition for a plebis~;

[

cite.lll

The Jones bill did not, however, pass on that day.

After the approval of prohibition, the Senate went to the consideration of Section 35, which defined the right to vote in Puerto
Rico.

George W. Norris, of Nebraska, objected to the wording of the

section because the intention of three alternative classes of qua! ification gave the Puerto Rican legislature the power to impose one
of them but not the others.

Senator Fall agreed that the section did

give the legislature that power.

Fall wondered if the Senate realized

1091bid.
llOMclntyre to Yager, 17 February 1917, BIA 3377/after 327.
111congressional Record 54:3468.
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the extent of power and self-government it was granting. 112
Martine then offered a substitute for Section 35 which would
give the vote to all males over twenty-one who were citizens of the
United States.

He argued against further qualifications because the

sugar plantations and franchises were owned by "a clique of wealthy
men in the United States, in England, and in Scotland, and it is their
purpose and desire to control the elections in the island."

Limiting

the suffrage made it possible for them to do just that, according to
Senator Martine. 113
Senator Smith objected to Martine's proposal that everyone be
allowed to vote whether or not they had the capacity to vote.
suggested another alternative section.

Smoot

Smith agreed to Smoot's pro-

posal that the phrase empowering the Puerto Rican legislature to fix
qualifications for the vote be stricken.

Norris and Smoot supported

the idea that the property qualification be stricken as well. 114

The

debate on Section 35 became very confused, with several motions on
the floor and several Senators trying to speak at once.

Senator Clapp

then made a motion that the three-dollar qualification be stricken
from the section.

He said that in theory the taxpaying provision

would enlarge the electorate, but it would also provide opportunity
to control the electorate.115
1121bid, 7 3469.
1131.bid.' 3470.
1141bid., 3470-3471.
1151bid., 3473.

The debate became undisciplined and
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confused again until finally Clapp's motion was called for a vote.
The motion carried by a vote of thirty-one to sixteen.116
Martine's substitute for Section 35 was then rejected without
necessity for a roll cal1.117

An attempt was made to move on to ano-

ther section of the bill, but Robert Lafollette, of Wisconsin, interrupted.

He said he was unwilling to allow the Puerto Rican legisla-

ture to fix the qualifications for voters in the island and insisted
on calling for a quorum call in order to have time to go over all the
corrections and changes in Section 35.

His amendment to cut out the

power of the legislature in Section 35 was agreed to easily.118

The

whole of the amended Section 35 was then agreed to by a vote of fortyone to thirteen.
section.

La Follette again reopened the issue of the voting

Fall and La Follette began to argue.

Lee S. Overman, a

Democrat from North Carolina, then insisted that the Senate return
to regular order, since debate on the bill was becoming prolonged. 119
The Jones bill got no further on February 17.
La Follette was still unhappy with Section 35.

Representative

Jones was recruited to reassure the Senator that the Puerto Rican legislature could not now fix a property qualification. 120

On February

1161bid., 3476.
117tbfd., 3477.
1181bid., 3477-3478.
119fbid,, 3479,
120Mcfntyre to Yager, 21 February 1917, BIA 3377/after 329.
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20, Shafroth asked for continuation of the debate on the Jones bill.
Atlee Pomerene, a Democrat from Ohio, objected because the interstate
commerce bill was due to come up.

Pomerene did not believe Shafroth's

contention that the Jones bill would not take much time.
motion to consider the bill passed.

Shafroth 1 s

He then introduced a substitute

Section 35 which had been approved by La Follette. 121
The new section specifically outlawed any
tion for the vote in Puerto Rico.

~roperty

qualifica-

Some Senators questioned whether

the section provided for woman-suffrage since it did not specify
"male. 11

Shafroth said the Puerto Rican legislature could decide on

woman-suffrage since the new Section 35 read:
That at the first election held pursuant to this act the qualified electors shall be those having the qualifications of voters
under the present law; thereafter voters shall be citizens of
the United States, 21 years of age and over, and have such additional qualifications as may be prescribed by the Legislature of
Porto Rico: Provided, That no property qua! ification shall ever
be imposed or required of any voter.122
The new Section 35 was approved by the Senate.

The entire Jones bill

was then read and approved on February 20 without a roll caJJ.123
Conference Committees from the House and Senate were then selected to iron out the differences between the Senate and House versions of the Jones bill.
the Senate.
the House,

Shafroth, Poindexter, and Kern represented

Jones, Garrett, and Judge Towner were the committee from
The report of the Conference Committee was submitted on

l21congressional Record 54:3666.
1221bid.
1231bid., 3666-3667.
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February 23, 1917.

The Gronna prohibition amendment was not killed

by the Conference Committee as Yager had hoped.
landholding amendment also remained in the bill.

Broussard 1 s mild
The Senate's ex-

tension to one year of the time during which islanders could reject
citizenship stood.

La Follette 1 s insistence on the outlawing of a

property qualification for the vote carried through the Conference
Committee.

The literacy requirement of the original Jones bill was

also gone.

Shafroth's substitute Section 35 did not provide for a

literacy test because he knew Martine would continue to fight.

In

addition, President Wilson had recently vetoed an immigration bill
because it contained a literacy requirement~ 12 4

Shafroth did not

want to risk opposition from Senators who feared another veto.

The

Senate's removal of a property qualification for members of the island's senate also stood through the Conference Committee.125

Repre-

sentative Jones, who had agreed to fight for changes Yager and Meintyre wanted, did not agree to the end of the property qualifications
and literacy tests in the bilJ.126

His opinion did not carry the

committee.
The report of the Conference Committee was accepted by both
Senate and House of Representatives with little argument.

President

124 tbid., 3473.
125u.s., Congress, Conference Report, to accompany H.R. 9533,
Civ(l Government for Porto Rico, Rept, 1546, 64th Cong., 2d sess.,
1917.
126Mclntyre to Yager, 21 February 1917, BIA 3377/after 329.
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Wilson signed the Jones bill into law on March 2,
that had belonged to Luis Munoz Rivera.

1917~

using a pen

Mcintyre, Shafroth, Jones,

a representative of the Union party, and Samuel Gompers were present
for the signing. 12 7 Mcintyre and Yager could console themselves that
some features of the Jones Act with which they disagreed or disapproved had been the result of congressional ignorance.

Both men had

commented frequently, while the bill was being discussed in Congress,
on the almost total lack of information congressmen exhibited about
Puerto Rico.

This included those who were members of the House Com-

mittee on Insular Affairs and the Senate Committee on Pacific Islands
and Porto Rico.

For their part the Puerto Ricans could adopt the

attitude of La Democracia that the Jones Act represented progress
toward their goals rather than their fulfillment.128
The Jones Act was the product of seventeen years of protest by
the islanders, led by Munoz Rivera, against the Foraker Act.

It was

also the product of four years of labor by Mcintyre and Yager.

Shaf-

roth's contribution in the difficult task of getting a bill through
the Senate justifies the name Jones-Shafroth Act for the product of
:'

I

his work.

Jones and Secretary Baker also contributed much.

Their

labors might, however, have been fruitless without Wilson's support.
Judge Hamilton wrote to thank Wilson for the Jones Act, which
nelther Jones nor Shafroth could get through Congress.

129

Pedro

127Mclntyre to Yager, 2 March 1917, BIA 3377/335.
128La Democracia, 21 February 1917.
129Hamilton to Wilson, 19 February 1917, Wilson Papers.
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Capo-Rodriguez, a prominent Puerto Rican intellectual, celebrated the
anniversary of the Jones Act by expressing thanks to P.resi·dent Woodrow
Wilson.l30

The Jones Act had been demanded by Puerto Rico.

been written by Mcintyre and Yager.

It had

It was passed by Wilson with the

able assistance of Jones, Shafroth, and Baker.

The indifference of

the American Congress to reform of the government of Puerto Rico was
overcome only when Wilson decided that the bill would be passed at
once, rather than if time allowed.

130Pedro Capo~Rodriguez, Just a Word for Puerto Rico (Washington, D.C.~ n.p,, 1918L pp. 3~4~

CHAPTER V11
THE JONES ACT
Puerto Rico was governed under the terms of the Jones Act for
thirty-five years,

There were no important amendments to the Jones

Act until 1947 when the islanders began to elect their own governor.
Then in 1952, Public Law 600 created a Puerto Rican Commonwealth in
which the islanders finally exercised a full measure of self-government.

Between 1917 and 1947 there were only very minor victories for

the islanders: the official spelling of the island's name reverted to
Puerto Rico and the administration of the island changed from the
jurisdiction of the War Department to that of the Department of the
Interior.
ker Act.

The long-1 ived Jones Act was an improvement over the ForaIts terms redressed many of the most serious grievances of

the Puerto Ricans.
Americanization
Among the provisions of the Jones Act were many that can be
classified as contribut{ng to the Americanization of the island.

The

most crudal and most controversial was the grant of collective United States cit{zenshfp in Section 5.

This section declared al I citi-

zens of Puerto Rico to be citizens of the United States.
230

Islanders
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did not need to take any action to become American citizens.

If they

preferred to retain their previous citizenship, they had to take an
oath before the district court within a year renouncing American citizenship.

The Jones Act did not contain any restrictions on natural-

ization of those who chose to retain Puerto Rican citizenship initial ly.1

They could, however, not vote or hold office.

three-hundred islanders rejected American citizenship.2

Fewer than
Vicente

Balbas Capo remained a citizen of Puerto Rico, but Jose de Diego did
not.

To have chosen to reject United States citizenship meant losing

one's political privileges.
The greatest criticism of the grant of United States citizenship came from the nationalists who followed Balbas and de Diego.
De Diego had opposed American citizenship because he knew it would
make the ultimate achievement of independence much more difficult.
Balbas' initiation of the "cannon fodder" theory of American citizenship was echoed by later nationalists.

Jose Coll y Cuchi commented:

Hasta ahora, solo sabemos que somos soldados de primera clase
y ciudanos de segunda. Podemos dar ciento cuarenta mil hombres
para morir cuando y donde lo ordene el Presidente de los Estados Unidos; pero no podemos dar un voto para elegir al Presidente que nos mande a la muerte.3
Puerto Rican participation in war has given credence to this
assertion.

Jose Enamorado Cuesta equated the grant of citizenship

lu.s., Congress, House, An Act to Provide Civil Government
for Porto Rico, Pub, L, 368, 64th Cong, 1 2d sess., 1917, H.R. 9533,
p. 3 (hereafter cited as U.S., Congress, Porto Rico).
2White, p, 47.
3coll y Cuchi, p. 11.
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with the organization of Puerto Rican military units and the desire
to draft 50,000 islanders.4

In World War I, roughly 236,000 Puerto

Ricans were registered for the draft, but fewer than 18,000 were
drafted,5

Voluntary enlistments were numerous.

The disproportion-

ately heavy casualties among Puerto Rican soldiers in later wars has
contributed greatly to the fact that the "cannon fodder 11 theory is
widely believed.

Even Puerto Ricans who favor statehood for their

island will tell you that American citizenship was granted because
the United States needed to draft the Puerto Ricans.6
Section 35 of the Jones Act defined the right to vote in Puerto Rico.

Those who had voted previously were not disenfranchised.

Voters were to be United States citizens over twenty-one.

The is-

land's legislature could prescribe further qualifications, but a
property qualification was specifically debarred.7

This section of

the Jones Act represents Americanization in the sense that the best
traditions of American democracy overcame the determined efforts of
Governor Yager to impose literacy or property qualifications.

The

legislature of Puerto Rico did impose the qualification that voters
be males.

Universal manhood suffrage continued to be the rule after

the passage of the Jones Act because the legislature never did impose
4Enqmorado, p, 173,
5Muniz, p. 201.
6tnterview with Dr, Miguelina Hernindez and Don Martfn Hern5ndez, Puerto Rtcan employees of the Chicago Board of Education, February 23, 1975 ..
7u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p. 15.
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I iteracy or property qualifications.

The Jones Act incorporated a lengthy Bill of Rights.

Among

the traditional American rights granted to the island were guarantees against excessive bail, unreasonable search or seizure, and
abridgement of the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition.
Freedom of religion was guaranteed.

There was a prohibition of

either establishing one religion or using public funds or property
to support a religion.

Slavery and titles of nob ii ity were outlawed.

Reflections of the Wilsonian reform era in the Bill of Rights included an eight-hour work day for island public works employees and
restrictions against employing children under fourteen in dangerous
jobs.

Also in the Bill of Rights was the amendment prohibiting al-

coholic beverages,8 by far the strangest inclusion of an American
reform idea in the Jones Act.

The inclusion of the prohibition of

alcohol points out that there were two classes of Americanization
provisions in the Jones Act.

The grant of citizenship, broad suffrage,

and the guarantees of civil liberties represent Americanization in the
sense of extending American privileges to the islanders.

Gronna's

prohibition amendment was Americanization of Puerto Rico in the sense
of extending currently popular reform ideas to the island.
Section 17 gave the Commissioner of Education great power.
approved qJJ spending for education ..

He

The Commissioner prepared all

courses of study, subject only to the governor "if he desires to act. 11
Also, the Commissioner had the power to set rules for the selection
81bid., pp. 1-3.
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of teachers and to approve the appointments of teachers.9

Under Sec-

tion 13 of the Jones Act, the Commissioner of Education was one of
the two department heads who was to be appointed by the President
with the consent of the United States Senate rather than by the governor with the consent of the Puerto Rican upper house.10
of education was kept in American hands.

Control

The Puerto Rican legisla-

ture would have no authority to debate or enact a law concerning the
use of English in the schools.

Representative Jones stated in the

House of Representatives that the intention of having the President
appoint the head of education was to assure the teaching of English
by removing the control of education from the islanders. 11

This fea-

ture of the Jones Act, creating a powerful Commissioner beyond the
control of the elected representatives of the people of Puerto Rico,
was predictably among the most distasteful provisions of the Act in
the eyes of Jose de Diego. 12
Section 41 of the Jones Act retained the Federal District
Court in Puerto Rico.

The court had the same jurisdiction as dist-

rict courts in the United States.

In addition, it had jurisdiction

over the naturalization of aliens and Puerto Ricans.

The crucial

power of the court was that it had:
9tbfd,, p. 7,
lOlbfd., p. 6,
11 u.s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 53:8458.
12de Diego, Nuevas Campanas, pp. 247-248.
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jurisdiction of all controversies where all of the parties
on either side of the controversy are citizens or subjects
of a foreign State or States, or citizens of a State, Territory, or District of the United States, not domiciled in Porto
Rico, wherein the matter in dispute exceedsi exclusive of interest or cost, the sum or value of $3000. 3
Americans with an interest in the island had successfully insisted on the retention of this court to protect their interests, despite
the opposition of Puerto Ricans to it.

The Act also provided that all

pleadings before the court be in English, that jurors have an adequate
knowledge of English, and that appeals from this court go to mainland
tribunals rather than the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. 14
The Jones Act did represent a further commitment to Americanization in Puerto Rico.

This commitment was based on the fact that

American citizenship was granted because the retention of the island
by the United States had become the general assumption by Americans.
In one way, however, the Jones Act was interpreted as Americanizing
no more than had the Foraker Act.

Alaska had been recognized as incor-

porated territory when citizenship was granted.

Puerto Rico was not. 15

In 1918, two cases went to the United States Supreme Court on appeal
from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and the Federal District Court.
The U. S. Supreme Court overturned the rulings of the courts on the
island and held that Puerto Rico was still not incorporated territory

13u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p, 17,
141bid,, p. 18,
15Lew is,

p, 111 •
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of the United States,16

Trumball White argued that the constant use

in the Jones Act of the phrase "elsewhere in the United States" meant
the merging of mainland and island with the grant of citizenship.17
White's argument appears sound, especially when based on the Alaskan
precedent.

However, the phrase he finds so meaningful by its constant

usage only appears once in the Jones Act,

The fact that the Wilson

administration did not really regard the island and the United States
as merged is demonstrated by the fact that the Jones Act provided
that the President could pick the department of the Federal Government
to which Puerto Rican affairs would pertain. 18 Wilson left Puerto Rico under the Department of War.

The significance of the decision of

the Supreme Court that Puerto Rico was not yet incorporated territory
until the Congress should specifically so provide was that the American Constitution still did not apply to Puerto Rico.

The island re-

mained the ward of Congress.
Self-Government
At the time of the passage of the Jones Act, citizenship and
Americanization were controversial issues on the island.
ment was not.

Self-govern-

Santiago {glesias was almost the only islander on record

to oppose increased autonomy for Puerto Rico.

Constant demands by the

16People of Porto Rico v. Jos~ Muratti, 245 U.S. 639 (1919);
People of Porto Rico v. Carlos Tapia, 245 U.S. 639 (1919).
17white, pp. 53-54.
18u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p. 5.
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Puerto Ricans for the reform of the Foraker Act in the direction of
more self-government had been the main reason for the passage of an
entirely new organic act.

The reforms desired by the American adminis-

trators of Puerto Rico could have been made by amending the Foraker Act
and passing a citizenship bill.

To include self-government reforms,

t

l

which were demanded on the island, it was easier to draft a new govern-

f

ment bill.
The most important demand of the islanders for reform of the
Foraker Act was that for an elected upper legislative house.

Section

26 of the Jones Act provided that the nineteen members of the Senate of
Puerto Rico be elected for four year terms.

Senators had to be over

thirty, literate in either English or Spanish, residents of the island
for at least two years and of their districts for at least one year.
The Senate was a purely legislative body, but it was empowered to approve the appointments made by the governor.

The House of Representa-

tives was to have thirty-nine members elected every four years.

Repre-

sentatives had to be twenty-five, literate in Spanish or English, and
residents of their districts for one year before election.
either house were eligible for re-election. 19

Members of

Puerto Rico had its en-

tirely elected legislature without the restrictions on the vote which
Governors Colton and Yager had seen as checks against abuse of this increase in self-government.
Colton and Yager had also wanted the island redistricted into
new representative districts.
191bid., pp. 9-10.

This reform was to be a check on election
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abuses and the power of the Union party.
ority party representation.

It was also to assure min-

Section 28 provided that the island be

divided into thirty-five representative districts and seven senatorial
districts.

The old hated Executive Council was to make the division

for the first election under the Jones Act.

The division into dis-

tricts by the Executive Council needed only the approval of the governor to be final.

The legislature of Puerto Rico could, however, re-

vise the boundaries of the districts in the future. 20
The Senate and House of Representatives were empowered by the
Jones Act to be the sole judges of the qualifications, election, and
return of their members.

Sessions of the legislature were to meet

every two years although the governor could call special sessions. 21
Biennial sessions, as Munoz Rivera had argued, did weaken the power
of the Senate to confirm appointments, since the governor's choice
did hold his post until the next session.

The Jones Act included

Shafroth's rather long 1 ist of provisions outlining simple parl iamentary procedure to insure that the Puerto Rican legislature would know
how to pass a bill.

These included the provisos that no law could be

passed except by bill and that a bill should cover only one subject.22
Puerto Rico's legislature had the power to legislate broadly.
It could change or create municipalities and the laws in force in the
island.

The legislature could change or organize courts and their
20tbid.
.
. ' P· 10.
21tbid., P· 11.
221bid., PP• 11-13.

239
jurisdictions, except that of the Federal District Court.

The legis-

lature could not create any new executfve department, but it could
consolidate or abolish departments
of the United States.

~

with the approval of the President

The legfslature could also regulate rates and

servfce of rafl carriers in Puerto Rico.

Other types of public carri-

ers were under the Interstate-Commerce Act of the United States23 because these were predominantly water carriers servicing the mainland
and island.

Puerto Ricans achieved their goals of gaining an elected

Senate and eliminating the Executive Council as a legislative body.
The significance of this step toward self-government was diminished
by the strength of the executive branch created by the Jones Act.
The governor appointed by the President, with the approval of
the United States Senate, continued to head the island's executive.
He was the supervisor of the government, commander of the militia and
could suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
fines and grant pardons or reprieves. 2 4
involved the vetoing of legislation.
ted.

He had the power to remit
His most important powers

The veto procedure was complica-

A bill passed by majority vote of both houses of the legislature

went to the governor who had ten days to consider it.

If he did not

approve a bill, he sent it back to the legislature stating his objectfons,
nor.

Two~thirds

vote of both houses sent the bill back to the gover-

lf the governor still did not wish to sign the bil 1, he sent it

to the President.

The Presfdent had an absolute veto.

23tbid., pp. 15-17,
241bid., pp. 5-6.

If he did not
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approve a bill, it did not become law.

Every law passed in Puerto Rico

still had to be submitted to the Congress which retained the power to
annul any legislation. 25

The Puerto Ricans had opposed an absolute

veto power for the governor,

As Jose de Diego pointed out, however,

the governor still had an absolute veto through the President. 2 6 The
power of the island's legislature was restricted deliberately by the
authority of the American President and Congress to kill their legislation.
The executive branch also consisted of the six heads of the
executive departments.

The attorney general and the Commissioner of

Education were appointed by the President.

The remaining four, for the

departments of Finance, Interior, Agriculture and Labor, and Health,
were appointed by the governor with the approval of the island Senate.27
The Executive Council continued to exist but as an entirely executive
body, functioning as the cabinet of the governor.

Approval by the

elected representatives of the Puerto Ricans of executive appointments
was an important move toward self-government.
The last member of the executive council was the auditor.

Like

the Commissioner of Education and the attorney general, he was appointed
by the President.

Appeal from the decisions of the auditor went to the

governor, from whom there was no appeal.
tures by

~11

The auditor reviewed expendi-

gQvernmental units and agencies in the island.

251btd., p. 12.
26de Diego, Nuevas Campanas, p. 259.
27u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p. 6.

He had

241

ultimate control of Puerto Rico's money and the ways in which it was
spent.
A member of the House of Representatives asked William Jones
why the auditor should be appointed by the President when the intention of the Jones bill was to give Puerto Ricans control over the
management of their affairs.

Jones replied that the bill was not in-

tended to give the islanders full control over their domestic affairs.
"It is intended," he said, "to give them the fullest measure of selfgovernment that, in the opinion of the committee, ought to be bestowed
upon them, taking into consideration the interests of the United
States. 112 9 The islanders would be given no control over the auditor
because that official was the supervisor of the revenues.
Some retention of control in crucial areas in American hands was
a major feature of the Jones Act.

The Commissioner of Education and

the attorney general were to be chosen by the President because their
areas of control would be important for Americanization.

The auditor

was to be appointed by the President because the administrators of
Puerto Rico did not wish the self-government of the islanders to be
extended to exclude American supervision of revenues.
as

well~

In other areas

the Jones Act carefully restricted the islanders' control over

their money.
The

isl~nd

of Puerto Rico and its municipalities were restricted

as to the amount of debt they could incur.
2 8 I b id . , p .

No public indebtedness over

8•

29u.s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., lst sess., 53:8458.
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seven percent of the value of the property of the municipality or island was permitted,30

Restrictions on the amount of debt that a gov-

ernmental unit could incur were usual practice in the United States.
There, however, the people of the State, Town, or County set their
own limitations.
A more serious curtailment of Puerto Rican control of finances
was found in the provisions of the Jones Act concerning appropriations.
At the beginning of each biennial session of the legislature, the governor was to submit a budget as the basis of the budget for the next
two years.

After the budget was passed by a majority of both houses,

the governor had the usual review.

In the case of appropriations, he

could approve parts of a bill but strike those to which he objected.
An appropriations bill then stood with the governor's objections
omitted, without further review by the legislature.

If no appropria-

tions bill was passed by the legislature, previous appropriations for
expenditures were automatically appropriated for the next year.3 1
In the event that the island treasury did not have adequate
funds to cover all appropriations, the Jones Act set out the order in
which expenses were to be paid.

First priority went to the costs of

the government and to interest on the public debt.
tutions of involuntary confinement.

Third was education.

other expenses of the island could be paid,3 2
30u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p. 3.
311bid., p. 14.
321bid.' pp. 11-14.

Second were instiThen the

Congress had not
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forgotten the appropriations crisis of 1909.

The island legislature

had less control of expenditures under the Jones Act than it had under the Foraker Act.
A last feature of the Jones Act relating to self-government
concerns the Public Service Commission.

Under the Foraker Act, the

Executive Council had control of the approval of franchises for publie works, utilities, and transportation.

The new Executive Council

remained a part of the Public Service Commission which had control
of franchises under the Jones Act.

In addition to the six department

heads, the auditor and two elected representatives made up the Commission.33

Munoz Rivera had fought for and won the place on the Commis-

sion for elected officials.

As a result, the islanders had some say

about who six of the nine members of the Public Service Commission
were to be.

Two were elected, and four confirmed by the island Senate.

As this analysis of the self-government aspects of the Jones
Act shows, the amount of self-government granted to the island was
quite 1 imited.

The islanders were not satisfied.

As early as August,

1917, the legislature petitioned President Wilson and Congress for
complete self-government. 34

In the absense of further legislation

by Congress, the islanders tried to enlarge the powers of the legislature,

They were especially concerned with attacking the powerful

governor,

After the hated Executive Council was no longer the upper

331bfd., pp. 15-16.
34petitions to the President and Congress, signed by Antonio
Barcelo and Jose de Diego, 14 August 1917, BIA 26429/53 A & B.
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house of the legislature, the most desired reform was an elected governor,

The great power of the governor was more offensive to Puerto

Ricans because the governors were always North Americans.

Only in

1946, just before the island began to elect its governor, was a Puerto
Rican appointed by the President to govern Puerto Rico.
Fiscal Provisions
There was one area concerning which islanders and mainlanders
agreed that the Foraker Act had been just and wise.

That area was

the fiscial provisions that reserved the income of the island's government entirely for its own use.
panded by the Jones Act.

This pol icy was continued and ex-

Both Governor Yager and General Mcintyre

had asked Congress to turn over to the island government all revenues
on the island's products collected in the United States.

These reven-

ues, almost entirely on cigars and cigarettes, would add approximately
$500,000 to the island's income.35

Section 9 of the Jones Act applied

the statutory laws of the United States to Puerto Rico with the exception of the internal revenue laws, as the Foraker Act had done.

In

addition, the Jones Act provided that the taxes collected in the United States under its internal revenue laws on the products of Puerto
Rico revert to the island's treasury.36
The island legislature could not impose duties on its exports.
lt could, however, enact property taxes, internal revenue taxes,
35u.s., Congress, Hearings, on H.R. 8501, 1916, pp. 18, 28.
36u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p. 5.
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license fees, and royalties to support its government.37

Puerto Rico

had to pay the salaries and expenses of its government and improvements, except that the United States would pay the costs of harbors,
buoys, 1 ighthouses, barracks, and defense works.3 8

All of the prop-

erty that passed to the United States government from the Spanish
crown was returned to the people of Puerto Rico and the control of
its legislature, with the exception of previously reserved properties necessary for public purposes under United States contro1.39
The treasury of the United States would pay the $7,500 annual salary
of the Resident Commissioner who would also receive the franking privilege, stationary allowance, and paid clerk that members of the House
of Representatives received.40

All of the expenses of the Federal

District Court, including the salaries of the judge, district attorney,
and marshal, would be paid by the United States rather than the island.
The income of this court in fines, fees, etc., would go to the Treasury
of the United States.41

It was,

think, wise that Puerto Ricans not

be asked to pay for a court that they despised because it served the
special interests of the Americans.
sions appear to be quite generous.
37tbid., p~ 3.
38 Ibid" p, 4.
39tbid.
40 I b i d • , p. 1 5.
4t Ibid. , pp. 17-18.

The rest of these fiscal

provi~.
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General Mcintyre had drafted the proposed bill that became the
Jones Act with a definite goal of cutting expenses.

A tentative com-

parison of costs between the Foraker and Jones Acts was given to Representative Jones in 1916.

It estimated that the costs of elections

and salaries under the Foraker Act had totalled $176,965.76 per year.
The Jones Act estimate was $120,951 .02.

A savings of $56,000 per

year would come with the Jones Act despite the fact that the salaries
of the governor, department heads, and other officials were all raised
by the Jones Act.42

This was possible because the costs of elections

were halved by making them every four years instead of every two.
Also the approximately $42,000 annual expenditure for the Federal District Court would no longer be borne by the island treasury.
After the passage of the Jones Act, the Union and Republican
parties argued about the costs of government under the Jones and Foraker Acts.
economical.
ly.

The Union party thought that the Jones Act would be more
The Republican party believed the Foraker Act less cost-

A comparison of actual costs of government, including more than

just elections and salaries, showed the Union party to be correct.
The expenses of government under the Foraker Act had been $255,670
annually.

Under the Jones Act, $204,030 was spent.

roughly $51 1 000 per year,43

The savings was

In the War Department estimate and in

pract(ce the Jones Act !\aved about $50 1 000 a year.

Since the two

42war Department Memorandum 1 2 March 1916, Jones Papers, Box
43Muniz, p. 157 ..
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comparisons are so similar in results, the savings can be attributed
to the less frequent elections and the fact that Puerto Rico no longer
had to pay for the Federal District Court.

The court alone accounted

for the bulk of the savings.
The Americanization provisions of the Jones Act included features that extended citizenship and American privileges and reforms
to the Puerto Ricans.

They also included the imposition of prohib-

ition which was hardly a major benefit to an island whose economy
was dominated by sugar cane.

Congress insured their goal of Ameri-

canization by retaining an American court and American control of
education in the island.
Act were a compromise.

The self-government reforms of the Jones
Congress granted increased self-government

and participation in government to the islanders.

At the same time,

Puerto Ricans were given only as much self-government as American
congressmen and administrators thought was good for them.

The Jones

Act was intended to reform the island's government by acknowledging
the demands and the seventeen years of improving governmental competency of the Puerto Ricans.

It was also intended to safeguard the

interests of the United States from too much self-government by retainfng American control of certain important matters as well as
keeping the ultimate authority over the island in the hands of the
United States

Congress~

Although the United States government ex ..

pected to retqin control of Puerto Ricer the fiscal provisions of
the Jones Act indicate that ft djd not intend to profit monetarily
from the relationship.

American trade balances, businessmen, and

f
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investors were profiting enough,
Interpretations
Whatever the shortcomings of the Jones Act, it is generally
acknowledged as an improvement over the Foraker Act, and it was so
regarded by the islanders.

The followers of Barbosa and Iglesias

had always wanted United States citizenship.

As Ju_dge Hamilton noted,

the Union party accepted the Jones Act as a step toward further reform.

In addition, they regarded the Jones Act as the special a-

chievement of their late leader, Luis Munoz Rivera.44

Munoz' death

had helped to consecrate the legislation he had worked so long and
so hard to see.

The Puerto Rican House of Delegates conferred honors

on Woodrow Wilson, William A. Jones, Senator Shafroth, General Mcintyre, and Governor Yager in celebration of the Jones Act. 45

Responses

such as the flood of voluntary enlistments in the American Armed Forces and the popular ratification of prohibition could not have been
expected if the Puerto Ricans in 1917 had been unhappy about the
Jones Act,
Jose de Diego was an exception.
Jones Act as imperialistic,46
and th.e grant of Uni:ted

St~tes

He had always regarded the

Jose Coll y Cuchi saw the Jones Act
citizenship as

Cl

utilitarian instru-

ment of th.e United State$ that deprived the Puerto Ricans of higher
44HC!roi,lton to Wilson~ 21 February 1917 1 Wilson Papers.
45Muniz, p~ 158,
46de Diego, Nuevas Campanas, pp. 246ff,

249
goals.47

Enamorado Cuesta regarded President Wilson as an agressor

throughout Latin America, who give United States citizenship only to
gain soldiers and to end Puerto Rican hopes for liberty.48

Silen,

who belongs to a present day group of nationalists who aspire to
follow the path of Cuba, sees the Jones Act as removing the last obstacle to American economic penetration of the island.49

These four

men were nationalist polemicists of different eras.
More moderate Puerto Rican writers are less critical of the
Jones Act.

Pedro Capo-Rodriguez stated that the Puerto Ricans were

loyal to their fellow citizens regardless of their goals for the future.

The Puerto Ricans had learned much through their relationship

with the United States but were ready for
ty belonging to us

as a people. 11 50

11

the full measure of liber-

Luis Munoz Marin, promoter of

the Associated Free State ideal and, like his father, a consummate
politician and perennial caudillo of Puerto Rico, praised the friendship of the United States and his island.

He saw the grant of United

States citizenship as a unique example of the extension of this privilege to an entire people.

The role of the United States in Puerto

Rico and the Philippines had been to test the flexibility of the
American Constitution,5 1 Antonio Fernos-lsern, apolitical follower
47coll y Cuchi, p. 11,
48

Enarorado,

.

p~

234,

49s i 1en, p. 58.
50capo-Rodriguez, p. 5.
51Muiioz Marin, Puerto Rico, p. 104
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of Munoz Marin and Resident Commissioner at one time, saw the Jones
Act as giving limited relief to Puerto Rfcan grievances, but it remained a mere organic act with Congress the benevolent sovereign of
Puerto Rico.5 2

Few Puerto Ricans ever regarded the Jones Act as the

embodiment of their aspirations.
issue remained unsettled.

Nor could they do so.

The status

Puerto Ricans wanted statehood, independ-

ence, or complete self-government.

Delores Muniz, whose disserta-

tion reflects a Union party slant due to heavy reliance on La Democracia as a source, correctly concludes that the Jones Act was accepted, although it did not satisfy Puerto Rican aspirations, until such
time as the status issue would be decided.53
An interpretation of the Jones Act coming closest to that of
the Puerto Rican nationalists is that of Gordon Lewis.

He criticized

the Jones Act for imposing a separation of powers designed to encourage fights rather than cooperation between the legislature and the
executive.54

Lewis' view of the relationship between the island and

the United States is not so much pro-Puerto Rican as it is critical
of American injustice.

A view opposite is presented by Trumball White.

His rather superficial study of Puerto Rico refuses to see Puerto Rican discontent or its causes,

His view of the Jones Act was simply

that {t was "infinitely more 1 iberal" than was the Spanish Autonomous
5 2 fern5s-tsern~ p, 20,

53Mun{z, pp, 142-143,
54Lewis, p. 108.
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Charter,55 a debatable point.
Victor Clark noted that both houses of the Puerto Rican legislature were elected by the same people at the same time.

Thus, they

represented the same interests which Clark seems to criticize because
the United States Congress was designed to represent different interests.56

Thomas Aitken, in his uncritical biography of Munoz Marin,

points out a more important defect in the Jones Act.

The legislature

was made responsible to the Puerto Rican voters while the executive
was responsible to Washington.
discontent.57

This system quaranteed dispute and

Leland Jenk 1 s brief but penetrating study continually

impresses with the quality of its analysis.

He states that the Ameri-

can bond had resulted in a lengthening of political infancy for the
Puerto Ricans, who were made distinctly second-class citizens, unless
they resided on the mainland.

He characterized the government estab-

1 ished by the Jones Act as one of "divided responsibility. 1158
Rexford Tugwell, who was Frankl in D. Roosevelt's well-intentioned Good-Neighbor governor, simply stated some important political
truths.

Congress delayed legislation for Puerto Rico primarily be-

cause time spent on such bills was of no political value.

The pre-

dominating attitude toward Puerto Rico was one of indifference.
55Whi'te 1 p. 41,
56c1~rk, p. 109,

57Attkeni p, 61.
58Jenks, pp. 150~152,

The
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grant of Unfted States citfzenship in the Jones act was, to Tugwell,
not a part of any pol fey, but the result of a vision of the strategic
possibilities at a time when the loyalty of the islanders was important.59

Tugwe11 1 s view is persuasive, except that I see the grant

of citizenship as a part of the decision to keep Puerto Rico.

That

decision had been made by many, including Woodrow Wilson, before the
outbreak of World War I.
The major flaw in the Jones Act as a governmental system was
that noted by Aitken and Jenks.

The compromise between autonomous

reform and American control created a political ambient almost as
uncooperative as that of the Foraker Act.

Puerto Rican desire for

complete self-government could not, however, have been successfully
compromised with American opinion that the Puerto Ricans were not to
be trusted with it.

Only after thirty-five years of dispute and of

growth would the islanders be granted the degree of self-government
they had ardently sought long before the United States Army landed
fn Puerto Rico.

59Tu gwe 1 I , pp. 70.;,71 ,

CHAPTER V1. I I
CONCLUSION
The Puerto Ricans had been fighting for self-government since
the

mid~nineteenth

century.

Their success in obtaining the Autono-

mous Charter from Spain, however, only served to make the form of government imposed by the United States Congress in the Foraker Act less
acceptable.

The Foraker Act denied citizenship and the United States

Constitution to Puerto Rico because the Congress had a precedent for
the Philippines in mind when the bill was passed.

That was not, how-

ever, why the civil government features of the Foraker Act were so
ungenerous.

The bill was drafted and passed swiftly by men who had

1 ittle knowledge of the Puerto Ricans and less confidence in the islanders' ability to govern themselves.
crucial issue in Puerto

Rican~American

Self-government became the
relations between 1900 and

1917,
There were many factors that contributed to the American opinion that the Puerto IUcans were not ready for self-government.
ci.a l prejudice was one factor.

Ra-

Even those Americans who seemed sym-

pathetic towqrd the islanders often exhibited patronizing and pater ..
nal fstic attftudes,
Americans.

Puerto Ricans were regarded as inferior to North

The ethnic factor of American prejudice included cultural
253
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as well as racial ingredients.

The islanders were predominantly Roman

Catholic, and anti-Catholic prejudice fortified the anti-Black and
anti-Latin American sentiments held by many Americans.
ever, was a less important issue than was language.
the Puerto Ricans could not speak English.

Religion, how-

The majority of

American pol icy makers

did not share the islanders' concern for the preservation of Spanish.
Most Puerto Ricans were illiterate.

American educational tradition

had long stressed the idea that education was necessary for good citizenship,

In short, the island with its dense homogeneous population

could not be assimilated easily into the United States.

Since assimi-

lation would be so difficult, Americans could not see how their traditional rights and privileges of self-government could be given to a
people so unlike themselves.

Previous territorial expansion by the

United States had proceeded with new areas being assimilated and then
given statehood.

This pattern seemed inappropriate for Puerto Rico.

During the nineteenth-century struggle for autonomy within the
Spanish Empire, Puerto Rico developed political traditions that were
carried over into the American era.

These traditions further convinced

Americans that Puerto Rico was not prepared for citizenship and selfgovernment,

The pol itlcal parties and the press in Puerto Rico were

bitterly factional,

They

domf'nate every issue,

~eemed

to allow pol ftfcal considerations to

As a consequence, Americans could attribute

Puerto Rican discontent and aspfratfons for
pol ftfcal motfves,

self~government

to purely

The pol jtfcal parties in the island aroused fierce

loyalties that occasionally inspired violence,

These loyalties were
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built upon the personal ism and bossism that characterized Puerto Rican
political life.

The existence of manhood suffrage, when the majority

of the voters were ill iterate and dispossessed, accentuated the problem of bossism.

United States congressional leaders and administra-

tors regarded many Puerto Rican politicians as mere office-seekers or
as irresponsible and ungrateful.

The domination of the Union party,

whose members included the prominent and wealthy, strengthened the
conviction of some observers that the island's political leaders had
no concern for the welfare of the majority of the people.
The American assumption of their own superiority, coupled with
the valid criticisms of Puerto Rican politics contributed to the slowness of many to see that the grievances of the islanders were also
val id.

Agitation and petitions from Puerto Ricans tended to receive

a hostile reception.

They could cause a retardation of any impetus

to reform instead of directing reform in accordance with the wishes
of the islanders.

The persistent petitions of the islanders became,

however, a primary reason for the enactment of an entirely new organic
act to replace the Foraker Act.

When reform of the political system

created by the Foraker Act was contemplated, American officials planned
a new government bill that would acquiesce in the major demands of the
islanders for

self~government,

At the same time, they carefully built

into reform proposals measures such as the veto of the governor and
1 fmitations on the right to vote\

The intention of these measures

was to protect the interests of the United States against any possible
abuse of the increased self-government granted to the Puerto Ricans.
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Originally the United States had no firm pol icy as to the future of Puerto Rico.

Uncertainty gradually changed to a general un-

derstanding that the United States would keep the island.

Puerto Ri-

co would remain a possession of the United States for the same reason
that motivated American intervention in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.

That reason was the Panama Canal.

Puerto Rico con-

trolled the Mona Straights, one of the two major lanes of access to
the Caribbean from the Atlantic.
The decision to retain Puerto Rico as a part of increased United States involvement in the Caribbean due to the acquisition of the
Panama Canal implied an obligation to grant United States citizenship
to the Puerto Ricans.

Citizenship, however, logically meant that the

islanders would receive the same rights and privileges of self-government other Americans had.

The decision to hold Puerto Rico had not

also implied American confidence in the ability of the islanders to
govern themselves.

Officials of the United States regarded their

governmental system in Puerto Rico as training for further self-government which they hesitated to grant too quickly.

The unassimilated

island could not become Americanized soon enough to avoid the dilemma
of a colonial ism incompatible with both the traditions of the United
States and the aspirat{ons of the Puerto Ricans.
Puerto Rican response to their treatment by the United States
varied,

Some political leaders never stopped agitating for citizen-

ship and statehood.

Others turned to hopes for independence in re-

action to American chauvinism and the realization that autonomy in
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any meaningful degree was not forthcoming.

The terms of the Olmsted

bill and the Jones Act did not fulfill the islanders' aspirations.
Disenchantment with the Americans continued to grow in Puerto Rico.
American insistence that the island Americanize its language and institutions before receiving citizenship and self-government contributed
to the Puerto Rican determination to defend their hispanic heritage.
The influence of the sugar interests and the general_ growth of United
States economic control of the island, together with institutions such
as the Federal District Court, helped to convince islanders that the
interests of the United States, not their own, were determining the
policies of the administration of Puerto Rico.

The islanders' dislike

for the Executive Council, the Federal District Court, and the teachers,
administrators, and missionaries as agents of Americanization was tied
to the wounded pride of the Puerto Rican.

He found himself regarded

as an inferior unable to determine his own destiny or that of his homeland.

Demands for self-government for Puerto Rico grew in volume and

intensity as time passed and the aspirations of the islanders remained
frustrated.
The appropriations crisis of 1909 represented the beginning of
the road to the Jones A.ct, just as it was the first successful attempt
by th_e islanders to obstruct the governmental system established by
the fornker Act,

The. island received unusual attention from the Presi-

dent, Congress, and mainland press,

President Taft stifled the appro-

priations avenue of protest against the system of the Foraker Act.
At the same time, Taft promised to look fnto the need for reform of
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that system.

The Taft administration reform bill, the Olmsted bill,

did not in fact represent any substantial increase in self-government
for Puerto Rico.

tts death in the U. S. Senate was aided both by the

sugar interests of Puerto Rico and by the opposition of the Puerto Rican political leaders.

The Jones citizenship bill was the next Puerto

Rican reform measure to die in the Senate, this time primarily because
of the relative unimportance of the island in the thinking of the busy
Senators.

Both the Olmsted and Jones citizenship bills passed the

House of Representatives with remarkable ease.

The Jones government

bill would have a slower transit through the House.
The successful passage of a reform government bill for Puerto
Rico can be seen as a part of the whole reform movement in United
States history that took hold during Woodrow Wilson's first term as
President.

Wilson's administration was committed to reform for Puerto

Rico because of Democratic opposition to the Foraker Act, a Republican
measure.

By 1913, however, Democrats had dropped their anti-imperial-

ist campaign to the extent that Wilson stated that Puerto Rico would
remain a possession of the United States.

Despite General Mcintyre's

initial draft of the administration government bill that did not confer United States citizenship, citizenship would have to be included
fn

~ny

tial [n
be

reform bil I for Puerto Rico.
~government

g~~ned

A grant of citizenship was essen-

bill both because Jess support or fnterest could

in the Congress without a citizenship provision and because

the decfs(on to hold Puerto Rico demanded the simple justice of an
extension of cftizenship to the islanders,

fn addition, it was felt
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that a grant of citizenship would gratify the Puerto Ricans and end
agitatton and dissatisfaction in the island.

Puerto Rican sentiments

opposed to American cftizenship were simply overruled by the United
States because citizenship was the crucial bond between the mainland
and the island.
The Jones government bill, prepared by Mcintyre and Yager in
the main, with modifications by Jones, Wilson, and Munoz Rivera, did
represent a real advance in the amount of self-government alloted to
Puerto Rico.

The Executive Council, as the upper house of the island

legislature, had been the most hated feature of the Foraker Act governmental system.

This was because the Executive Council was domina-

ted by Americans and because it could and did prevent the enactment
of legislation desired by the elected representatives of the Puerto
Rican people.

The Jones Act replaced the Executive Council with an

entirely elected legislature for Puerto Rico.

Restrictions on the

competence of the island legislature and the powerful executive branch
of the government of the Jones Act partly nullified the success of
the Puerto Ricans in gaining an entirely elected legislature.
The Jones bill spent three years in the House of Representat{ves before it was passed in May 1916.

This delay was due to the

overwhelroing i_mportance of reform of the tariff in 1913.

In 1914

and 19J5 delay was due to Representat{ve Jones• Jllness and greater
i'nterest i_n his bill for the Phil(ppines ..

The Congress was still

very busy wi·th the reform Jegfslation of the Wilson era,

World War

and the preparedness controversy absorbed the attention of Washington.

---~.--~-
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President Wilson had always wanted the Jones bill passed when time
permitted.
early 1914.

He had clearly intended that the bill be enacted from
Only when he gave the Jones bill priority did the Con-

gress overcome its general indifference to Puerto Rico and pass the
Jones bi 11 into law.
Passage in the Senate was complicated by several issues.

Pro-

hibition was imposed upon Puerto Rico, incongruous though it was in
a government bill,

Land-1 imitation amendments threatened to cause

the opposition of the sugar interests of Puerto Rico to the Jones
bill.

The most difficult problem for Senator Shafroth in gaining

passage of the bill, however, was to gather enough interest in the
bill to get it out of committee and then considered on the floor of
the Senate.

The Senate disagreed with the House of Representatives

that 1 imitations on the right to vote should accompany a bill increasing self-government or that property qualifications for office
or the franchise were appropriate.

The Jones Act differed from the

Olmsted bill and the Jones citizenship bill in that it passed the
Senate in less time than the House.

In addition, it was in the Sen-

ate, and not the House, that the democratic tendencies of the Jones
Act were broadened,
After seventeen years of discontent with the Foraker Act, the
is;] anders seemed pl eased with the passage of the Jones Act.

Few

Puerto Rlcans chose to renounce citizenship, although to have done
so would have deprived them of their civil rights.

The Jones Act

did eliminate the Executive Council and replace it with an entirely

I
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elected Senate.

In the Jones Act 1 however, the executive branch of

the government remained powerful.
marily of Americans.

This power was in the hands pri-

The struggle of the Puerto Ricans for self-gov-

ernment continued after 1917.

Their next goal was the right to elect

their own governor 1 and 1 thereby, to gain control of the powerful
executfve created by the Jones Act.
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